Problems of Communism

JULY-AUGUST 1972



MOSCOW'S OPTIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD

Vernon V. Aspaturian

The USSR and Pollution—Keith Bush
Soviet Party History—Sidney I. Ploss
Bulgaria under Zhivkov—F. Stephen Larrabee
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Moscow's Options in a Changing World

By Vernon V. Aspaturian

During the past four years there has been a dramatic transformation in the fortunes of Soviet foreign policy and a remarkable revitalization of Soviet decisiveness and self-assurance in foreign affairs. The Soviet leadership appears to have overcome much of its previous feelings of inferiority and inadequacy in facing up to the manifold issues that confronted it both as a global power and as the leader of an ecumenical revolutionary movement. Only in dealing with the Chinese do the Soviet leaders fail to exude the self-confidence they have acquired over the past four years and instead continue to betray signs of irresolution, uncertainty of purpose, and indecisiveness. There are good explanations for these distinctive Soviet postures in dealing with the West and with China, just as there was considerable warrant for the irresolution and demoralization that characterized the Soviet leadership in foreign affairs between 1961 and 1968.

The Period of Defeatism, 1961-68

Before 1968, the Soviet leadership was divided, hesitant, and confused about its direction in foreign policy. On the global level, its ambitions were blocked by the United States; within its own Communist world, it was challenged by the Chinese, and its East European empire appeared to be in the throes of dissolution as individual countries responded favorably to the seductive siren calls of the Johnson administration's "bridge-building" policy and the Erhard-Kiesinger brand of West German *Ostpolitik*. The Soviet leadership, sitting in Moscow, seemed gripped by paralysis as Czechoslovakia under Dubcek appeared to be slipping out of the Communist community. But the Czechoslovak Spring was only the latest in a succession of minor and major disasters in Soviet foreign policy since the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Although the Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of July 1963 had stabilized Soviet-American relations, the embryonic condominium that it established worked clearly to the advantage of the United States, the most powerful of the dyarchs. The Soviet position in world affairs, instead of being enhanced by the Khrushchev detente, was diminished to that of a tired, worn-out revolutionary power content with permanent status as "Number 2," while the United States was left free to flex its diplomatic and military muscles all over the world and to undermine the Soviet position in Eastern Europe with subtle policies of "bridge-building" and "peaceful engagement." Although the Johnson administration faithfully refrained from aggressive and overtly hostile moves against the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, its selective enticement of individual Communist states proved to be a device against which the unimaginative Soviet leaders had no defense except military intervention to arrest the growing forces of autonomy. Furthermore, China had been progressively transformed from an alienated ally into a hostile and threatening neighbor, the world Communist movement was fractured and demoralized, and the national liberation movement was deprived of its protective umbrella.

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Confident of its superior power and relying on a prudent Soviet Union to refrain from any action that might endanger Soviet-American collaboration, the United States in 1965 massively escalated the war in Vietnam against Moscow's North Vietnamese ally and landed Marines in the Dominican Republic to regime. Furthermore, not only in Moscow but also in prevent the establishment of a revolutionary-minded Belgrade, Cairo, and elsewhere, particularly after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the impression that the Johnson administration had been using the detente not to preserve international stability but to mount a cleverly conceived political offensive against Soviet and radical nationalist positions all over the world achieved widespread acceptance. The Dominican affair, the ousters of President Sukarno in Indonesia and of João Goulart in Brazil, the fall of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, the overthrow of Mohammed Ben Bella in Algeria, the Greek military takeover, and finally the Israeli attack upon Egypt appeared to many in Moscow as part of an overall United States design. Gamal Abdul Nasser openly complained in Cairo that the chief danger to peace and progress was the absence of any force that could deter or contain the United States, while the Italian Communist journal *Rinascita* flatly claimed that the Johnson administration was pursuing a cleverly concealed "rollback" policy:

For the policy of the status quo *and the attempts to divide the world into zones of influence between the two superpowers, US imperialism is gradually substituting a revised and corrected re-edition of the old policy of* rollback, *giving birth, within the framework of nuclear coexistence with the USSR (caused by reasons of* force majeure*), to a series of local interventions (economic, political, military) designed to modify the world equilibrium by means of setting up reactionary regimes, or by support given to them, and by liquidating the progressive forces and movements in individual countries.*[1]

Only in the Middle East, where Khrushchev's successors embarked upon a bold effort to develop a Soviet sphere of interest in the Eastern Mediterranean through the transformation of Egypt into a client-state, did it appear that the new leaders were making headway. But this effort also culminated in a debacle of substantial magnitude as the tremendous Soviet investment in Egypt was incinerated by Israel in the lightning six-day war of June 1967. The defeat of Moscow's Arab client-states was a humiliating and sobering experience, and it perhaps convinced the Soviet leaders that unless they altered their behavior, they might sink in the morass of defeatism.

The generally defeatist, hesitant, and vacillating mood of the Soviet leadership continued to manifest itself for over a year as Moscow helplessly watched developments in Czechoslovakia (and to a lesser extent in Romania) approach a climax that could prove catastrophic for the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders opted at this stage to adapt and adjust to the developing situation in Czechoslovakia, not only out of a sense of responsibility and prudence but also out of fear of the consequences of forcible Soviet intervention, particularly if it were to fail.

Revival of Self-Confidence

But in the meantime there had been several developments that impelled the Soviet leaders to risk a reversal of their previous pattern of behavior and to act more militantly. First of all, the gap in strategic capabilities between the Soviet Union and the United States had narrowed considerably, thus diminishing the risk of American counteraction. Secondly, the United States itself was gripped by domestic turmoil that caused President Johnson not to seek a second term, which meant that the United States would be temporarily governed by a lame-duck President less likely to act vigorously in countering Moscow. Third, the US President was psychologically vulnerable because he was anxious to cap his political career by making a state visit to Moscow and was therefore predisposed not to react in a way that might result in the cancellation of his prospective trip. And fourth, the Chinese leadership was involved in a debilitating internal power struggle that deprived it, too, of the capacity to react effectively.

Whereas the Israeli defeat of Egypt in 1967 had had a traumatic impact in Moscow, the successful outcome of the decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia seems to have had an electrifying effect upon the Soviet leaders. Since that time, they have appeared more decisive, self-assured, and confident in the correctness of their judgments. The regime has been considerably strengthened, and although Brezhnev still has his critics and detractors, his position in the leadership has been conspicuously enhanced. The most immediate manifestation of this new self-confidence was the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine

[1] *Rinascita* (Rome), Aug. 4, 1967.

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wherein Moscow announced in advance that the Soviet Union would no longer tolerate any internal or external challenge to its authority and hegemony in Eastern Europe.[2]

The reassertion of Soviet self-confidence has produced dramatic results in the form of a string of successes in foreign policy since the Czechoslovak occupation, and this has continued to reinforce Soviet self-assurance. The most important practical results have been the reversal by the Brandt government of the Erhard-Kiesinger *Ospolitik* and the halting of the Western policy of "bridge-building" to Eastern Europe with the formal acceptance by the Western powers of the post-World War II East European status quo.[3] Juridically this has been expressed in the two treaties concluded by West Germany with Poland and the Soviet Union, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin signed on September 3, 1971, Bonn's instrument of adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and other related documents.

Although the original reach of the Brezhnev Doctrine has been contracted somewhat to exclude Yugoslavia, the Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe has been largely stabilized, with the defiance of Romania considerably muted. The reassertion of Soviet confidence may also have been instrumental in impelling the Soviet Union to confront the Chinese militarily on the Ussuri in early 1969—a confrontation which seemingly achieved its immediate aim of frightening the Chinese, but was also instrumental in persuading the Chinese to mend their fences with the United States. Just as the China problem has been an important stimulus to the USSR to reach agreements in the West, the Soviet problem has impelled China to move toward the West as well, given favorable circumstances. To this degree, the Soviet reassertion of confidence may have set in motion patterns of realignment that will have long-range implications.

The revival of Soviet self-confidence has left its imprint not only in Central and Eastern Europe but also in other parts of the world where the Soviet Union has undertaken the commitments of a global power. The decisive nature of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia and its salutary impact (from the Soviet point of view) on West Germany, the United States and NATO, and others, aroused expectations —on the part of Moscow's non-Communist client-states—of more credible Soviet commitments, and these expectations were reciprocated by Soviet willingness to give these commitments formal juridical expression. Thus, during the past year, the Soviet Union has signed no less than three "Treaties of Peace, Friendship and Mutual Assistance" with non-Communist states: Egypt, India and Iraq, in that order. While these treaties are not formal treaties of alliance, they can only be defined as proto-military alliances, since a common feature is that their provisions are so devised that the stronger party can, if it wishes, come to the assistance of the weaker in accordance with the articles dealing with "mutual consultations" and "appropriate effective measures" in the event of attack or threat of attack. Furthermore, each of these new Soviet treaty partners is the beneficiary of increased Soviet military and economic assistance. In short, the treaties convert all three countries into *de jure* client-states and *de facto* protectorates of the Soviet Union.[4]

[2] For a discussion of the broad implications of the Brezhnev Doctrine, see the author's *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1971.

[3] For further elaboration see the author's "Soviet Aims in East Europe," *Current History* (Philadelphia), October 1970.

[4] Full texts of the treaties with Egypt and India can be found, respectively, in *Pravda* (Moscow), May 28, 1971 and *Izvestia* (Moscow), Aug. 10, 1971. The chief distinction between the two treaties is that the Egyptian treaty contains provisions relating to "cooperation in the military field." Article 8 reads: "Such cooperation will provide, in particular, for assistance in the training of UAR military personnel and in mastering the armaments and equipment delivered to the United Arab Republic for the purpose of increasing its capabilty for eliminating the consequences of aggression, as well as for increasing its ability to withstand aggression in general." There is no counterpart to this article in the treaty with India. Otherwise, the two treaties share the following significant provisions: Each party pledges not to enter or participate in military alliances directed against the other, or to allow its territory to be used militarily by another party attacking the other; each pledges to refrain from giving assistance to a third party involved in armed conflict with the other; in the event of attack or threat of attack upon one of the parties, mutual consultations are provided for to deal with it; and finally, each side pledges not to make commitments to third states incompatible with the treaty and declares that no existing commitments to third parties are incompatible with the treaty. Significantly, however, the treaty with India covers secret as well as open commitments to third parties, reaffirms India's "policy of nonalignment," and also includes the specific phrase "will not make any commitments that may be militarily detrimental to the other side," whereas none of these provisos is in the treaty with the UAR.

The most recent of the three treaties, that with Iraq (full text published in *Pravda*, April 10, 1972), embodies some noteworthy variations from the treaty with Egypt. Art. 2 of the Egyptian treaty defines the UAR as a state "which has set as its goal the socialist reconstruction of society," whereas socialism is not mentioned in the Iraqi treaty; on the other hand, Art. 4 of the latter pledges "a steadfast struggle against imperialism and Zionism," whereas Zionism is not mentioned in the UAR treaty. The most notable difference, however, is in the military provisions, which are more precise and elaborate in the Egyptian treaty than in the treaty with Iraq. In contrast to the detailed provisions of Art. 8 of the UAR treaty, already quoted above, Art. 9 of the Iraqi treaty merely states that both parties "will continue to develop cooperation in strengthening their defense capabilities."

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The treaty with India, moreover, effectively eviscerates the legal remains of the Sino-Soviet military alliance in the event of a Sino-Indian war. Indeed, during the Indo-Pakistan war of late 1971 it was revealed that the Soviet Union engaged in "appropriate effective measures" to deter the Chinese from supplying material assistance to Pakistan, including the discreet movement of Soviet troops along the Chinese border. Conversely, the treaty formally involves India in the Soviet encirclement and containment of China, a matter which will be discussed later in another connection.

The Shifting Strategic Balance

What accounts for this resurgence of self-confidence in the Soviet leadership, and how will it affect future Soviet behavior in world affairs? The first question is easier to answer than the second, because the new horizons created for Soviet foreign policy by the factors which have brought about the recrudescence of Soviet self-assurance are many, and the Soviet leaders themselves remain sharply divided as to whether they should use the occasion to exercise self-restraint and magnanimously agree to choices that would reduce international tensions or to opt for policies designed to exploit to the maximum whatever momentary advantage exists.

In any event, the Soviet leaders appear to have become persuaded, soon after their remarkably smooth operation in Czechoslovakia, that the conditions and circumstances that enabled them to act decisively and successfully in that instance were not momentarily fortuitous but represented a condition of flux in the military, political, and psychological balance of power that would continue for some time. The Soviet reappraisal of power trends since 1968 seems to stress three major elements. First of all, it takes cognizance of the extraordinary growth of Soviet strategic and conventional military capabilities, which has brought the armed strength of the USSR up to rough parity with that of the United States.[5] Second, it sees a corresponding decline of the relative strategic power of the United States resulting in part from the costs of the Vietnam war and in part from US volitional restraints on further quantitative armaments expansion. Third, it posits an increasing American infirmity of purpose and weakening of will and commitment brought about by domestic turbulence, by racial and generational conflict, and by the social, ideological, and political polarization that has resulted. What in 1968 appeared to Moscow to be perhaps just a momentary upsurge of public demoralization and disillusionment with the Johnson administration over Vietnam now seems to the Kremlin to have the character of a continuing and more enduring condition.



Soviet warships maneuvering at an unspecified location in the Mediterranean. The extension of Soviet fleet activity into wider areas reflects the shifting global balance of strategic forces.

—TASS photo via UPI cablephoto.

Among other causes of the revival of Soviet self-confidence, one might mention the resurgence of anti-American revolutionary movements, forces and regimes of various hues in the Third World and elsewhere. Although the Soviet reception of such revolutionary movements is mixed because they often represent kaleidoscopic melanges of sectarian and Peking-inspired groupings that at best may be of marginal value to Soviet policy and sometimes may even be counterproductive, the proliferation of these groups is usually accepted by Soviet strategists as further evidence of the disintegration and dissolution of the fabric of bourgeois and feudal societies.

As a consequence of all these factors, there has been a remarkable revitalization of Soviet will and a dramatic expansion of Soviet capabilities. Before World War II, the Soviet leaders possessed the will and were gripped by a fanatic, focalized purpose, but they were bereft of capabilities; after the war they possessed both, but unfortunately for Moscow,

[5] See, for the most recent data, *The Military Balance, 1971-1972*, London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971; and for a trenchant analysis, Walter D. Jacobs, "Soviet Strategic Effectiveness," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), Vol. 26, No. 1, 1972.

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the United States possessed even more of both essential ingredients, with the result that for more than two decades the Soviet Union was compelled to play second fiddle to the United States on the world stage. Today, there is little doubt that the Soviet Union, if it cannot boast a clear or even meaningful superiority, is at least no longer second to the US in strategic weapons capability.[6]

If the old bipolar international system were still functioning, with just two players opposing each other in a dangerous sort of zero-sum game, this development would be cause for grave alarm in an immediate operational sense. But the international system is no longer bipolarized, and power is no longer—if it ever was in its entirety—distributed and redistributed within the context of a zero-sum game. Other powers, particularly China, have assumed a greater importance, and although they are not sufficiently powerful to challenge the two global powers, they are sufficiently influential, individually in some cases and collectively in any event, to seriously alter the balance between the two global giants and thus to function as objective and prescriptive balancing actors.

For this reason, while most members of the world community—with only the clear exception of China—are fundamentally interested in a meaningful rapprochement or detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, they share with the Chinese an opposition to any arrangement that would be tantamount to a condominium or dyarchy, with or without a division of the globe into spheres of influence. Today, at least three secondary power centers (Japan, China, Western Europe) and possibly India are too powerful to be subordinated or assimilated into a sphere of influence of the global powers. The United States and the Soviet Union individually still remain in a distinct class by themselves in terms of power magnitude—possessing together perhaps 90 percent of effective operational strategic power in the international community—and could conceivably impose solutions upon the rest of the world if they were able to act in concert and with a unified will. Such a true dyarchy, however, no longer seems possible, and any attempt by the two global powers to impose solutions on the secondary power centers, increasingly sensitive and alert to any such tendency, could be expected to meet with more intensive and extensive defiance and incur higher costs than previously.

[6] While the Soviet leadership shows an awareness of this new state of affairs, Soviet military writers continue to stress the expansion of US strategic capabilities. For a recent example, see Col. V. Kharich, "The Strategic Arms Race in the USA: Reliance on Nuclear Might," *Krasnaia zvezda* (Moscow), July 16, 1971.

Internal Debate on Global Strategy

These fortuitous changes in the strategic balance create both opportunities and risks for the Soviet leaders. They provide Moscow with a wider range of options, including some that would stabilize the existing situation and reduce international tensions as well as others that would expand Soviet power and influence at the risk of generating greater tensions and dangers. As in the past, these choices can be expected to divide the Soviet leadership, but whereas before 1968 the divisions reflected a condition of relative Soviet strategic inferiority, since 1968 they have revolved around options created by the growth of Soviet power and the contraction of American global commitments. The Kremlin's choices, however, are complicated by the fact that Chinese power has also grown qualitatively during this period. The Soviet Union, unlike the United States, now finds itself vulnerable to nuclear devastation from two directions, and some Soviet leaders tend to see the problem as one of how to take advantage of the new strategic balance while China is still relatively weak. For the Chinese, on the other hand, the question is how to postpone a showdown with the USSR while they are still weak. The immediate resolutions of these interlocking sets of problems have apparently been separate decisions by Moscow and Peking to reduce tensions with the United States. These decisions suggest that both Communist powers no longer see the United States as posing an immediate threat to themselves—or rather that each of them views the other as a greater threat to its own interests than the United States.

The evidence is strong that elements in both the Chinese and Soviet leaderships perceive the lessening threat from the US as reflecting American decline, although some Soviet commentators warn that the US retreat from globalism, rather than reflecting a crippling of objective potential, is volitional and represents merely a temporary phase of debilitation of will stemming from disappointment and disillusionment over the costs, both domestic and foreign, of trying to police the world. Given the immense industrial and technological capacity of the US, according to this view, the situation could once

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again change very quickly if the American public should become sufficiently aroused to resume the arms race. Hence, there have been powerful voices in and around the Soviet leadership arguing that the time is ripe for a stabilization of the arms race at current levels, since it would provide Moscow with ample "sufficiency" to pursue its aims without provoking fears in America that might refuel demands for an escalation in US capabilities. These voices still recall with concern the consequences of Khrushchev's irresponsible bluffing in the late 1950's which gave rise to the "missile gap" myth in the United States and the consequent spurt in American strategic capabilities.[7]

Furthermore, a detente with the United States, and with NATO generally, would defuse international tensions, stabilize the status quo in Germany to Soviet advantage, reconfirm Western recognition of Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of interest, and open up vast opportunities for expanding trade and commercial relations with the industrial capitalist states. The Soviet leadership is particularly eager to import advanced technology from the United States, especially in the computer realm, and is interested in importing consumer goods which its own economy is unable to deliver in sufficient quantities, as well as entire factory installations. Finally, detente with the United States and the West, in addition to protecting Russia's western flank in the event of a conflict with China, would create the conditions for a shift in economic priorities away from heavy industry and defense to consumer goods, light industry, agriculture, and public services.

The controversy over options in Soviet foreign policy thus merges with the debate over economic priorities. For decades now, the continuing postponement of priorities for the consumer sector has been officially justified in terms of Soviet foreign policy obligations and security considerations. Soviet Premier Kosygin's revelation at the 24th Party Congress that the Soviet military establishment had been absorbing about 25 percent of all funds available for economic development over the preceding five years was tantamount to an accusation that development of the consumer sector of the economy was being frustrated by the terrible appetites of the military, whose chief spokesman at the Congress, Defense Minister Marshal A. A. Grechko, demanded an even larger share of the nation's resources as he continued to emphasize that the United States and NATO were plotting aggressive actions and spending huge sums on armaments in order to dictate to the Soviet Union from "a position of strength." [8]

As Soviet policy has tended to become increasingly oriented toward internal constituencies, various groups, institutions, and personalities have become polarized into two competing constellations: a security-productionist-ideological grouping and a consumptionist-agricultural-public services grouping, which take opposite stands with reference to the distribution of investments, resources, and expenditures on the basis of their conflicting assumptions and/or expectations concerning the likelihood of heightened international tensions or of a relaxation *cum* detente.[9] This issue has agitated the Soviet leadership since Stalin's death, the basic arguments remaining relatively intact as leading political personalities changed sides and exchanged arguments in accordance with their political and factional interests at any given time. Thus, Khrushchev, when he was challenging Malenkov before 1955, emerged as a leader of the security-productionist-ideological forces against Malenkov, but once he became firmly installed in power after July 1957, he switched over to the consumptionist-agricultural-public services constellation.[10]

[7] For example, in what might be considered a cautionary warning that a policy based on achieving Soviet superiority might simply refuel the arms race and backfire, Georgi Arbatov, director of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute of the USA, points out that during "the very alarming experience of the previous decade, the 1960's, . . . the USA's strategic arsenal increased by 10 to 12 times. An aggressive war against the Vietnamese people was started. Israel launched aggression against the Arab states. . . . And in 1962, as a result of the Carribbean crisis, the USA and the USSR found themselves rather close to the brink of war. . . . If the 1970's are merely a repetition of the 1960's . . . peace may be seriously jeopardized." "A Step in the Interests of Peace," *SShA—Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiia* (Moscow), November 1971. p. 56.

[8] *Pravda,* April 7, 1971.

[9] The conflicting views of these opposed interest groupings have found frequent expression in Soviet writings. For example, an exponent of the consumptionist viewpoint, commending Soviet efforts to lower international tensions and check the arms race, wrote in 1969 that "experience has proven that only under conditions of a relaxation of tensions is it possible to concentrate a maximum of resources for accomplishing plans for the building of communism" (K. P. Ivanov, *Leninskie osnovy vneshnei politiki SSSR* [Leninist Fundamentals of the Foreign Policy of the USSR], Moscow, 1969, p. 50). On the other hand, a military spokesman, writing in the official organ of the Soviet Defense Ministry, paraphrased Lenin in an effort to imply that no ceiling should be placed on military spending. "Everyone will agree," he wrote, "that an army that does not train itself to master all arms, all means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, *or may possess,* is behaving in an unwise or even criminal manner." (A. Lagovsky, "The State's Economy and Its Military Might," *Krasnaia zvezda,* Sept. 25, 1969).

[10] See H. S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union,* New York, Praeger, 1959.

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By and large, Brezhnev and Kosygin have attempted to steer a middle course between the two principal demand-sector coalitions. Although on balance the military and heavy industry groups appear to have increased their influence in shaping Soviet priorities and their preferences continue to be favored over those of the consumptionists, the regime has compromised the issue by simultaneously supporting both detente abroad and a high level of defense expenditures and priority for heavy industry at home in an endeavor to demonstrate that detente policies need not lead to an immediate reorientation of budgetary priorities detrimental to the interests of the military and heavy industry. However, stepped-up Soviet military commitments to Egypt, stronger political commitments to India, the growing Chinese nuclear capability, the deteriorating situation in Czechoslovakia before August 1968, and the ambivalent character of the defense debate in the United States have all had a part in reinforcing the skepticism of the military and their allies as to the desirability of detente-oriented policies. Furthermore, it is possible that the military's opposition to detente policies is also motivated by expectations of new opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence as the strategic power balance vis-à-vis the United States becomes more favorable. At the same time, Soviet military leaders apparently perceive that the exploitation of these opportunities will involve risks, and this in turn leads them to keep on pressing for higher margins of safety and hence greater defense expenditures.

The Kremlin's Options

The revival of Soviet self-confidence, the changes in the strategic balance, America's redefinition of its global role, and China's efforts to force her way into the global club have combined to present Moscow with a variety of discrete options in the choice of grand strategy. Some of these, if elected, could plunge the world into a new era of violence, uncertainty, turbulence, and confrontation; others might provide the foundations for mutually agreed-upon adjustments and arrangements of outstanding questions, thus ushering in a long era of negotiation and reduced tensions. Whatever choices are made by the Kremlin, they will inevitably be affected by domestic Soviet interests as well as by the external environment, and all the available options involve both dangers and opportunities for the Soviet leaders. What these options are with primary reference to dealing with the United States on the global strategic level may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. *Strategic superiority.* This would require the retention of current economic priorities and continuous maximization of Soviet power in order to achieve a permanent, clear-cut superiority over both the United States and China, individually and jointly. Such a policy would be based upon the assumption that the Soviet Union will be more able than was the US to convert military muscle into diplomatic and foreign policy gains because Soviet power will be consonant with the rhythm of historical processes whereas US power attempted to arrest and reverse the wheels of history and consequently was crippled by the weight of its own internal contradictions. This policy would, in effect, result in the unilateral assertion by Moscow of a role as "world gendarme" with all that that would imply: threats, intervention, imposition of solutions upon local conflicts, and continuous global surveillance.

2. *Condominium/detente based upon Soviet strategic superiority.* This policy would be similar to the first, except that it would not require the same magnitude of superiority because it would involve a limited detente relationship with the United States. As Moscow would not challenge the security or vital interests of the US directly, the policy would be less likely to arouse the kind of fears and anxieties that might provoke the American public to support another round in the arms race. In addition, it would envisage expanded commercial contacts with the West, enabling the Soviet Union to exploit the tremendous industrial and technological resources of the capitalist world and thus to lessen the pressures for an immediate shift in internal economic and budgetary priorities; but cultural contacts would remain minimal, and there would probably be a tightening of ideological controls. Finally, this option, which presupposes further and perhaps escalating conflict with China, would permit Moscow to concentrate on the Chinese danger without at the same time forfeiting the right to make gains at the expense of its capitalist American partner at the global level—a right which would be impaired if Moscow were to accept a limited sphere of interest temporarily off limits to Soviet intrusion.

3. *Condominium/detente based upon strategic parity.* This option would more accurately resemble a condominium or dyarchy based upon an authentic detente relationship. Such a policy would involve formal agreements establishing both *quantitative* ceil-

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ings and limitations on *qualitative* development and deployment of weapons; furthermore, it would require agreement on joint measures to keep other powers in check by enforcing the nuclear non-proliferation agreements and obtaining ceilings on the development of capabilities by other nuclear powers (France, Britain and China). Beyond this, there would be a clear though tacit and indirect demarcation of US and Soviet spheres of influence; joint action would be taken to resolve selected local conflicts; agreements would be devised to allow continuing rivalry in marginal and peripheral areas of the world involving minimal risks of direct confrontation and nuclear war. Most importantly this option—in calling for a wider orbit of cooperation and a more restricted arena of rivalry than does the preceding option—would create the conditions for a drastic shift in Soviet domestic economic and budgetary priorities and a restructuring of the distribution of social and political power in Soviet society; hence, it is vigorously opposed by the Soviet military-industrial complex embracing the military professionals, the defense industries, heavy industry, and key personalities in the party apparatus. Advocates of this policy, on the other hand, wish not only to solve internal economic problems but also to diminish the disproportionate influence of the Soviet military-industrial complex and enhance that of other social and functional institutions and groups in Soviet society. The policy would perhaps allow a wider degree of cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges, but even under this option Moscow would not formally relinquish its broad ideological goals or accept "ideological coexistence" as the basis for agreement.

4. *Entente with the United States.* An entente would involve radical changes in Soviet attitudes tantamount to agreement on first principles with the United States. It is doubtful that any serious sentiment exists within the inner circles of Soviet power for this option, although some progressive and democratic intellectual groups centering upon individuals like the dissident nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov advocate what amounts to an entente relationship.[11] Thus, the "democratic movement" in Russia calls not only for administrative reforms designed to enhance efficiency, but also for drastic political and social reforms that would indeed result in the possibility of agreement on first principles with the United States.

5. *Triarchy with the United States and China.* This also is not a likely possibility as it would involve agreement with China, which poses insuperable problems for the Soviet Union. It would entail satisfying not only Chinese national demands against the USSR (on territorial boundaries, for example) but also Peking's demand for parity in the world Communist movement. If agreement could be reached with the Chinese on these two vital issues, Moscow would presumably have little use for a condominium or triarchy of any kind with the US as Soviet policy could then be founded on Sino-Soviet reconciliation, which would in effect present Moscow with a whole new set of possible options. (As indicated earlier, Soviet options relating primarily to relations with China will be discussed later.)

The Case for Detente-*cum*-Parity

These, then, are the broad options that have confronted the Soviet leadership in deciding the USSR's global strategy. The author has discussed at considerable length elsewhere the views and attitudes of different Soviet groups with respect to some of these options.[12] Suffice it to note here that controversy within the leadership has probably centered on the first three options, and that the debate has apparently tended more and more to narrow down to the second and third—that is, to condominium/detente based on Soviet strategic superiority *vs.* condominium/detente based on strategic parity. The terms of the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement signed in Moscow during President Nixon's recent visit suggest that those in the Soviet leadership who advocate detente based on parity have won out in the internal debate—at least for the time being. It may therefore be useful to take a detailed look at the perceptions that appear to underlie this decision.

Although certain members of the top Soviet leadership—notably, Premier Kosygin, President Podgorny, D. S. Poliansky, and G. I. Voronov—can be identified as advocates of the detente-*cum*-parity position, its most articulate public proponents appear

[11] See Andrei Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom*, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1968.

[12] "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex—Does It Exist?," *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 1, 1972. See also the author's "Foreign Policy Perspectives in the Sixties," in A. Dallin and T. Larson, Eds., *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968; "Soviet Foreign Policy at the Crossroads," *International Organization* (New York), No. 3, 1969; and "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System," in R. Barry Farrell, Ed. *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1966.

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CPSU General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev (representing the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet) and US President Richard M. Nixon sign the USSR-US strategic arms limitation agreement in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Soviet leaders standing behind the signers include, from left, Piotr E. Shelest, Mikhail A. Lesechko, Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, Dmitri S. Poliansky, Boris N. Ponomarev, Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny, Fiodor D. Kulakov, Mikhail A. Suslov, Semion K. Tsarapkin, and Andrei P. Kirilenko.

—UPI photo.

to be the Americanologists in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the most conspicuous of whom are the two doyens of Soviet Americanology, Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Academy's Institute of the USA, and N. Inozemtsov, Director of the Academy's Institute of World Economy and International Affairs. The former is also a member of the Central Auditing Commission, and the latter is a candidate member of the Party Central Committee. Thus, both are members of the outermost rings of the inner circles of Soviet power and have access to the top decision-makers.

In a succession of remarkable and audacious expositions of this position over the past several years, Arbatov bases his arguments on a subtle and relatively sophisticated analysis of US domestic and foreign policy. His analysis is extraordinarily nonpolemical in tone and marked by pragmatic realism; yet it is framed within orthodox doctrinal parameters, positing the steady growth of Soviet power on the one hand and the bankruptcy of US globalism and continued US domestic turmoil on the other.

Writing in 1970, Arbatov asserted that US globalism based on the concept of "world gendarme" had failed, but at the same time, he gave no comfort to the advocates of Soviet superiority when he emphasized that "no single country can govern worldwide processes." [13] In another roundabout hint that strategic superiority fueled the arms race and created temptations to engage in actions that undermined the possibility of detente and coexistence, he recited his version of how President Johnson—at a time when the US enjoyed strategic superiority—had converted the policy of "bridge-building" into a ploy to undermine Soviet authority in the USSR's own sphere:

At the time it [*i.e., the policy of bridge-building*] *was announced, it could still be regarded by many as a kind of response to the challenge of peaceful coexistence hurled by the socialist states. It was no acci-*

[13] G. A. Arbatov, "American Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the 1970's," in *SShA—Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiia*, January 1970, as translated in *Soviet Law and Government* (White Plains, N.Y.) Summer 1970.

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dent that, at the outset, it was subjected to a fire of criticism by the extreme Right in the USA. . . . However, the "bridge-building" policy soon presented itself . . . as a platform for extended subversive activity aimed at dissolving the socialist commonwealth and undermining [its] *. . . social system.*[14]

In the same article, Arbatov argued that while US global strategy was crumbling and the role of "world policeman" had already been renounced by President Nixon prior to his election to the White House,[15] the collapse of US "globalism" as distinct from its role as a global power not only could create problems for US foreign policy but would confront the Soviet Union and other countries with new, hard choices. The US, he cautioned, would remain a powerful and formidable power for many years, although its opportunities would progressively diminish. Under these circumstances, Arbatov saw the appropriate Soviet response to be one of continuing to blunt American foreign policy and to deter Washington from residual acts of foreign intervention as the US retrenched, but at the same time acting to prevent acute local conflicts from escalating or spreading. "The matter at issue," he wrote, "is essentially that of further limiting the freedom of action of imperialism—above all, US imperialism." [16]

More than a year later, in May 1971, Arbatov emphasized the increasing impact of domestic conflict and disturbances as a factor restraining US foreign policy and suggested that a new strategic balance was taking shape as a result of this in combination with the growth of Soviet power:

The past five-year period confronted imperialism, including American imperialism, with new realities—above all a further change in the alignment of forces between the two world social and economic systems in favor of socialism. Throughout the past few years, this process has grown in two ways, so to speak. It has proceeded both through the further strengthening of the positions of the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and the international workers' and liberation movements, and through the serious exacerbation of the internal contradictions in the imperialist camp itself.[17]

The United States was thus being forced to adjust to the new strategic equation, and Arbatov went on to pose the logical question: "How should the attempts of the imperialist bourgeoisie to adapt to the new world situation be treated?"

Arbatov's counsel was both measured and prudent. He gingerly warned against resorts to threats and force to take advantage of the situation and explicitly advocated that the Soviet Union should respond positively to any realistic adjustments the United States sought to make in order to ameliorate its difficulties, even though such a course might be attacked by unnamed quarters as "reformist" or "revisionist":

. . . it does not at all follow from this [*new strategic balance*] *that elements of realism in the domestic and foreign policies of the capitalist powers have no importance and should be rejected on the ground that such attempts express an endeavor to preserve imperialism, to prevent new shocks and political failures for imperialism. Needless to say, any concessions by imperialism, any steps in the direction of adapting to the existing situation, objectively express this kind of class interest of the bourgeoisie. But such steps signify forced concessions under the pressure of the forces of peace and progress and objectively can have consequences that correspond to the people's interests. . . . The peoples of socialist states are by no means indifferent to the direction in which international relations develop—in the direction of preparations for thermonuclear war or in the direction of the peaceful coexistence of states and a political detente which, of course, does not abolish the struggle between the two systems itself but moves it into channels in which this struggle does not lead to military conflict. The significance of these distinctions was emphasized by V. I. Lenin, who pointed out that one should take different attitudes toward those representatives of the bourgeois camp who "gravitate toward the military resolution of questions" and toward those who "gravitate toward pacifism, even if they are of the very worst sort and, from the standpoint of communism, cannot withstand even the slightest criticism."* [18]

But perhaps the most ambitious and elaborate examination of the preconditions for, and general

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[15] See Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), October 1967, pp. 111-25.

[16] Arbatov, "American Foreign Policy on the Threshold . . .," p. 17.

[17] "American Imperialism and New World Realities," *Pravda*, May 4, 1971.

[18] *Ibid.*

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configuration of, a detente based on strategic parity was provided by Arbatov in November 1971. Hailing the projected visit of President Nixon to Moscow as a "positive act," he noted:

The possibility of the normalization of Soviet-American relations, just as the sphere of such normalization, is determined by the interests of the two states. If spheres of common interests exist, normalization is possible. If there are no such spheres, it will be impossible to achieve normalization. How do things stand in this case? Are there problems whose solution would be in the interests of the Soviet Union and the USA and at the same time would not be contrary to the legitimate interests of other countries? There certainly are.[19]

As the "most important" of these problems, Arbatov listed "the prevention of nuclear war," stating that everybody, including "most representatives of the ruling circles" in America, considers thermonuclear war "a 'useless' instrument of policy." This common foundation of concern, he argued, establishes the basis not only for a "normalization" of relations but for a detente as well. Alluding to previously-signed US-Soviet agreements designed to reduce the possibility of accidental or unauthorized employment of nuclear weapons, including the "hot line" agreement and its various refinements, Arbatov advocated further measures that would involve closer Soviet-American collaboration in order to reduce the possibility of inadvertent confrontation as a result of incremental escalation:

There is another danger that is less noticeable and therefore perhaps more serious: Even if they do not deliberately want a world thermonuclear war, states may be drawn into serious conflicts whose escalation at some point may get out of control and make war unavoidable. This danger can be prevented only if there is a radical improvement in the international situation.[20]

That the Soviet leaders already accept the wisdom of this view was demonstrated by their refusal to be dragged into a confrontation with the United States over the mining of the Haiphong harbor on the eve of President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union. When asked at a Moscow lecture on the President's visit why the Soviet navy did not sweep the mines, V. S. Glagolev, a Soviet specialist on arms control, replied that "the sweeping of mines takes a great deal of time, and furthermore *such action on our part would greatly aggravate the situation.*" [21]

In his November 1971 article, Arbatov went on to cite the recent Soviet and Polish treaties with Bonn as examples of settlements which defused crisis situations and relaxed tensions. His general implication was that particular situations, such as that in the Middle East for example, could be defused without the necessity of a substantive or definitive settlement:

Not to stop with what has been achieved, not to rest content with an unstable equilibrium between peace and war, but to seek a more stable foundation for strengthening peace and international security—this is an important common interest of the Soviet and American peoples, as well as of all the other peoples in the world. If this interest finds proper reflection in US policy, the sphere of possible cooperation in international affairs will be expanded considerably. Within the framework of the overall normalization of the international situation, we must extinguish the hotbeds of international crises in the Near East and Southeast Asia, take new steps to improve the situation and set up a reliable security system in Europe, and create conditions precluding the possible outbreak of new crisis situations. Only in this way can really durable guarantees of peace be created.[22]

Arbatov further cited the termination or limitation of the arms race as lying within the sphere of common US-Soviet interest. Emphasizing the onerous drain on economic and financial resources for both countries, he asserted that these political goals are becoming ever more attainable in our era. Then, shifting from "normalization" to more positive measures of "detente," Arbatov stressed that "expansion of commercial, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation can be an important sphere of common interest for the USSR and the USA" and offered these vistas of potential cooperative endeavor:

In conditions of detente, broad possibilities would

[19] "A Step in the Interests of Peace," *SShA—Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiia*, November 1971, p. 55.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[21] *The New York Times*, May 23, 1972. (Emphasis added.)
[22] "A Step in the Interests of Peace," *loc. cit.*, p. 56.

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open up for cooperation in such spheres as the development of science, the utilization of natural resources of the oceans, the struggle against pollution of the natural environment, etc.[23]

It should be noted, however, that in all of his analyses Arbatov stresses the difficult task of reaching agreement on specific points and issues and warns that "it would be unrealistic to close one's eyes to the very serious obstacles blocking improvement of Soviet-American relations." Understandably enough, he points in particular to "influential forces in the USA that oppose such an adjustment and are trying to drag the country back to the time of the 'cold war'," but needless to say, he could also have mentioned the "influential circles" in the Soviet Union, including the Soviet military-industrial complex, that would like to resume the "cold war" under conditions of Soviet strategic superiority.

It should further be noted that Arbatov is careful to base his prescriptions on the line laid down by Brezhnev at the 24th Party Congress, thus indirectly invoking the authority of the party General Secretary:

As for the Soviet Union's position, our line was clearly set forth by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the 24th CPSU Congress: "We proceeded from the premise that the improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA is possible. Our principled line with respect to the capitalist countries, including the USA, is consistently and fully to implement in practice the principles of peaceful coexistence, to develop mutually advantageous ties and—with those states that are ready to do so—to cooperate in the field of strengthening peace, making mutual relations with these states as stable as possible." [24]

The Brezhnev statement quoted by Arbatov ended with a cautionary declaration that the Soviet Union, while seeking detente with the US, would still have "to consider whether we are dealing with a real desire to settle questions at the negotiating table or with an attempt to pursue a 'positions of strength' policy." Similarly, although the results of President Nixon's visit to Moscow would appear to confirm that a majority of the Soviet leadership has accepted detente based on strategic parity rather than on Soviet superiority, it must be remembered that there are powerful elements in the Soviet hierarchy that are undoubtedly still wedded to the goal of superiority as expressed in the following statement by a Soviet military writer in 1969:

. . . Vladimir Ilyich taught that one must pay the closest attention to the enemy's possibilities, study his strong and weak points, and carefully weigh the balance of forces. "Everyone will agree," V. I. Lenin wrote, "that the army that does not train itself to master all types of weapons, all means and methods of struggle that the enemy has or may have is behaving unwisely or even criminally" (Vol. XLI, p. 81) . . . . Here special attention should be given to the words "may have." This means that it is necessary to evaluate the military, economic and scientific potential of a possible enemy on the basis of a careful study both of the existing situation and of realistic prospects. Only with such a sober and scientific approach can one outline the correct path to the achievement of superiority over the enemy in the balance of forces.[25]

Moscow's Two Worlds

So far we have focused our attention on Soviet-US interaction and Moscow's strategic policy options primarily in relation to the United States. But Soviet interaction with the US takes place in only one of the two international environments in which the Soviet Union operates, *i.e.*, the general interstate system and the parallel world system of Communist states and parties. The network of 14 Communist states constitutes a subsystem within each of the two international environments, and thus cuts across the two. Indeed, from the Soviet point of view, the present group of Communist states represents the vanguard of a universal system of such states which will eventually displace the existing international order made up of Communist and non-Communist states poised in varying degrees of protracted coexistence.

While this is the theory, that theory has in recent

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 57.
[24] *Ibid.*

[25] A. Lagovsky, "The State's Economy and Its Military Might," *Krasnaia zvezda*, May 25, 1969 (emphasis added). See also Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Interests in SALT; Political, Economic, Bureaucratic and Strategic Contributions and Impediments to Arms Control*, RAND Paper P-4702, Santa Monica, Calif., RAND, 1971; and Uri Ra'anan, "The Changing American-Soviet Strategic Balance: Some Political Implications," Memorandum prepared for the US Senate Committee on Government Operations, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1972.

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years foundered on the shoals of both logic and national interests. The world Communist movement has become transformed from an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, first, into an arena of conflict, controversy, and debate among Communist states and parties, and second, into a distinctive international environment in which the Soviet Union and other Communist states must act and react. Instead of assuming the contours of a placid and harmonious community in accordance with the idyllic visions of "socialist internationalism," this distinctive Communist environment now functions increasingly like a microcosmic international countersystem akin to the general interstate system it has penetrated and seeks to displace. Organized into nation-states or national Communist parties that are proto- or potential Communist states, the Communist world, in faithful reproduction of the general international order, is divided along developmental, racial, and geographical lines, structured vertically rather than horizontally, and organized hierarchically rather than laterally, with the Soviet Union at the apex. Furthermore, it is polarized by great-power rivalries, spheres of influence, and constellations of client-states and parties, and it is regulated by an internal balance-of-power mechanism. Its principal mark of distinction from the existing order it seeks to replace is the ideological and socio-political content of its constituent states.

Curiously enough, the Soviet Union increasingly occupies essentially identical positions in both international environments, and its behavior in one environment inevitably creates perturbations and reverberations in the other, as imperatives and responsibilities generated in each tend to come into collision, forcing the Soviet leaders to establish priorities not only within environments but between them as well. The contradictory imperatives stem from the fact that in the Communist environment the challenging power is China, whereas in the general interstate system Moscow's principal rival is the United States.

Recently, the situation in both environments has become even more seriously complicated for the Soviet leaders because China has now burst out of the confines of the Communist environment and is demanding recognition and a role as a third global power in the general international system. This means that the Soviet Union is now challenged by two global powers: by the United States in one environment, and by China in two.

In dealing with the Chinese, the Soviet leaders have failed to exude the self-confidence that they have evinced in dealing with the Americans. Indeed, they have periodically given vent to outbursts of irrationality and desperation where China has been concerned. The reasons transcend the mere fact that China shares a 4,000-mile-long frontier with the Soviet Union and that her 800 million population presses down like an oppressive incubus upon the Soviet psyche. More important, the Chinese constitute an inside threat to Soviet power and ambition because China is part of the socialist commonwealth and challenges Moscow's legitimacy and power within the world of Communist states and parties as well as in the overall international system. For example, Peking cannot be credibly termed an interloper in the Kremlin's ideological garden, which is roughly congruent with the Soviet Union's regional sphere of influence. Hence, while Soviet leaders have had a fair amount of success in employing non-Communist states like India as means of countering the Chinese challenge, they have been less successful in achieving this purpose by using the Communist states, which frown on the notion of intra-Communist ideological and military coalitions arrayed against one another. Only Mongolia (which shares a common border with both China and the USSR and fears engulfment by the Chinese) and occupied Czechoslovakia have signed military alliances which could be invoked in the event of a Sino-Soviet war; moreover, all attempts by Moscow to read China out of the world Communist movement or to transform the Warsaw Treaty Organization into a potential anti-Peking alliance have thus far been unsuccessful.[26] Broadly speaking, then, the Chinese challenge within the Communist camp continues to cripple Russia's consolidation of control over Eastern Europe, as well as over nonruling Communist parties elsewhere, and it has been instrumental in facilitating the erosion of the Soviet Union's ideological legitimacy and in forcing her to behave more like an imperial rather than an ecumenical power.

The Dual Threat of China

Thus, of all the states in the international system, only China today poses a direct threat to the Soviet territory and at the same time is in a position to threaten the Soviet Union with means other than nuclear weapons. The American threat to the Soviet

[26] For a detailed discussion of these matters, see the author's "Soviet Aims in East Europe," *Current History*, October 1970.

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Union has always exhibited a synthetic, abstract quality at the olympian level of strategic and global rivalry: US and Soviet troops have never clashed, and neither country has territorial demands against the other. Their rivalry has mainly been one for "world leadership" as champions of contending ideological social systems. And in this contention the Soviet leaders have derived comfort and sustenance from their belief that, no matter how powerful the United States, the civilization and social order that it represents are in the long run historically obsolete, that no matter how protracted and erratic the contest, history and the dialectic will at some point catch up with the United States, and it will inevitably enter into a period of decline and social dissolution.

But the same historical and ideological convictions that sustain the Soviet leaders in their rivalry with the United States have tended to produce irresolution, ambivalence, and cognitive inadequacy in their approach to China, for the ideological prism that they employ to perceive the world provides them with little or no guidance about how to cope with those who use the identical prism but perceive a different rainbow. The Chinese subscribe to the same convictions as the Soviets, yet their prognosis for "Soviet revisionism" is remarkably similar to some of the Soviet predictions of doom for "American imperialism." Moreover, the Soviet leaders view China not as a declining power, but as an ascending one; and their awareness of the tremendous material and human potential of China, combined with their inherent faith in the inevitability of growth and development, can only create in their minds the ineluctability of Chinese paramountcy if they continue to subscribe to their own doctrinal postulates. Thus, their ideological presuppositions lend credence to their visceral fear that Peking's claim to future world hegemony may be stronger and perhaps more warranted by history than their own. Chinese efforts to move the epicenter of the international Communist movement, which the Soviets regard as the historical vehicle for the future transformation of the world, from Moscow to Peking have further stoked this fear. According to one Soviet commentator,

The course of the "great leap" pursued the ambitious goal of taking a vanguard position among the socialist countries. This appealed to Maoist hegemonic aspiration. . . . No matter what ultrarevolutionary phraseology was used to cover up this course, its essence remained unchanged . . . . to establish hegemony in a world devastated by war. . . . It [Peking] would like, in implementing its plans, to use the military and economic might of the socialist countries, the strength of the international working class and the possibilities of the national liberation movement, striving to turn these factors into tools of its great power hegemonism. . . . It sees the Soviet Union, the policy of the CPSU . . . as the main obstacle to the implementation of its hegemonic aspirations in the international arena.[27]

Furthermore, as a result of these historical and ideological beliefs, the Soviet leaders have seemed to assume that China's baffling, obstinate, and persistent hostility toward the USSR reflects a Chinese conviction that Soviet power will eventually be destroyed or subjugated to Chinese hegemony on the road to the final Armageddon with imperialism.[28] This assumption, in turn, has caused the Soviet leaders increasingly to regard the military and strategic components of the "balance of forces" between Moscow and Peking as critically important.

Looking at the Soviet position vis-à-vis China from another angle, one can see that Soviet advocates of detente with the United States based on strategic parity have a powerful ideological argument to support that policy, but that the same argument collapses when applied to China. The argument is that strategic parity with the United States is sufficient to achieve Soviet aims and purposes because the natural movement of world social, political, and historical processes is in tune with Soviet goals and because, given a constant military equilibrium, any alterations in the overall "correlation of forces" can only be in a direction detrimental to the US position. It holds further that strategic parity is sufficient to deter any attempts by the United Sates to intervene in order to arrest or reverse these processes (as was possible under conditions of US superiority), although on the Soviet side it may mean foregoing the option of intervention (*i.e.*, "export of revolution") designed to

[27] I. Aleksandrov, "Slogans and Deeds of the Chinese Leadership," *Pravda*, Sept. 4, 1971.

[28] These Soviet perceptions were undoubtedly reinforced by a Chinese attack on both the Soviet Union and the United States during President Nixon's visit to Moscow, when the central Chinese party organ *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) let loose with a blast condemning both powers as the "archcriminals" of the modern world who "are colluding and at the same time contending with each other" for the purpose of dividing the world into spheres of influence. The paper assured its readers that "despite the baring of their fangs and showing of their claws today, the US and Soviet overlords are very weak by nature and nothing but paper tigers," and predicted that both would be swept "into the garbage heap of history." See *The New York Times*, May 22, 1972.

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force or accelerate revolutionary transformations in marginal situations. All these assumptions become implausible, however, in dealing with Peking. Seen from the perspective of the Soviet leaders, China—unlike the United States, which is viewed as a powerful, capitalist industrial nation in a state of decline and on the brink of being consumed by its own developing internal contradictions—is an underdeveloped giant on the rise. Furthermore, and most critical, China's visions and purposes are also in tune with the social and revolutionary processes of history, and while the unfolding of the historical dialectic may be to the detriment of the United States, China will inevitably share some of the benefits. Hence, in its confrontation with China, Moscow cannot rely on the assumption that revolutionary forces in the world operate solely to Soviet advantage, for though the "correlation of forces" may enhance the Soviet position vis-à-vis the United States, it may simultaneously weaken Moscow's posture vis-à-vis China.

For the moment, the Soviet leaders can safely accept strategic parity with the United States by freezing weapons at current levels and still enjoy considerable superiority with respect to China. However, some Soviet leaders undoubtedly feel that such a freeze will inevitably create conditions which will allow China to improve its relative military position. This is more crucial for Moscow than for Washington, for while China is in no position to use its developing military capability directly against American targets, it can employ both conventional forces and strategic weapons against the Soviet Union. As a consequence, the Soviet leaders will probably continue to be concerned about erosion of their relative strategic power as long as it remains frozen by agreement with the United States—unless China in the future also enters into arms control agreements placing a ceiling on her military capabilities.

Options Vis-à-vis Peking

What options, then, do the Soviet leaders have in dealing with the Chinese problem? Hypothetically, there are at least three, conceptualized as follows: (1) reconciliation, (2) annihilation, and (3) pragmatic adaptation.

The avowed Soviet preference is *reconciliation,* and there is no doubt that the Soviet Union is willing to make a number of compromises and concessions to achieve it, although so far all these efforts have failed. Apparently, there are factions and influential individuals in and around the Chinese leadership who favor some sort of limited reconciliation with Moscow in preference to rapprochement with the United States, and the Soviet rulers doubtless continue to hope that the death of Mao Tse-tung may bring to the fore new Chinese leaders who would prefer to select the United States rather than the Soviet Union as the "main" or "immediate" enemy. But the Soviet leaders seem to entertain no illusion that any reconciliation would be more than limited and temporary in essence, reflecting the current calculation of some Chinese leaders that China's immediate interest would be better served by colluding with Russia against America rather than the other way around. Still, they would probably accept even a temporary reconciliation as a welcome respite.

On the Chinese side, however, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai are apparently persuaded that under existing conditions, with Soviet power on the upswing and US power on the decline, a Soviet embrace might be more perilous than continued hostility. Furthermore, they recognize that China's leverage with Moscow against the US is rapidly diminishing, particularly since they believe that the United States is now retrenching and withdrawing from the Asian mainland. Finally, just as the Soviet leaders are determined never again to accept strategic inferiority vis-à-vis the United States, Mao Tse-tung is equally determined that China will never again play second fiddle to Russia in the world Communist movement, and since the Soviet Union is clearly unwilling to accept "parity" with China and China does not possess sufficient capability to assert equality with the Soviet Union in the Communist movement unilaterally, the necessary prerequisite for a reconciliation appears to be absent.

This leads to the second possible option, *annihilation—i.e.,* the destruction of China's military capability, especially nuclear and strategic. This option apparently was pressed vigorously by some elements in the Soviet military shortly after the successful invasion of Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine." Sentiments in favor of administering the Chinese a "bloody nose," as well as the notion of a "surgical strike" to arrest or destroy China's burgeoning nuclear arsenal, became quite current in Soviet circles. But cooler heads prevailed, and Soviet action in the 1969 border conflict on the Ussuri was kept at a level sufficient to provide a warning "lesson" for the Chinese. However, now that China possesses a modest nuclear arsenal and

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has developed intermediate-range missiles capable of reaching major urban and industrial centers in the USSR, the risks of a Soviet preventive attack have escalated, and annihilation is no longer a viable hypothetical option. The Soviet leaders must thus learn to live with and adjust to the reality of growing Chinese nuclear and missile power and must seek other means to deter the Chinese from attempting to employ that power against the Soviet Union.

This leads to the third option, *pragmatic adaptation,* which of course may cover a wide range of specific policies, depending upon conditions and circumstances. Currently, Soviet strategy toward China appears to involve four separate but interrelated links. The first is a policy of encirclement and containment involving primarily non-Communist powers, the chief of which is India. Moscow would also like to involve Japan in its encirclement strategy now that it can no longer count on the US as a tacit partner. The second link is an effort to forge an effective, if initially selective, anti-Chinese coalition within the Communist system of states. So far only Czechoslovakia and Mongolia have been recruited, but the Soviet effort will continue.

The third link is active Soviet reinvolvement in Southeast Asia and stepped-up assistance to North Vietnam. But North Vietnam poses a problem for both Communist giants, who have successively caused concern in Hanoi as each in turn welcomed Nixon to its capital while pledging its own undying support of North Vietnam and charging the other with designs for a "sellout." In both summit episodes, the North Vietnamese have tried to complicate matters by deliberately escalating the war and compelling President Nixon to retaliate, hoping that this would create sufficient embarrassment, first in Peking and later in Moscow, either to cause them to cancel their invitations to the President or to cast a pall over the negotiations. Both Communist giants, however, apparently felt that they had their own fish to fry and gave Mr. Nixon's visits higher priority in their respective calculations than they gave to the feelings of North Vietnam. Since both Moscow and Peking welcomed the US President, neither could gain any advantage over the other in Hanoi on this issue. And since North Vietnam is dependent upon the Soviet Union and China for its military supplies, it is hardly in a position to threaten them, individually or collectively.

Moscow's decision virtually to ignore the mining of Haiphong harbor and other North Vietnamese ports and to extend a warm welcome to President Nixon was a signal to Hanoi that a detente with the United States and the Western powers was of more vital interest to the Soviet leaders than the specific character or degree of Hanoi's victory. As Moscow views the situation, the US has already conceded virtual defeat in Vietnam and is merely seeking an "honorable" exit, while the North Vietnamese are only delaying the inevitable US withdrawal because of the specific character of the victory they seek. As far as Moscow is concerned, this is a luxury for which Hanoi must be prepared to pay, and the Soviet Union has shown, by receiving President Nixon, that it will not allow Hanoi to complicate its larger design. The initial reassertion of Soviet interest in Vietnam after Khrushchev's ouster was clearly designed to prevent Hanoi from falling completey under Chinese influence, and it is not likely that Moscow anticipates that North Vietnam, once the war is over, will join Moscow's Chinese encirclement strategy. Instead, Hanoi will probably continue to play its two Communist allies off against one another—and perhaps even engage in its own version of "collusion" with the United States.

The fourth and final link in the Soviet leaders' current China policy is detente with the United States and the West. This detente, which encompasses the new treaties with West Germany, means in effect US and West German acceptance of the East European status quo, and it also creates at the very least a foundation for defusing and managing Soviet-American conflict over the Arab-Israeli question. The detente thus serves to stabilize and secure the Soviet western flank and *ipso facto* strengthens the Soviet Union's strategic position in dealing with a hostile China. Detente with the West is therefore one of the main ingredients—together with the USSR's quasi-military treaty with India, its anti-Chinese alliances with Czechoslovakia and Mongolia, and continued assistance to North Vietnam in order to at least neutralize Hanoi in the Moscow-Peking conflict—in the Soviet leaders' current policy of pragmatic adaptation to China's growing power.

For the long run, Moscow no doubt hopes for an amelioration of the China situation, either through changes in the Peking leadership and the assertion of authority by new generations, or through more "responsible" Chinese behavior as a result of growth and development. But should this not occur, the Soviet leaders envisage that there will be sufficient basis for Moscow to form a common front against China with other major powers in the world, who will presumably become increasingly threatened as

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China's development extends her strategic reach to all corners of the globe. The Soviet leaders probably anticipate that at some future date China may become the single most powerful state in the world, but surely not sufficiently mighty to overwhelm all the others combined. This also suggests that at some future point the disparate policies which Moscow has been pursuing in the Third World, in Western Europe, with the United States, and elsewhere will be merged and unified. For the time being, the Russians will continue to operate on the dual track of global power and revolutionary power, but at some point these two may be brought into inevitable conflict as Moscow attempts to mobilize both Communist and non-Communist countries against the Chinese threat.

The Impact of De-Bipolarization

In all this, it is apparent that the Soviet leaders have had to revise their strategic thinking drastically as a consequence of the new triangulation of world politics. Originally, they evidently anticipated that a change in the strategic balance between the United States and the USSR would merely alter the power relationship between the two global powers. Thus, it would greatly increase the Soviet Union's freedom of action around the world. But things did not turn out as Moscow expected, for the shift in the strategic balance altered the entire international landscape by encouraging China and the United States to move toward a rapprochement. This rapprochement can be viewed as stemming from the virtually simultaneous realization in Peking and Washington that existing Sino-American animosity strengthened Moscow's hand with both of them, and that, correspondingly, a rapprochement would diminish and even in some respects nullify Soviet gains flowing from the changing balance of power.

From the standpoint of the Soviet leaders, the conversion of the bilateral Soviet-Chinese and Soviet-American relationships, in which the USSR was either clearly the strongest party or on the way to becoming the stronger party, into a triangular relationship has served to reduce the relative leverage of the Soviet Union with respect to both China and the United States, for it has restricted the options and latitude of action that they would have enjoyed in a bipolar or a double-bipolar situation. President Nixon's visit to Peking, in short, has tended to limit whatever gains the Soviet Union made as a result of

A symptom of de-bipolarization—Y. A. Malik, Soviet Permanent Representative at the United Nations, greets Chiao-Kuan-hua, chief delegate of the People's Republic of China, upon the formal seating of the PRC Delegation in the General Assembly, Nov. 15, 1971.

—United Nations photo.

the change in the strategic balance. In fact, the Soviet leaders were fearful, at least for a time, that Washington and Peking might conspire and collaborate against Moscow, and their fears received wide and repeated articulation in the Soviet press. It should be underscored, however, that the Soviet apprehension was not that a Washington-Peking axis threatened Soviet security or interests directly, but rather that it would ultimately rob Moscow of the possible fruits of strategic parity or superiority.

The impact of the triangulation of global politics is perhaps most readily visible in the Asian context, for it was there that Moscow appears to have entertained the greatest hopes of capitalizing on its new strategic position to expand its influence and to cut China down to size. Let us, therefore, explore the Asian situation briefly.

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Before the dramatic escalation in Soviet military capabilities, it seemed clearly in the Soviet interest to keep the United States involved on the Asian mainland for the short term. Indeed, the Kremlin leaders initially sought to use the United States as a tacit part of an encirclement and containment strategy for dealing with China. That strategy relied upon the continuation of China's diplomatic isolation, in which Sino-American animosity played the key role. What enabled Moscow to think in such terms, of course, was the fact that Washington's pursuit of a policy of isolating and containing China placed the Soviet and American positions in tandem—something that the Chinese leaders recognized quite well, as their repeated denunciations of Soviet-American collusion against China demonstrated.

But after the USSR had accomplished its military buildup, Moscow's interests, while not altogether clear, seemed to lie in a quick American departure from Asia. The buildup had already put the USSR in a position to take advantage of a number of situations on the Asian continent to enhance its influence, as the subsequent course of events in South Asia proved. With the United States gone from the region, the Soviet Union would plainly be the most powerful state there, and this circumstance might in itself suffice to persuade Asian states fearful of Chinese hegemonic aspirations to scramble under the protective umbrella of an Asian security system, a scheme which the Soviet leaders have advanced on a number of occasions. The American-sponsored SEATO might thus give way to a Soviet counterpart.

To Moscow, the enunciation in 1969 of the "Nixon Doctrine" and its specific application to Southeast Asia, the policy of "Vietnamization," appeared to be a major step in the desired direction, for the Soviet leaders perceived the action as a signal of US intent to withdraw militarily from the Asian mainland and to allow local conflicts to become indigenized and subject to resolution without benefit of American intervention or involvement. However, the Chinese discerned similar implications, and while one of their more obvious goals has been to expel all external intruders from East Asia and they have consequently welcomed the US policy of indigenization of Asian conflicts, they obviously felt that the premature withdrawal of the United States might simply redound to the advantage of the Soviet Union as long as the latter chose to assert itself as an Asian power. For this reason, they not only have endeavored to reach a measure of understanding with the United States but have shown remarkable patience regarding the American timetable of withdrawal, including the ambiguous matter of the continuing US presence on Taiwan.

The Soviet leaders, then, foresee the possibility that instead of being able to translate their new prowess into political gains in Asia, they will be prevented from doing so by the Sino-American rapprochement. One Soviet commentator has expressed the matter thus:

Outwardly, the Chinese leadership appears uncompromising in its assertion that the affairs of Asia should be settled by Asians, the affairs of Europe by Europeans, and the affairs of Africa by Africans. It may seem that Peking is really concerned over defending the national interests of the peoples and states of Asia, Europe and Africa against "the superpowers' interference." But here, too, this is only camouflage. In proclaiming the slogan, "Give Asians the opportunity to settle their own affairs and eliminate the dominance of the 'superpowers' in Asia," the PRC leadership hopes that China, as the largest power on the continent, will be able to impose its will and solutions on the Asian peoples.

In this respect, the contacts between unofficial American representatives and Chinese leaders in preparing the ground for Nixon's visit to the PRC are indicative. Mao Tse-tung, in an interview with the American journalist E. Snow in December 1970, gave a positive evaluation of the "Vietnamization" policy. According to E. Snow, high-ranking officials in China said that Nixon is "withdrawing from Vietnam and Asia." They saw this as an opportunity to restore the grandeur of the Middle Kingdom and the Asian people's vassal dependence on China.[29]

The Japanese Enigma

The rising power of Japan introduces another complex element into the new triangular configuration of world politics. Japan remains an enigma for the Soviet Union as much as for the Chinese. Both Moscow and Peking respect Japan's mighty industrial and technological base and fear her military potential should the restraining influence of the United States be withdrawn or jettisoned. In immediate terms, both Peking and Moscow recognize that Japan could become the dominant power in East

[29] G. Kadymov, "Class Betrayal is the Essence of the Maoists' 'Superpower Domination' Thesis," *Krasnaia zvezda*, Dec. 14, 1971.

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Asia virtually overnight should she choose to transform her tremendous industrial and technological capability into a military one. Each would like to use Japan as a counterpoise against the other, without at the same time exposing itself to manipulation by Tokyo. The Sino-American rapprochement having ruptured a vital link in Moscow's chain of encirclement around China, Japan could become an acceptable surrogate, and in a sense her cooperation would be indispensable to Moscow's design. On the other hand, a Sino-Japanese rapprochement could be disastrous for the USSR in East Asia as such a combine might conceivably force the Soviet Union out of the area, or force it to maintain massive military formations there, draining the Soviet economy and depriving Moscow of the will and energy to pursue global policies elsewhere.

Thus, the diminution of American strategic power, instead of simply creating unambiguous advantages for the Soviet Union, confronts Moscow not only with greater opportunities but greater dangers as well. The most frightening of these dangers might be a Soviet Union faced with a united Europe in the West and a Sino-Japanese coalition in the East, which could effectively and perhaps even permanently seal Soviet power within its present boundaries and create the conditions for its contraction and dissolution in its own developing contradictions. Much of this is sheer fantasy—for the Soviet leaders, no doubt, nightmarish fantasies—but Soviet commentators, particularly those who have since 1966 been vocally articulating the fantasy of a Sino-American rapprochement, are now fantasizing along these lines. One recent article put it this way:

Recently Chou En-lai stated that the Common Market is the "first step on the road to an independent Europe." Peking warmly welcomes Britain's entry into the Common Market. ..... This position on the part of the Chinese leaders indicates that they are eager to see a united "Europe for the Europeans" as a counterweight to the Soviet Union and as their possible partner.[30]

China, of course, has comparable fantasies concerning Japan, but fantasies based on concrete historical memories, not simply nightmares. A Soviet-Japanese rapprochement in conjunction with a Soviet-Indian partnership in the South could vitally cripple China's ambition to function on the world stage as a global power. But there are formidable barriers to a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement—some trivial, some symbolic, and others of substantial magnitude.

The first is the territorial issue arising from Japanese demands for the return by the USSR of three small islands off the coast of northern Hokkaido. These islands are of little or no strategic value to the Soviet Union, nor do they contain any important resources. Nevertheless, they have assumed great symbolic and psychological importance for Japan, and the issue continues to agitate Soviet-Japanese relations, having been responsible most recently for Japanese refusal to undertake projects involved in the development of Soviet Eastern Siberia. If the issue did not go beyond Soviet-Japanese relations, there is little doubt that Moscow would willingly relinquish the islands in return for a dramatic improvement in relations. But Tokyo's territorial demands are psychologically connected with other territorial demands against the USSR. In fact, Mao Tse-tung himself, in an interview with a group of Japanese visitors, not only agreed that Japan's claim to the islands was justified, but proceeded to associate Japan's territorial claims with those of Finland, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and China against Russia.[31] Thus, Moscow fears that a territorial settlement involving the return of territories to one country would establish a precedent, arouse expectations, and certainly aggravate many of the muted claims against Soviet territory. More importantly, as the Soviet-Chinese border conflict on the Ussuri over Chenpao/Damansky island demonstrated, the territorial issue is a particularly volatile one in Sino-Soviet relations, and a return of some small islands to Japan might serve to reexcite the appetites of the tigers in Peking.

The dilemma of both Communist countries in their attempt to use Japan against the other is that the chief beneficiary of such a policy might be Japan itself. Unlike the United States, Japan is a regional power, and her interests are more intimately connected with the Asian mainland. A strong United States might be a temporary interloper in Asian affairs, but a powerful Japan would be a permanent fixture, with all that that implies. What the Japanese propose to do with their tremendous capability will in large measure determine the responses of the Soviet Union and the Chinese. The tripolar world is still in embryonic form and could easily be aborted before it achieves definitive or even recognizable

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *Pravda*, Sept. 2, 1964.

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configuration, if Japan chooses to play a diplomatic and military role in world affairs commensurate with her potential. Should Japan "go nuclear," for example, and succeed through adroit maneuvering in developing a powerful strategic capability, it would seriously alter the overall balance of power and once again force a realignment among the major powers of the world.

The Outlook for Moscow

Confronted by all the manifold complexities of the drastically altered global distribution and alignment of power, how is the Soviet Union likely to behave? Generally speaking, Moscow will probably prefer to continue along prudent and well-worn paths, attempting to retain the main configurations of the bipolar system and refusing to recognize that a tripolar or multipolar system is already here or on the horizon. Now that the Soviet Union has achieved genuine equality with the US in the international arena, the Russians are loath to debase their newly-achieved eminence by accepting China as a global power, since this would mean according China a standing of equality not only in the general interstate system but in the world Communist movement as well.[32]

Thus, the Soviet leaders are likely to try to keep membership in the global club restricted to Moscow and Washington. At the same time, however, they have now recognized the existence of a broader nuclear club than they were previously willing to acknowledge. Such recognition was implicit in Moscow's call, issued at the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971, for the convocation of a conference of the five nuclear powers, including China. Peking, however, has spurned the call and awaits formal recognition as the third global (as opposed to nuclear) power, while simultaneously professing to renounce any such heady ambition.[33]

Meanwhile, Moscow can be expected to keep on refraining from imprudent adventures, but this does not mean that the Soviet leaders do not intend to employ their strategic prowess so as to score diplomatic gains commensurate with the changing strategic balance. Since the United States appears to be ready to make adjustments conforming to the new distribution of power, Moscow will doubtless proceed with the West along the path of limited detente through the negotiation of formal agreements, the postponement of some problems, and limitation of bipower confrontations to certain geographic areas where the vital interests of neither party are likely to become involved. Strategic parity may be sufficient to enable Moscow to make incremental gains in marginal areas of the world, and even marginal gains in more significant regions, particularly in the Middle East at American expense and in South and Southeast Asia at the expense of both the US and China. Marginal gains may be anticipated in Latin America as well, particularly if more revolutionary regimes of the Allende type come to power constitutionally or extra-constitutionally.

Thus, a prudent Soviet foreign policy is not to be confused with an inert one, but it remains to be seen how successful the Soviet Union will be in converting its new military muscle into diplomatic gains. It should be remembered that the USSR, unlike the United States, is a *revisionist* rather than a *status quo* power, and as long as Soviet revisionist aspirations coincide with the objectives of local revolutionary movements, Moscow may well be able to make more gains with less power than was the United States. For a status quo power simultaneously to deter a powerful revisionist adversary and quash or deter indigenous revolutionary movements around the globe requires clear-cut and overwhelming nuclear superiority, whereas for Moscow to deter intervention designed to quash revolutions requires only parity.

Nevertheless, Soviet adjustment to a de-bipolarized world in which the USSR may be the paramount strategic power will be difficult. The Soviet leaders will be catapulted into a strange world, for they are accustomed in both thought and action to think in terms of bipolarity and zero-sum situations. The world is no longer "we and/or they": a loss in American power is no longer an automatic gain for Moscow. The decline in American power may simply create opportunities for other powers to assert themselves and thus create more rivals and more problems for Moscow to deal with.

[32] Thus, one Soviet commentator petulantly notes that Chinese rhetoric about the "two superpowers" is merely a smokescreen behind which "the Peking leaders are trying to create an independent ideological and political center (a 'third force') . . . [and] they hope that, relying on this center, they can turn China into a global power and make up for its military and economic potential, which is insufficient for the purpose." G. Kadymov, *loc. cit.*

[33] The distinction between "nuclear powers" and "global powers" has been clearly though implicitly drawn in Soviet commentaries. *E.g.*, see the commentary on the Soviet-proposed conference of the five nuclear powers, in *Pravda*, July 30, 1971.

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Environmental Problems in the USSR

By Keith Bush

The USSR has not escaped the environmental problems to which all industrializing nations have fallen prey. The incidence and scale of environmental disruption (ED) in the Soviet Union have been diligently chronicled in a number of Western studies.[1] Insofar as the extent and overall intensity of pollution can be quantified, most observers would agree that the natural resources of the USSR have not been affected to the same degree as those of many advanced Western countries. This is attributable to a number of factors—*e.g.*, the lower stage of development of many sectors of the Soviet economy and the relatively low population density, even in the more populated portions of the country west of the Ural Mountains. The present study will attempt to examine these and other factors which have contributed to a different pattern of environmental disruption in the USSR and to discuss some of the advantages and disadvantages possessed by the Soviet political system and command economy in formulating and implementing corrective measures.

Water Resource Problems

The most serious environmental issue facing the Soviet Union is how to protect and utilize its relatively scarce and unfavorably distributed fresh-water supplies. With some 16 percent of the world's land mass, the Soviet Union has only 11 percent of world fresh-water supplies, and only 12 percent of this is available to the densely populated regions of European Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. By the end of the century, the urban population will have increased to an estimated 216 million (compared with 143 million today), and per capita consumption of fresh water in the cities will have leaped 100 to 150 percent—to about 500 liters a day.[2] Thus, markedly sharper demands will be made on the supply of fresh water. Yet this precious resource faces diversion and depletion through grandiose land-improvement schemes and massive new industrial uses, and degradation by industrial and sewage pollution.

The most spectacular of the land-improvement projects contemplate diverting some of the northward flow of the great Siberian rivers to irrigate dry regions of Kazakhstan and Central Asia to the south. Soviet and Western specialists have called for fuller prior scientific investigation of the possible ecological and climatic consequences of such colossal gambles with nature's water balance—possible melting of part of the Arctic ice-cap, disruption of the climate of the Northern Hemisphere, and major shifts in rainfall patterns because of evaporation from millions of irrigated hectares.[3] Yet, work is already under way to pump water from the Irtysh River to Karaganda, and surveying is being done for a canal to divert water from the junction of the Tobol and Irtysh Rivers to the Aral Lowlands and thence to desert

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[1] See for example Marshall Goldman, "The Convergence of Environmental Disruption," *Science* (Washington, DC), Oct. 2, 1970, pp. 37-42, and "Externalities and the Race for Economic Growth in the USSR: Will the Environment Ever Win?" *ASTE Bulletin* (Washington, DC), Spring 1971, pp. 19-27; David E. Powell, "The Social Costs of Modernization: Ecological Problems in the USSR," *World Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey), July 1971, pp. 613-34; and the author's *Environmental Disruption: the Soviet Response*, Radio Liberty Research Paper No. 48, New York, 1972.

[2] *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR: seriia ekonomicheskaia* (Moscow), No. 2, 1971, pp. 35-47.

[3] See, for instance, *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 7, 1968; *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 26, 1970; and *The Observer* (London), July 18, 1971.

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regions of the Kazakh, Uzbek and Turkmen republics.[4]

The Soviet Union's industrial sector also makes immense and growing demands on fresh-water supplies. The quantity required for Siberian industry alone in 1968 was estimated at 150 million cubic meters a day. With Siberian industrial output scheduled to grow some 500 percent during the next 10-to-15 years, an amount equal to all of the water carried by the Yenisei and Ob Rivers will be needed unless radically new processes for recycling and reusing water are devised and installed.[5]

In addition, the existing water resources of the USSR are being degraded by widely documented practices allowing the introduction of untreated or inadequately treated industrial effluents and sewage. One of the most dramatic results has been the drop in the sturgeon catch from the Caspian Sea (from some 50,000 tons annually in the 17th century to a current annual catch of less than 10,000 tons), caused at least in part by an annual seepage of 65,000 tons of oil—twice the load of the Torrey Canyon, which spilled its cargo of petroleum into the English Channel in 1967—into Baku Bay each year.[6]

Although they have yet to reach the level of pollution of, say, the Rhine or the Mississippi, the great rivers of Russia are becoming increasingly affected. This is particularly true of the Volga, which alone carries half of the country's industrial effluents into the Caspian Sea. Sewage facilities in the Soviet Union are often still primitive. A volume on the order of 25 cubic kilometers of untreated water is introduced each year into open sewers.[7] Until the mid-1960's, some 300,000 to 400,000 cubic meters of raw sewage was flushed each day into the Moskva River. This has reportedly been stopped, and virtually all domestic sewage is now purified. But the discharge of untreated industrial waste water into this river flowing through the Soviet capital is expected to continue until 1976.[8]

An increasingly common hazard, shared by the Soviet Union with other agricultural countries, is the pollution of lakes and rivers by agricultural chemicals. This can occur through drainage, but one of the worst cases of pollution occurred when dust storms blew fertilizer mixed with topsoil off the land in Krasnodar Kray into the Sea of Azov. On the other hand, the USSR has so far been spared the disruption of water supplies caused by massive infusions of household detergents in the West.

Automobiles and the Atmosphere

The Soviet Union's relative neglect of the consumer in another area—that of motor vehicle production—has also been an environmental "plus," helping to preserve the quality of air in Soviet cities. With an estimated current stock of roughly eight million vehicles of all types (of which less than two million are privately owned), the USSR obviously lags far behind the United States (with some 120 million vehicles) in this major source of air pollution. As the Soviet Union gears to enter the mass motor era, its technical experts show a clear awareness of Western experience in the generation and abatement of vehicle exhaust emissions; yet the planners give no evidence of being willing to delay or reduce the output of polluting vehicles on environmental grounds or to invest adequately in emission-control devices. Presumably, Soviet efforts to export passenger cars will eventually oblige its manufacturers to conform to existing and future exhaust-emission standards. Research on control devices has still to develop a catalytic neutralizer with a long effective life and capable of withstanding temperatures ranging from minus 60 degrees Centigrade (encountered in Siberia) to plus 1000 degrees (operating temperatures). Fuel injection is in its infancy, with the first production models scheduled for 1973. Experiments with battery-driven vehicles have encountered the same difficulties experienced elsewhere: short radius of operation, poor acceleration, excessive weight, and great expense.[9]

In the field of public urban transportation, most Soviet cities have a distinct environmental lead over their Western counterparts, although this may perhaps be ascribed as much to backwardness as to foresightedness. In marked contrast to the noxious diesel bus service now prevalent in the West, trolley-bus and tram networks continue to receive priority in the USSR. For instance, during the current five-year plan period (1971–75), nearly 3,000 kilometers of new trolley-bus routes are to be opened and about 1,200 kilometers of additional tram lines are to

[4] *Pravda*, Dec. 27, 1971.
[5] *Nedelia* (Moscow), No. 12, 1968, p. 14.
[6] *Khimiia i zhizn* (Moscow), No. 1, 1970, p. 51.
[7] *Nauka i tekhnika* (Riga), No. 9, 1969, p. 2.
[8] See *Moskovskaia pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 1, 1968, and *Gorodskoe khoziaistvo Moskvy* (Moscow), No. 6, 1971, p. 42.
[9] For a review of the latest results, see *Za ruliom* (Moscow), No. 12, 1971, p. 11.

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

Source: Adapted from a map of Soviet water resources and their utilization in Atlas razvitiia khoziaistva i kultury SSSR *(Atlas of the Development of the USSR Economy and Culture), Moscow, Glavnoe Upravlenie Geooezii i Kartografii, 1967, p. 8.*

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be laid.[10] While many would maintain that trams are too noisy and that their inflexibility excessively impedes other road-users, it could be argued that the trolley bus has been dismissed prematurely from Western cities. It is quiet and emits no harmful fumes. And as far as the limits it allegedly imposes on road use are concerned, more and more Western cities are being obliged to set aside special lanes for buses anyway.

Another source of air pollution—accounting for nearly one-tenth of atmospheric contamination in the United States and perhaps more in Western Europe and Japan—is domestic heating and refuse disposal. Here, too, the USSR would seem to have an advantage, and its claim to have the best regional heating in the world may well be true. Some 60 percent of the Soviet urban population currently uses centrally-supplied hot and warm water for heating and washing.[11] This results from the heavy emphasis on apartments rather than on private dwellings and the recent construction of much of the Soviet urban housing stock. The Soviet use of natural gas is another plus: by 1975 some two-thirds of the population will be using this relatively clean fuel.[12] Air pollution in the Soviet Union is also reduced by the widespread practice of central treatment and incineration of refuse, mainly at combined heating and incinerator plants.

Thus, the air over Soviet cities would appear to be less burdened with emissions stemming from private cars, public transportation, domestic heating, and refuse disposal. Nevertheless, it is appreciably degraded by truck exhausts and by industrial pollution, as may be confirmed by visitors to any of the major industrial cities. In Leningrad, for example, the brightness of daylight is reported to be little more than half of that in surrounding areas because of industrial haze aggravated by the use of low-grade fuel. The chemicalization drive of the 1960's contributed greatly to air pollution: a prominent example is the notorious "foxtail" of chemical smoke from the Shchekino combine, which has threatened the forest at nearby Yasnaya Polyana.[13]

In the quest for quick means to neutralize industrial emissions, some Soviet engineers have taken a wrong tack in suggesting construction of factory chimneys higher than the Eiffel Tower, or one that will emit smoke in a spiral into the upper atmosphere.[14] Perhaps these engineers should be reminded of the old adage that "what goes up. . . ." as well as a host of other, more recent adages about the unity of man's environment.

The horrifying vision of Western man standing knee-deep in his own refuse, conjured up by the environmentalists, may not become reality, but the battle against indestructible plastic bags, non-recyclable cans and the "no deposit, no return" bottle has only just started. Soviet man has so far been spared this penalty of consumerism owing to the backwardness of the light and food industries and neglect of packaging technology. The bulk of the Soviet housewife's food purchases are still unwrapped: as late as 1970, it was reported that less than 7 percent of flour, sugar and butter sold in Ukranian state retail stores was sold in a packaged form, although it is promised that by 1975 the share of packaged foodstuffs in all-Union sales will rise to 60-65 percent.[15] The adoption of self-service stores and, more recently, of Western-style supermarkets (*universamy*) has obliged the foreign trade organizations to order packaging technology from Eastern and Western Europe, and there is no evidence to suggest that ecological considerations played any part in their selection.

Committees or Earplugs?

Another potential threat to modern man's environment is noise pollution. Soviet urban dwellers may still experience less noise from automobiles, jet airplanes, and neighbors' stereophonic phonographs and tape recorders than do their Western counterparts; yet Soviet bus and truck drivers seem to exult in the noise-generating capability of their vehicles, and owners of private vehicles persist in warming their automobile engines periodically during cold winter nights despite the contrary advice of motoring journals and the complaints of ground-floor residents. Western observers have also noted a surprisingly high noise level at Soviet workplaces. Furthermore, in constructing millions of new apartments, the Soviet planners have been understandably preoccupied with quantity rather than quality, and while

[10] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 4, 1972, p. 17.

[11] TASS, Jan. 13, 1972.

[12] *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1972. It has been reported that introduction of natural gas fuels has reduced the level of air pollution in Moscow and Leningrad by over 80 percent. See *Gazovaia promyshlennost* (Moscow), No. 4, 1970, p. 37.

[13] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, April 3, 1968.

[14] TASS, Aug. 28, 1971.

[15] See *Pravda*, March 5, 1971, and *Izvestia* (Moscow), Nov. 18, 1971.

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occupancy of a private apartment, after a lifetime of communal living, is a consumer benefit far outweighing such minor desiderata as doors and windows that fit or acoustically insulated walls and ceilings, the absence of adequate soundproofing does contribute to a noisy environment. Soviet awareness of the existence of a noise pollution problem and of its detrimental effects on the human organism is evidenced by creation of a National Anti-Noise Committee in September 1969,[16] and by the recent campaign to speed up the production and sale of earplugs.[17] In addition, the Chief Public Health Officer of Moscow has promised to retain trolley buses in the capital and to see that residential blocks are located away from busy thoroughfares and public buildings.[18]

Contributing markedly to environmental disruption in the USSR is the Soviet penchant for "conquering" nature. Perhaps the single greatest act of degradation of nature and violation of the principles of conservation was Khrushchev's Virgin Lands campaign. As an emergency one-time boost to Soviet grain production, this subjection of marginal soils to grain monoculture was quite successful, but the former First Secretary's crowning error was to push his luck too far by not switching investment resources and manpower back into traditional grain areas. As a result of failure to leave adequate acres of Virgin Land soil fallow according to available expert advice, the Soviet Union soon saw the topsoil from millions of hectares in Kazakhstan and Siberia blown away in dust storms, leaving the exhausted acreage often scarcely capable of replacing the seed sown in it.

In similar disregard of conservationists' warnings, the Soviet Union continues to expand open-pit mining.[19] Although apologists argue that this will occur mostly in remote regions far from human habitation, even Russia is not so vast that it can dismiss so lightly the laying bare of huge areas.

The record of the Soviet government in protecting and preserving the natural resources of its vast territory has been very mixed. Although successive administrations have adopted legislation dealing with various aspects of conservation,[20] there persists in the minds of officials and citizens alike the impression that the expanses of Mother Russia are infinite and her riches inexhaustible, and that Nature is something which is to be tamed and transformed. To be sure, there are growing signs of a grudging comprehension that man must work *with*—not *against*—Nature, and one broadcast referred to over one hundred projects "where Soviet scientists have artificially restored the balance of nature, including the breeding of species which had become almost extinct." [21] Nevertheless, only a relatively small and voiceless handful of Soviet citizens could be termed "ecological activists," ready to combat industrial pollution, automobile exhaust, or the use of non-recyclable packaging.

"The Committee for Combating Urban Noise at its work."

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), No. 8, 1972.

[16] Among the achievements of the Committee are the design and production of a thicker Keramzit concrete block to lower noise in prefabricated apartments and the enforcement of noise regulations in residential districts of Lithuanian cities. See TASS, Sept. 8, 1970.

[17] *Izvestia*, Jan. 25, 1972.

[18] Radio Moscow, Sept. 13, 1971.

[19] By 1975, an estimated 208 million tons a year, or about one-third of the total coal mined in the USSR, is to be extracted by the open-pit method. See *Vestnik Moskovskovo universiteta: geographiia* (Moscow), No. 3, 1971, p. 4.

[20] See, *inter alia*, *Pravda*, Jan. 17, 1967; *Nedelia*, No. 12, 1968, p. 14; *Komsomolskaia pravda*, April 3, 1968; and *Okhrana truda i sotsialnoe strakhovanie* (Moscow), No. 11, 1969, p. 32.

[21] Radio Moscow, May 25, 1970.

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On viewing or smelling smoke from factory chimneys, most Russians probably feel a sense of pride, or at most echo the tolerant acceptance found in the north of England: "Where there's muck, there's money." To a motorist who has never before owned a car, who has saved the equivalent of nearly four years' take-home pay and has waited on a list for three or more years to buy a modest sedan, the admonition that his new car will add "x" grams of pollutants each year to the atmosphere will seem irrelevant. For a housewife accustomed to collecting the family's milk in a can and having her sugar wrapped in the evening newspaper, the problem that arises from the disposal of millions of bottles or indestructible plastic packaging is a marginal consideration.

When the inhabitants of Baku or Riga emerge from a dip in the sea covered with oil, they would not dream of manifesting their resentment with acts of "ecotage" directed against the offending derricks or tankers. Instead, this anger is channeled into the docile "public nature protection committees," or oily bathers are asked to telephone their complaints to, say, the Riga Zonal Water Inspectorate of the Ministry of Land Improvement and Water Resources of the Latvian SSR.

If Soviet society is to combat effectively the environmental by-products of industrialization and modernization, its citizens and officials should have comprehensive data on ecological problems and unimpeded access to the research and experience of other industrialized societies. Until recently, however, there was a tendency to treat pollution—like unemployment, drunkenness, crime, or airplane crashes—as a necessary concomitant of capitalism and to dismiss the ecology campaign in the US as a vehicle for "social demagogy" designed to blunt political opposition.[22] The Soviet news agency TASS is quick to report oil seepages offshore from Teheran,[23] while a similar break of a pipe off Baku may become known only months or years later, if at all. Such an approach clearly draws attention from the very real susceptibility of the USSR to the environmental problems of modern industrial societies and cannot but impede the development of effective environmental policies.

In the Soviet Union, access to the latest and most alarming ecological data is denied to all but a handful of selected scientists and officials. As Dr. M. D. Millionshchikov, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences, recently told a Western reporter,

We [in the USSR] treat all these problems a bit differently. Open discussion in the press and in public does not always produce a review of problems from the right point of view. We try to consider this in scientific discussion, not in public.[24]

In the 1950's and early 1960's, what publicity there was for ecological issues was concentrated in such literary journals as *Novyi mir, Literaturnaia gazeta,* and *Nash sovremennik,* and in the youth newspaper *Komsomolskaia pravda.* Occasionally national, local and specialized journals have brought their combined weight to bear on specific environmental crises, but there has been no single forum for ecological concern. Thus, those concerned with the environment of the USSR must have been disappointed with the much-bruited and long-awaited publication of the journal *Ekologiia* (Ecology) in 1970. Not only did the magazine have a severely limited circulation (below 1,400 issues), but its focus seems to be on problems of general biology. The journal *Priroda* (Nature) has proved to be a stauncher champion of social issues in recent times.

A partial corrective to the incomplete and sometimes manipulated coverage of environmental matters in the official press is the treatment of these topics in *samizdat* writings. The most noteworthy of such well-informed discussions include Andrei D. Sakharov's treatise *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom,* the first issue of *Veche,* and Vladimir E. Maksimov's *Seven Days of Creation.*[25] However, despite the illegal distribution of such documents to a wide circle of concerned citizens, one suspects that they reach a very small percentage of the Soviet population.

Despite such an environment of incomplete information, the Soviet planner must attempt to assess and allocate economic and social costs involved in a new technological process, plant, mine, or water-management project. Do the increases in output or the additional job opportunities created by a new plant offset the social cost of a disfigured landscape, a noisy urban setting, a defiled atmosphere? Do the

[22] See e.g., *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 48, 1971, p. 24.
[23] TASS, Feb. 1, 1972.
[24] *The New York Times,* March 30, 1972.
[25] These documents are available as items AS 200, AS 1013, and AS 1047 at the Arkhiv Samizdata (Samizdat Archive) of Radio Liberty, Munich.

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savings in investment on transportation, power, and other aspects of the economic infrastructure gained by placing a new plant in an existing metropolis justify the ensuing environmental disruption, and where does the ED cost enter the balance sheet? Such questions arise in all industrial societies, whether Soviet or Western, but as has already been seen in the matter of the publicity given environmental problems, there are certain unique factors which hinder the Soviet planner.

Calculating ED Costs

Occasionally the economics of environmental disruption is reduced to a simple equation, as in the contention by biologists and Baku residents that the restoration of previous levels of sturgeon population (and hence, of caviar production) in the Caspian would be worth more financially than continued oil extraction in the immediate environs of the sea.[26] Yet, there still seems to be a hesitancy on the part of Soviet authorities to apply a specific scale of charges to pollution which would oblige plant economists to balance off the economic sanctions on a new piece of technology against its projected contributions to output or profits. Such an approach has reportedly been considered by the US Environmental Protection Agency, where it is proposed to control sulfur emissions by imposing a charge of 1 cent per pound and gradually raising the charge to 10 or even 15 cents a pound on the assumption that somewhere along the curve of rising assessments it will pay offending plants to install the necessary pollution controls.[27]

A few Soviet economists have courageously attempted to quantify the costs—in terms of economic growth foregone—of eliminating pollution or of reducing it to more tolerable levels, but the estimate that it would entail a slowing of the rate of growth of national income by only one-tenth seems exceedingly modest.[28] For example, a study of pollution in the US prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimated it would require 2 percent of the US Gross National Product to slow noticeably the spread of pollution, 4 percent to stop deterioration of the environment, and 8 to 12 percent tangibly to repair the environment.[29] Such a reallocation of resources is likely to require a sacrifice of investment, and hence of future growth, which may be unacceptable to Soviet planners. It should also be noted in this context that Soviet attitudes toward expenditures on antipollution measures are in part a function of national accounting practices in the USSR. Whereas in the West expenditures on the control and remedying of pollution are included in the basic measure of economic performance (gross national product),[30] in the case of the USSR pollution-control expenditures are considered "nonproductive" investments and therefore do not figure in the major Soviet performance indicator (gross social product). Faced in the 1970's with the uninspiring prospect of a middling growth of 4–5 percent per annum, roughly on a par with that projected for the present EEC member states and marginally, if it all, ahead of the US, the Soviet leadership shows no evidence of being prepared to sacrifice economic performance on environmental grounds.

The matter of assessing the costs of ED is further complicated in the Soviet case by an ideological factor—the Marxian prejudice against establishing a charge for natural resources. True, some enlightened Soviet economists have long protested the irrationality of this dogma, but as N. P. Fedorenko has observed, the idea "has been overcome in economic theory only."[31] Thus, during the public debate concerning the Draft Principles of Water Legislation for the USSR and the Union Republics, the President of the Commission for Studying Productive Forces and Natural Resources, along with numerous other Soviet citizens, called for establishing a charge for water, on the grounds that when water is supplied free of charge, enterprise directors have no incentive—other than moral—to economize in the use of this precious and limited resource.[32] But when the final version of the Principles was adopted, the free use of water was perpetuated.[33]

Administrative Barriers

As if the above attitudes and conceptual blindspots were not enough, Soviet institutional complexity also acts to impede effective measures against ED. At present the environment of the USSR would appear to rest in the hands of a plethora of unco-

[26] *Khimiia i zhizn*, No. 1, 1970, p. 15.
[27] *Business Week* (New York), April 10, 1971.
[28] See for example *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 23, 1970, p. 11.
[29] *Harvard Bulletin* (Cambridge, Mass.), April 13, 1970.
[30] UN, Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1971* (Provisional version), New York, 1972, Part I, p. 182.
[31] *Nedelia*, No. 34, 1967, p. 14.
[32] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, July 12, 1967.
[33] See *Izvestia*, Dec. 11, 1970.

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ordinated, largely advisory bodies, supplemented by the 20 million persons organized in seemingly impotent "public nature protection committees" under the auspices of the Central Council of the All-Russian Nature Protection Society. Soviet environmentalists have long campaigned for creation of a single all-Union agency with meaningful powers of enforcement over ministries and local authorities—an agency such as Britain's Department of the Environment or the US Environmental Protection Agency, which show some promise of being able to collect and collate the necessary information, to formulate a meaningful framework in which to assess the economic and social costs and benefits of environmental matters, and to initiate and enforce preventive legislation. Indeed, the German Democratic Republic itself has established a Ministry of the Environment and Water Management.[34] Hence the cry in the USSR for an "integrated pollution control service," for "a scientific coordinating institution for exploiting nature," or for a State Committee for the Preservation of Nature.[35]

The narrow "departmentalism" of the Soviet ministerial system which Khrushchev tried in vain to remedy also has its impact on the environment. As one observer stated,

Each department can defend its own interests and put forward its own reasoning. But there is not one agency among them which is wholly responsible for the conservation and augmentation of our national resources.[36]

In an interesting episode at the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971, USSR Agriculture Minister V. V. Matskevich accused the USSR Minister of Power and Electrification with needlessly flooding thousands of hectares of good arable land for his power stations.[37] While the Power Minister doubtless was aware of the impact of his projects, lack of communication among vertically-oriented Soviet bureaucracies may well have accounted for the flooding of enormous reserves of petroleum, gas, lignites, and nonferrous metals by the Nizhne-Obskaia power station project.

Furthermore, in the complex Soviet administrative bureaucracy, almost every agency charged with preservation of some aspect of the environment is itself involved in the exploitation of natural resources. When the Ministry of the Fishing Industry is held responsible for conserving fish stocks, it is really a case of "the poacher appointed gamekeeper." Once again the preoccupation with output clashes with the desire for conservation, and the outcome is predictable.

When one turns to the matter of deterrent legislation, the fact emerges that Russian and Soviet legal history abounds with measures providing for the conservation of natural resources and prohibiting wasteful use of the land and pollution of water and air.[38] Soviet antipollution legislation fills a sizable volume,[39] yet the supreme criterion of such legislation is its effectiveness. Eschewing the draconian aspects of Peter the Great's Ukase of 1720 (which prescribed capital punishment, flogging, branding or imprisonment for felling trees in the royal forests), Soviet environmental legislation has often fared no better than the 1930 German law protecting the environment, to the impotence of which today's befouled Rhine River is a moving testament. Referring to a 1964 decree combating pollution in a local river adopted by a Soviet oblast's party and government organs, a critic in 1970 concluded: "Alas, not a single point of this decree has been implemented."[40] Such candor is rare, although the impotence of much Soviet environmental legislation is suggested by the repeated adoption of measures to combat such conditions as the pollution of Lake Baikal.[41]

Soviet environmental laws have generally lacked specificity, relying instead on largely hortatory provisions, if one is to judge by the published texts of decrees such as those on the Caspian Sea and Lake Baikal.[42] The recent Soviet decree on measures to prevent further pollution of the Volga and Ural river basins does show a marked improvement over previous measures in respect of specificity.[43] However, the Volga-Ural decree highlights another problem in enforcement: the one billion rubles to be spent on pollution control in 1972-75 is to come from the

[34] *Die Welt* (Hamburg), Jan. 25, 1971.

[35] See for example *Pravda*, Oct. 7, 1968; *Nedelia*, No. 12, 1968, p. 14; and *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 40, 1969, p. 17.

[36] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, April 3, 1968.

[37] *Pravda*, April 6, 1971.

[38] For examples see *Posev (Frankfurt)*, No. 6, 1970, p. 37; *Gorodskoe khoziaistvo Moskvy*, No. 6, 1971, p. 41; *Komsomolskaia pravda*, April 3, 1968; and *Ekonomicheskaia zhizn SSSR* (Economic Life of the USSR), Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia," 1967, Part I, p. 55.

[39] *Okhrana prirody* (The Protection of Nature), Moscow, Yuridicheskaia literatura, 1971.

[40] *Ural* (Sverdlovsk), No. 6, 1970, p. 87.

[41] See *Izvestia*, Feb. 8, 1969, and *Pravda*, Sept. 24, 1971.

[42] See citations in preceding footnote and also *Izvestia*, Oct. 3, 1968.

[43] *Ibid.*, March 17, 1972.

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As the factory official cheerfully pays a "fine for polluting the atmosphere," he tells the health inspector: "Now they can't say we dirty up the air for nothing."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 16, 1970.

budgets of ministries and municipal authorities, *i.e.*, from funds which, presumably, have already been committed for other purposes. One may have to wait until 1976 to know how this episode in the conflict between production priorities and environmental interests is resolved.

Theoretically, city and town planning in the USSR can create an improved environment without encountering many of the complexities known in the pluralist societies of the West. There already exist impressive "master development plans" for several major cities covering the forthcoming decades. The "General Plan" for Moscow addresses the environmental problem by targeting the dismantling of about 200 polluting enterprises presently located within the city limits and flatly forbids the construction of any new offending plants.[44] Yet, although existing Soviet legislation empowers the authorities to shut down polluting enterprises,[45] the author has found only a few instances where such a sanction has been applied.[46] One possible explanation is the fact that Soviet municipal governments use fines collected from polluting enterprises to finance construction of parks and clubs, and there is consequently something of a civic stake in continued pollution (*i.e.*, in continued collection of fines). Furthermore, reducing any capacity in an output-oriented USSR is indeed a drastic step.

Whether as a result of stiffer legislation, or as a reflection of the intensified campaign to increase labor discipline launched by the December 1969 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Soviet courts in the past few years have begun to mete out stiff jail sentences against environmental offenders, a practice which is still rare in the West. Thus, the assistant chief engineer of a sugar refinery was sentenced to one year at corrective labor for permitting discharge of untreated waste into a river, and the captain of a dredge was sentenced to five years in jail for poaching sturgeon.[47] In this respect, Soviet authorities seem to have recognized earlier than their Western counterparts that moral strictures and fines are not always adequate deterrents to the despoilers of nature. As suggested above, the practice of levying monetary fines or of withdrawing bonuses has proved generally ineffective. Even when repeatedly levied, the fines were too small (usually 100 rubles, or about 122 dollars) and were most often paid out of enterprise funds rather than out of the offending official's pocket—another case of the production function taking priority over other social interests.

The USSR and Worldwide Efforts

While grappling with the many dimensions of its domestic response to the threat of environmental disruption, the Soviet government has shown an awareness that environmental problems respect no political boundaries. As one official publication stated,

The protection of the natural environment is acquiring an increasingly international character. . . . Therefore, in recent years, the UN has shown increased interest in the problems of conservation.[48]

Soviet representatives have been active in signing agreements or issuing declarations to protect endangered species—seals, polar bears, dolphins, and crabs. However, in the case of whales—a major industry, which provides meat and numerous by-

[44] TASS, Oct. 21, 1970; see also *Moscow News*, July 24, 1971, and *The International Herald-Tribune* (Paris), Jan. 19, 1972.

[45] See *Sovetskaia Latviia* (Riga), Dec. 14, 1969.

[46] See for example, *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (Moscow), Nov. 14, 1969, and *The New York Times*, Feb. 13, 1972.

[47] *Selskaia zhizn* (Moscow), Jan. 18, 1970, and *Izvestia*, July 24, 1970.

[48] *Nedelia*, No. 9, 1971, p. 21.

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products, and for which substantial sums have been invested to create a modern, impressively-equipped fleet—the USSR has hardly acted according to its protestations. Before the start of the 1971 season, in which the US decided to halt all whaling for a year to protect the overhunted species, the Soviet Union joined with Norway and Japan in an agreement to carry international observers on whaling ships to police observance of quotas set by the International Whaling Commission and to prevent killing of protected varieties. After the signing, Soviet whaling fleets slipped out of Vladivostok before any observers could board.[49]

Apart from international agreements on the conservation of various species of animal life, the USSR has consulted with Iran on joint efforts to clean up the Caspian and has called on other Baltic states to collaborate on pollution control measures. Yet at major international gatherings, Soviet representatives have vacillated between propaganda and candor in discussing pollution in the USSR. At the 1970 symposium on environmental problems organized by the UN's Economic Commission for Europe, Soviet delegates contrasted the "purity" of the Moscow River (see above) to the filth of the Potomac, the Thames, and the Seine. Another Soviet spokesman there contended that the intensity of pollution in the USSR was declining despite the continuing growth of industrial capacity.[50] At a Finnish conference on the environment the chief Soviet delegate unwisely confided to a Western journalist that some of his colleagues were concerned about the possible effects of SST exhaust on the stratospheric ozone shield and thus upon the amount of harsh radiation reaching the earth—a disclosure which conflicted sharply with the sanguine official position on possible ecological effects from SST operations presented by A. F. Aksionov only a few days earlier.[51]

On the whole, the Soviet record of international consultation and collaboration on combating environmental disruption has been as good as that of most other industrialized nations. However, the USSR's boycott of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held this June in Stockholm does raise an interesting question. While it might be argued that this action represented a principled, fraternal stand on behalf of the German Democratic Republic (which was not invited), there may have been another, more fundamental issue involved—the jealous protection of Soviet national sovereignty from possible infringement under international accords which might arise in Stockholm. In an early discussion of the conference, Dr. Konstantin Ananichev, Director of the International Organizations Department of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, had stressed that any new environmental protection machinery should be of an "international and not of a supranational character" and that it should operate "only through the cooperative actions of sovereign states."[52] It should be noted that this same Dr. Ananichev was the principal Soviet negotiator—together with Dzh. Gvishiani—of the USSR-US agreements establishing a bilateral committee to consult semiannually on means to cooperate in environmental protection and providing for cooperation of the two nations on research in various scientific areas, including environmental health, both signed in Moscow during the recent visit of the US President.[53]

Soviet Ecology: The Outlook

All that has been said indicates that the USSR is faced with much the same environmental problems that are experienced by any industrial society—the differences in incidence and scale of disruption being largely a function of the stage of development, but also of the spectacularly large amount of air, land, and water in which to disperse the pollutants. Insofar as one can judge, water pollution represents the gravest immediate threat to human and animal well-being and to the USSR economy, and it is therefore the subject of greatest concern and legislation. Yet there is a seeming indifference to the possible long-term hazards to this resource of massive land-improvement schemes. Air pollution has yet to become a major problem, but the level of noise in Soviet cities is an acknowledged irritant.

Further progress in modernization and industrialization will bring further problems to test the ingenuity and perseverance of Soviet environmentalists. Thus, the harmful side-effects of the use of agricultural chemicals may increase once the USSR reaches current West European levels of applica-

[49] *The International Herald-Tribune*, Oct. 8, 1971.

[50] See *Pravda*, July 29, 1971, and CTK (Czechoslovak Telegraph Agency), May 4, 1971.

[51] *Cf. The International Herald-Tribune*, June 19, 1971, and *The Observer*, July 4, 1971.

[52] *Saturday Review* (New York), Aug. 7, 1971, p. 49.

[53] *The New York Times*, May 24, 1972, pp. 1, 14.

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tion. The possible quadrupling of the number of private motor vehicles in the USSR by the end of the decade threatens to befoul the atmosphere. Western packaging technology is being imported, and Soviet housewives are discovering detergents.

There are many other similarities between Soviet and Western environmental problems. An enterprise director in each type of society will probably continue to pollute the air, water, or land in the drive to increase output, to reduce prime costs, and to enhance profitability unless he faces adequate economic or penal sanctions. The manufacturer in the USSR, and in most Western nations, still does not bear the burden of proving that society will *not* be harmed by his product or production process. The social costs of industrial operations will mount in the absence of an effective watchdog organization.

Where, then, does the Soviet experience of environmental disruption and in the formulation and implementation of countermeasures differ? On the surface of things, the Soviet political, economic and social structure would seem to offer certain distinct advantages in the area of prevention. Planners' preferences reign over consumer choice in matters ranging from city layout, highway construction, and siting of airports to the concentration on large apartment buildings or the selection of consumer goods to be produced. States' rights or private property interests present no obstacles to adoption and implementation of legislation against pollution.

Yet many aspects of the Soviet economic system appear to militate against environmental interests. In a centralized system of planning and management, the peculiarities of time and place tend to be ignored, introducing inflexibility into control measures. Then, too, the vertical structure of the system of industrial branch ministries may impede the flow of information concerning pollution. The absence of a charge (or in some cases the inadequacy of the charge) for natural resources leads to unbridled use and profligate waste.

Rapid economic growth has historically been a prime objective of Soviet policy, and success in attaining that goal has helped to legitimize party control over planning and management. However, by any measure, Soviet economic growth slowed during the 1960's and is not expected to stand out in the international "growth stakes" during the foreseeable future. Any additional impediments to growth, such as the diversion of massive funds to environmental measures, are hardly likely to be accepted by the Soviet leadership. At the enterprise level, the prime criterion of performance and the main yardstick for awarding premiums remains the growth of gross output. When this goal conflicts with the protection of the environment, the latter suffers. Another major legacy of the "Stalinist" model has been the unevenness of Soviet economic development. Key sectors have been accorded priority and have recorded impressive growth, while the remaining sectors have been treated as residual claimants on investment resources. Like consumer services, trade and other "nonproductive" spheres, environmental protection has been such a residual claimant; and insufficient resources have been allocated for research and development on pollution control technology, little capacity has been devoted to its production, and a low status has been accorded to its specialists. Furthermore, as has been noted, in many instances the ultimate responsibility for preserving natural resources lies with the agency charged with exploiting them.

Control of the media has meant that the officials, executives, and technicians concerned, as well as the broad public, are less than fully informed regarding the successes and shortcomings of other nations in curbing environmental disruption. It has also meant that only "approved" debates are aired: thus, the misgivings of certain scientists regarding the possible damage caused to the stratospheric ozone shield by SST flights are simply not disseminated. *Samizdat* offers a supplementary and alternative channel of dissemination. But as yet its radius is limited, and other issues are paramount.

The past ten years may someday be known as the decade of universal discovery of the issue of environmental disruption; and the coming decade will demonstrate what citizens and their governments are prepared to do about it on both a national and international scale. Soviet authorities are by now aware of the fundamental issues involved and of the choices to be made if ED is to be checked and/or corrected, but as yet, no major case has arisen which would unambiguously identify the true priorities of the Soviet leadership in this regard. To deal effectively with environmental problems, it must establish machinery to monitor environmental disruption and assess its social costs, set firm standards for the protection of the environment, establish sanctions adequate to deter violations, and enforce such measures consistently. It remains to be seen how the Soviet Union will respond to this serious problem facing its industrial society.

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Soviet Party History: The Stalinist Legacy

By Sidney I. Ploss

Since the death of Stalin the Soviet Union has undertaken a vast rewriting of the history of the Soviet Communist Party. Four different editions of a one-volume history of the CPSU—all compiled under the editorship of Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev—have been published (in 1959, 1962, 1969, and 1971) under the title of *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza* (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). In addition, pursuant to a Central Committee decree of June 22, 1960, the first five volumes of a new multi-volume series bearing the same general title have appeared in print between 1964 and 1971—these under the editorship of P. N. Pospelov, a leading official of the CPSU's Institute of Marxism-Leninism.[1]

The narrative of the multi-volume history, which has thus far been carried only through 1945, displays noticeably less candor in the portrayal of controversial episodes and issues in the party's past than did the revised histories published during the rule of the late Nikita Khrushchev. The variations in treatment between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods become relatively minor, however, when one compares the whole corpus of post-Stalin party historiography with that of the Stalinist era. What this article proposes to do, therefore, is to review the development and essential characteristics of Stalinist party history and then to examine to what extent these characteristics have changed through the post-Stalin years. By establishing the elements of continuity and change in this bellwether sphere of Soviet activity, we may perhaps gain some insight into the larger question of the relative influence of narrowly personal and deeper systemic factors in Soviet national life.

[1] Two of the five volumes (III and IV) consist of two parts. The periods covered by the successive volumes are as follows: I, 1883-1903; II, 1904-February 1917; III, March 1917-1920; IV, 1921-1937; V, 1938-1945.

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The Formative Period

Stalin was the principal architect of the centralized machinery that still survives in the Soviet Union today to administer and control studies of the history of the CPSU. When he became party General Secretary in 1922, there already was a "Commission for the Collection and Study of Materials Relating to the History of the October Revolution and Russian Communist Party" attached to the party headquarters. Known as Istpart, or Party History Section, this body was authorized to gather press and manuscript materials, to organize archives, libraries and museums, and to publish the findings of interested persons.[2] Upon Lenin's death, Stalin quickly expanded these functions with a view to creating a virtual monopoly of historical data which could be used to make or break the reputations of contenders for the supreme leadership of the single-party state. A Central Committee decree of November 5, 1924, ordered all party members to transmit to the main party office "all materials which are in any way related to the Central Committee archive and to the history of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)," [3] and one of those assigned to enforce this edict was I. P. Tovstu-

[2] *Izvestiia VTsIK* (Moscow), No. 213, 1920, and *Izvestiia TsK RKP(b)* (Moscow), No. 2 (38), 1922.

[3] *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Moscow), No. 5, 1958, p. 159.

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kha, Stalin's private aide and head of the party Secretariat's section for liaison with the secret police.[4] Shortly thereafter, Istpart itself was reorganized on a thoroughly authoritarian basis. Pursuant to a Central Committee decree of November 17, 1924, its "collegium" was replaced by a weaker "council," and its "chief" (*zaveduiushchii*) was empowered to decide, without council approval, all questions other than those relating to research.[5]

Not long after this chain of command was created between Istpart and the party Secretariat, Stalin himself acted to effect the suppression of documents which might be utilized to legitimize the current policy proposals of his adversaries in the top-level organs of the party. Urging that Leon Trotsky, then Chairman of the Revolutionary War Council and member of the Politburo, be disciplined for factional activities, Stalin told the Central Committee in January 1925 that Istpart was "not only a repository, but also an interpreter, of party documents." He added that "we find there, too, documents which are very negative in character and to which the party cannot reconcile itself" [6]—implying that such documents ought to be suppressed. Nevertheless, party historians, the majority of whom were then addressing themselves to the achievements of Bolshevism up to the early 1920's, were able to draw fairly generously upon primary source materials, and the works of V.I. Nevsky, N.N. Popov, and Ye. M. Yaroslavsky provided reasonably balanced assessments of the Bolshevik experience—without of course being notably objective in treating the motives of rival political forces and personalities.

The real stalinization of party-historical studies began with the dictator's sudden decision to launch a massive attack on the country's system of private farming. The regime's fear that party officials might balk at carrying out the forcible drive for total collectivization of agriculture led to a sharp shift of focus in the work of party historians from the early program and tactics of Bolshevism to the rise and fall of deviators within the party. In February 1930, a conference of teachers of party history was held under the auspices of the Section for CPSU(B) History of the Communist Academy's Society of Marxist Historians. Addressing the conference, Yaroslavsky, then Secretary of the party's Control Commission, criticized "some comrades" for dealing only with remote happenings and not wishing to explore the past from the viewpoint of present-day politics. Such researchers were told to bring their work "closer to reality" and, in particular, to link "the present-day struggle with opportunism" with "the struggle against opportunistic currents in the history of our party." [7] Another speaker, Professor D. Ya. Kin, went so far as to assert that the study of intraparty conflicts "justifies the existence of party history as a science," and he declared that "the main task" of party historians was "to study the social roots of the regularity of deviations and of overcoming them in struggle." [8] Stalin promptly instructed the editors of *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia* (Proletarian Revolution), the official journal of party history, to publish Yaroslavsky's conference report as a special article.[9] However, the new stress on bygone heresies within the party was deplored by Istpart's first chairman, the old Bolshevik M. S. Olminsky, who warned in a letter to the editors of *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia* that, if this policy were to continue, "we shall get emasculated Leninism and a one-sided version of party history." [10]

The Cult of Personality

Along with the move to inject an inquisitorial bias into the writing of party history, a trend toward making Stalin appear infallible also became evident. As early as the General Secretary's fiftieth birthday, on December 21, 1929, *Pravda* affirmed that "Stalin is a whole epoch in the history of our party and party leadership." The grossness of this exaggeration, however, did not heighten its plausibility, and Stalin was obliged to resort to administrative pressure in order to force a revision of party history that would properly exalt his personal role. The General Secretary launched his move in October 1931 with a letter to the editors of *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia* charging that there were certain unspecified "errors of principle and of a historical nature" in the party histories edited by Yaroslavsky.[11] The charge was elaborated by party Secretary L. M. Kaganovich at a meeting of

[4] *Ibid.* and "Ivan Pavlovich Tovstukha. Kratkaia biografiia" (Ivan Pavlovich Tovstukha, A Short Biography), *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia* (Moscow), No. 6, 1935, pp. 130-31.

[5] *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 5, 1958, p. 159.

[6] I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia. Tom 7. 1925* (Works, Vol. 7, 1925), Moscow, 1947, p. 8.

[7] *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, No. 2-3 (97-98), 1930, pp. 146-71.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 176-79.

[9] L. A. Slepov, *Istoriia KPSS—Vazhneishiaia obshchestvennaia nauka* (History of the CPSU—The Most Important Social Science), Moscow, 1964, p. 11.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] No. 6, 1931, pp. 3-13.

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the Red Professors' Institute on December 1, 1931, when he accused Yaroslavsky of having given a "slanderous" and "Trotskyite" appraisal of the conduct of Bolshevik leaders in March 1917, just after the downfall of Tsarism.[12] What Kaganovich was referring to was Yaroslavsky's recognition, in his *Istoriia VKP(b)* [History of the All-Union Communist Party (B)] published in 1930, of the well-known fact that Stalin, then editor of *Pravda*, had joined Lev B. Kamenev and others in opposing Lenin's advice from abroad that the Bolsheviks should come out against the Provisional Government and its pro-war policy. Kamenev, according to Yaroslavsky's account,

. . . held an extreme right-wing position and vocalized the semi-Menshevik tendency noticeable among certain Bolshevik elements. Comrades Muranov and Stalin also held a mistaken position in basic questions, but they corrected themselves rapidly while Kamenev continued to "deepen" his wrongful course.[13]

This version of the March 1917 events was obviously one that Stalin was determined to have expunged from the party records. Under heavy pressure, Yaroslavsky dutifully rewrote his manual "on the basis of the instructions furnished in Comrade Stalin's letter and the party criticism of my works." When treating the 1917 Revolution in his revised volume, published in 1933, he quoted Stalin almost 20 times in the space of less than 35 pages and claimed that Stalin in March had instantly backed Lenin's uncompromising stand.[14]

By now, the retroactive hounding of opposition figures within the party and the legend of the Leader's infallibility had already become established hallmarks of the Stalinist brand of party history, and to these Yaroslavsky's 1933 manual added another key ingredient. This was a reassertion of the early Leninist unwillingness to recognize the working class as capable of any spontaneous movement. Besides criticizing Western socialists for neglecting the "role of the party apparatus," Yaroslavsky flayed A. G. Shliapnikov's eyewitness account of the March 1917 Revolution on the ground that it depicted the turmoil as a "spontaneous" development in large part not organized by the Bolsheviks.[15] It should be noted that Shliapnikov, a leader of the Petrograd Soviet in 1917, had already been expelled from the party in 1931 as a "degenerate."

Still another new wrinkle was added to the Stalinist version of the Bolshevik past by the *Kratkaia Istoriia VKP(b)* [Short History of the All-Union Communist Party (B)] edited in 1934–36 by V. G. Knorin, Comintern bureaucrat and director of the Red Professors' Institute for Party History. Whereas earlier works had told of Lenin's reverence for the 19th-century *Narodnik* (Populist), S. N. Khalturin, as an exemplar of devotion to party and had noted that it was another *Narodnik,* Ye. O. Zaslavsky, who founded the first workers' organization in Russia, Knorin's book entirely disowned the *Narodniki* because of their advocacy of individual acts of political terror. There is reason to believe that this curious shift was prompted by concern in the Kremlin over signs of the spread of violent anti-Stalin moods among Soviet youth following the murder in 1934 of Politburo member S. M. Kirov.[16]

The Monolithic Stage

However, the subornation of party historiography in order to further Stalin's personal ambitions was yet to enter its most blatant phase as the dictator, in 1937, unleashed a savage reign of terror designed to stamp out all vestiges of opposition within the party. Absorbed by the issue of intraparty dissension and by his own as well as the party's public image, Stalin now moved to harness the presentation of the party's historical past to the task of eradicating any lingering nostalgia for healthy intraparty debate and dispelling the belief that political Darwinism was the supreme law of Kremlin existence. In a letter addressed to the compilers of a projected new textbook of party history and published in *Pravda* on May 6, 1937, Stalin asserted that intraparty conflicts and disagreements were inevitable only under conditions of capitalism, and that all of the old settling of personal accounts inside the Bolshevik party had to be presented as "a struggle *of principle* for Leninism" or else the Bolsheviks would be discredited as "incorrigible and restless brawlers and scufflers."

[12] *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 12, 1931.

[13] *Istoriia VKP(b)* [History of All-Union Communist Party(B)], Moscow, 1930, p. 77.

[14] *Istoriia VKP(b) Chast 2* [History of the All-Union Communist Party(B), Part 2], Moscow, 1933, p. 17.

[15] *Ibid.*, Chapters 10 and 13.

[16] Valuable information concerning the attitudes of Soviet youth in this period is found in the secret reports filed in March 1935 in the Western Region of the USSR, which are part of the "Smolensk Archive," a collection of Soviet documents now in the custody of the Departmental Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, US Army. See WKP 415, pp. 1-10, 32-40.

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In order to embellish his own historical image, Stalin also ordered a new periodization which gave him coequal status with Lenin as a charter party member. Whereas Lenin had pointed to 1894 as the year when the Social-Democratic movement in Russia embarked on its organizational phase,[17] Stalin's letter of May 1937 prescribed that Chapter 2 of the new textbook should be entitled "Formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party. Appearance of the Bolshevik and the Menshevik Groups Within the Party (1901–1904)." The significance of this bit of historical legerdemain was transparent, for it was in 1901 that Stalin had joined the political underground and the illegal Georgian journal *Brdzola* (The Struggle) had carried his essay, "The Russian Social-Democratic Party and Its Immediate Tasks."

The new party history—*Istoriia vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (bolshevikov). Kratkii kurs* [History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik): Short Course], henceforth referred to as the *Short Course*—was serialized in *Pravda* from September 9 through 19, 1938, and published in book form one month later. In conformity with Stalin's own directives, it elevated him to the same pinnacle of immortality hitherto reserved for Lenin alone. Lenin and Stalin together were depicted as the prime movers of the Bolshevik Revolution, the former as drafter of the party resolution for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the latter—imaginatively—as practical director of the armed uprising. The fact that Stalin had at first demurred to Lenin's proposal to sign a peace treaty with the Central Powers in February 1918 was forgotten, and instead the *Short Course* asserted that both leaders had insisted throughout the Central Committee debate on the issue that peace be signed.

Again, in dealing with the civil war, the *Short Course* claimed that when the Soviet regime was imperiled by the White army of General Denikin in 1919 and Lenin issued the slogan of total mobilization, Stalin had put forward his own plan for defeating the enemy—an invention that was to be debunked after the dictator's demise. The argument that had taken place between the two leaders over the formation of the USSR was another fact that the compilers of the *Short Course* chose to consign to oblivion; they credited the establishment of a union of socialist republics to "the proposal of Lenin and Stalin," extolling it as "a great victory for the Leninist-Stalinist policy of the Bolshevik Party on the national question." But perhaps the master stroke was the placing of Stalin's collectivization of agriculture on a par with Lenin's capture of state power: the *Short Course* called the collectivization drive "a profound revolution, a leap from an old qualitative state of society to a new qualitative state, equivalent in its consequences to the Revolution of October 1917."

On the other hand, no ink was spared in the vilification of the closest associates of Lenin whom Stalin had ruthlessly liquidated by means of the Moscow purge trials of 1937–38. The "new facts" of party history as delineated in the trials were sprinkled throughout the *Short Course* and recapitulated in its final chapter:

The trials showed that these dregs of humanity, in conjunction with the enemies of the people, Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, had been in conspiracy against Lenin, the party and the Soviet state ever since the early days of the October Socialist Revolution. The insidious attempts to thwart the peace of Brest-Litovsk at the beginning of 1918, the plot against Lenin, and the conspiracy with the "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries for the arrest and murder of Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov in the spring of 1918, the villainous shot that wounded Lenin in the summer of 1918, the revolt of the "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries in the summer of 1918, the deliberate aggravation of differences in the party in 1921 with the object of undermining and overthrowing Lenin's leadership from within, the attempts to overthrow the party leadership during Lenin's illness and after his death, the betrayal of state secrets and the supply of information of an espionage character to foreign espionage services, the vile assassination of Kirov, the acts of wrecking, diversion and explosions, the dastardly murders of Menzhinsky, Kuibyshev and Gorky—all these and similar villainies over a period of twenty years were committed, it transpired, with the participation or under the direction of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov and their henchmen, at the behest of espionage services of bourgeois states.[18]

The effect of this wholesale falsification of the party record was to consign the most eminent political and military organizers of 1917–20 to the dustbin of history for the greater glory of Stalin and of those lesser party figures who were credited in the *Short*

[17] *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Complete Collected Works), Moscow, 1961, Vol. 26, p. 264.

[18] Installment in *Pravda*, Sept. 19, 1938.

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Course with having established Bolshevik rule at the lower levels and were now members in good standing of the Politburo, Secretariat and Orgburo. N. I. Yezhov, head of the secret police during the Great Purge, shared in these encomiums—but only temporarily as his name was soon to be dropped from later editions of the *Short Course* after he, too, was purged in 1939 for "crimes."[19]

The *Short Course* was further characterized by a clear-cut attempt to suppress the last evidences of a historical-ideological basis for the observance of any kind of democracy within the party, even if only in the top-level decision-making bodies. Now ignored was the fact that Stalin had been elected to the post of General Secretary by a plenary session of the Central Committee in 1922—an omission which implied that the Leader was not even formally accountable to what was theoretically the party parliament. The old art of canvassing opinions before voting on final decisions in the Central Committee was also passed over in silence. Nor was reference any longer made to the Politburo as a forum in which conflicting views were exchanged on vital issues of national life. As for open policy discussions at the lower levels, the last ones that had been held in the Soviet Union in the 1920's were now mocked as the handiwork of "lovers of controversy." The stamp of finality was put on all these omissions and falsifications by a decree of the Central Committee declaring that the *Short Course* offered "an interpretation of the basic questions of CPSU(B) history and Marxism-Leninism which has been verified by the CPSU(B) Central Committee and does not allow for any arbitrary interpretations." [20]

Withdrawal from Monolithism

From 1938 until Stalin's death in 1953, party historians were allowed to do little more than comment on the propositions laid down in the *Short Course*. No sooner had the old dictator passed away, however, than the Ministry of Higher Education implicitly recognized the intellectual worthlessness of such exegeses of Stalinist historical scripture by ordering the closing down of party-history departments at major universities and in effect barring graduate students from specializing in the subject.[21]

But it remained for the 20th CPSU Congress of 1956, which brought Khrushchev's repudiation of Stalin, to inject new life into party historiography. Addressing the Congress, A. I. Mikoyan enjoined party historians to reject the amateurish methodology of Stalin's day and strongly implied that the interpretations in the *Short Course* needed revision:

If our historians *would really and deeply study the facts and events of our party's history for the Soviet period, including those elaborated in the* Short Course, *if they dug well into the archives and into the historical documents, and not only into newspaper files, they would now be able to illuminate better and from positions of Leninism many facts and events recited in the* Short Course.[22]

Not until the following year, however, was an official journal of party history reestablished to fill the vacuum left by the termination of *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia* in 1940.

Khrushchev's destalinization policies paved the way for the correction of some of the most flagrant distortions of Stalinist historiography, but the writing of party history nevertheless remained thoroughly politicalized. Although the party's top leader might refrain from dictating how to depict the past in Stalin's fashion, he and the other members of the Politburo continued to involve themselves closely in the setting of interpretive guidelines. They were not always in agreement on crucial issues. According to an official source, Khrushchev's demand for revision of the *Short Course* gave rise to dispute at a meeting of the party Presidium (now the Politburo) soon after the 20th Congress, with Molotov and Kaganovich defending the *Short Course* and opposing the writing of a new party history as well as the granting to authors of access to archival documents.[23]

In any event, the top party organs continued to keep a watchful eye on party historians and to hand down occasional directives with respect to their work, particularly in touchy areas such as the treatment of the Stalinist heritage. On at least two occasions, this issue was the subject of formal Central Committee decrees: one in March 1957, which ordered cautious treatment of the Stalin period, and

[19] B. Gavrilov, M. Chernov, *Vosemnadtsatyi sezd VKP(b)*, [18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party(B)], Moscow, 1961, pp. 63-64.

[20] *Pravda*, Nov. 15, 1938.

[21] *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie o merakh uluchsheniia podgotovki nauchno-pedagogicheskikh kadrov po istoricheskim naukam* (All-Union Conference on Measures to Improve the Training of Scientific-Instructional Cadres in Historical Science), Moscow, 1964, p. 235.

[22] *Pravda*, Feb. 18, 1956.

[23] *Vsesoiuznoe soveschanie* . . ., p. 289.

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another in October 1962, which called for an opposite—*i.e.*, bolder—approach.[24] More often, guidance has taken the form of "directive" articles featured in press organs close to the Secretariat—notably *Pravda* and *Kommunist*—or in the monthly journal of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Problems of CPSU History).[25]

As the two quite contrary Central Committee decrees mentioned above already indicate, sudden shifts in the political climate have continued to complicate the task of party historians in the post-Stalin period. Advance copies of the very first volume of the new multi-volume CPSU history ordered by the Central Committee in June 1960 had barely been distributed when Khrushchev's overthrow in late 1964 caused them to be recalled, and five years later a shift in the policy of the successor leadership caused the same thing to happen to the third edition of a one-volume party history originally published in 1959 to take the place of the *Short Course*. In both these instances, second printings were necessary in order to permit *ex post facto* adjustments in the texts dictated by the altered political situation.

End of the Stalin Cult

While policy with respect to party historiography has differed in some matters of detail under the Khrushchev and Brezhnev leaderships, the main features of the post-Stalin overview have remained fairly constant. The nimbus around Stalin, destroyed in 1956, has not been restored. All the standard manuals on the party's history now reproduce the once-buried passage of Lenin's "Testament" advising that Stalin be replaced as General Secretary by someone "more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less capricious, etc." [26] All major texts likewise reject the old duality-equality of Lenin and Stalin in dating the origins of the Communist Party back to 1894 rather than 1901, diminishing Stalin's role in the 1917–20 "heroic period," and allotting to Lenin's October Revolution clear-cut primacy of importance over Stalin's collectivization of agriculture. Under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, Stalin has been consistently reproached for his original support of the Provisional Government (1917), for "haste and proneness to command" in connection with the formation of the USSR (1922), for making scapegoats of local officials when it became necessary to sound a temporary retreat from the assault on private farming (1930), and especially for having unleashed the great terror against the party (1937).[27]

There has, to be sure, been a difference of degree between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev policies on just how far to carry the dethronement of Stalin. By 1962, when the second edition of the one-volume *Istoriia KPSS* appeared, Khrushchev's historians were thoroughly blackening the dead dictator's image by emphasizing such things as his disagreements with Lenin, his use of the Kirov murder as a pretext for settling personal scores with his party rivals, his near-fatal minimization of the danger of Nazi attack on the USSR in 1941, and his oppressive and even paranoiac rule after the Second World War. However, unlike its predecessor, the third edition published in 1969 restored a measure of balance by picturing Stalin as a generally reliable cohort of Lenin in the party's march to power and as a staunch though harsh defender of the party's undivided authority.[28] Whatever the motives behind the Brezhnev leadership's limited reinstatement of Stalin, it has the sensible effect of according the latter a place in history somewhere between the grossly exaggerated one he claimed for himself after 1938 and the limbo to which he was consigned by Khrushchev.

A second great change in post-Stalin party historiography is a noticeable downplaying of personal power rivalries within the top leadership in favor of greater attention to substantive policy decisions, party programs, mass campaigns, and the operations of the party bureaucracy. The power struggles of the past are also dealt with in a less emotional and less calumniatory fashion. The members of Lenin's old

[24] *Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika* (Party Worker's Handbook), First Issue, Moscow, 1958, pp. 381-82; and Fourth Issue, Moscow, 1963, pp. 454-57.

[25] See, for example, *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, 1956, pp. 14-26; No. 1, 1960, pp. 10-35; and No. 3, 1969, pp. 67-82.

[26] See, *e.g.*, *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza. Tom Chetviortyi. Kommunisticheskaia Partiia v borbe za postroenie sotsializma v SSSR. 1921-1937 gg. Kniga pervaia (1921-1929 gg.)* [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Vol. 4. The Communist Party in the Struggle to Build Socialism in the USSR. 1921-37. Book One (1921-29)], Moscow, 1970, p. 331.

[27] *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza (Izdanie vtoroe, dopolnennoe)* [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (2nd Edition, expanded)], Moscow, 1962, pp. 210, 361, 445, 504-505; and *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza (Izdanie trete, dopolnennoe)* [History of the Communist Party (3rd Edition, expanded)], Moscow, 1969, pp. 192-93, 325, 405, 451-52. Hereafter these two volumes will be referenced as *Istoriia KPSS* (1962) and *Istoriia KPSS* (1969).

[28] *Istoriia KPSS* (1962), pp. 136, 168, 244, 375, 486, 540-541, 622-624; and *Istoriia* KPSS (1969), pp. 123, 154, 222, 343, 437-438, 478-479, 549.

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THE CURVE OF THE CULT

1—Stalin enshrined with Lenin in the Red Square mausoleum; the names of both leaders are embossed above the entrance.

2—Stalin's name has disappeared from the mausoleum entrance following the removal of his body in October 1961, symbolic of an intensified wave of destalinization launched at the 22nd CPSU Congress.



3—Flowers mark Stalin's modest new resting place behind the mausoleum on December 20, 1964 (the 85th anniversary of his birth).

4—Tourists file past the bust of Stalin which was unveiled over his grave on June 25, 1970, marking his partial rehabilitation.

Photos 1, 2, and 4 by Wide World; photo 3 by UPI.

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guard liquidated by Stalin—Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin—are no longer branded as spies and saboteurs, but merely as "opportunists" and "capitulators"; they are reduced, as it were, to wooden figures of minor importance, yielding place to secondary actors as Y. E. Rudzutak and S. V. Kossior, builders of the Stalin machine which finally destroyed them.

The same holds true for the portrayal of those brought down in more recent power struggles in the Kremlin. Even former security chief L. P. Beria, save for the obloquy heaped upon him for persecuting high officials and trying to seize the reins of power after Stalin's death, is simply dismissed as an unperson. G. M. Malenkov, Stalin's *alter ego* for many years and his successor as premier from 1953 to 1955, is mentioned in the most recent editions (1969 and 1971) of *Istoriia KPSS* only in connection with having belonged to the "anti-party group" defeated in June 1957. V. M. Molotov, though criticized for having incurred Lenin's wrath, having organized party purges (with Kaganovich), and having ended up as a backward intriguer, is nevertheless given credit as a stalwart of the 1920's. Similarly, the 1969 volume denounces Khrushchev himself as a power-lover, an agricultural dilettante, and the nemesis of honest party workers, but praises him for his supervision of front-line generals in World War II.[29] (It may be noted here that the new multi-volume history of the party, in listing the top organizers of the war period, names all the important leaders with the exception of Beria.[30]) All this, of course, indicates few, if any, concessions to historical objectivity. What it does seem to reflect is a conscious effort to stress the collective activity of the party rather than the contributions—good or bad—of individuals.

A third change has been a departure from Stalin's blanket condemnation of the *Narodniki* in order to forge a nationalist link with Russia's pre-Marxist radicals. N. G. Chernyshevsky and other Revolutionary Democrats of the 1860's are honored anew for their socialist instincts and denunciations of Western representative government. *Narodnik* ideologists of the 1870's are criticized for their propensity toward putsches and historical leaps-forward, but the inspirational quality of their rebellious conduct is now hailed; and their militant followers, though scored for harboring terroristic "illusions," are credited with handing down to the Bolsheviks a model of organizational centralism. The onetime *Narodnik,* G. V. Plekhanov, who created the first group of Russian Marxists but was downgraded in the *Short Course* for his later adherence to Menshevism, is proudly represented as the equal of any European Marxist.[31]

A fourth break with Stalinist orthodoxy is the rediscovery of the higher party bodies as the repositories of collective decision-making power and as forums of policy debate. The Politburo is identified as the maker of strategic decisions in the Civil War and the place where Trotsky should have brought his complaints against the party bureaucracy—"as this was and is usually done." [32] Lenin's authority is invoked against "the unilateral solution of questions of principle" and for the quasi-constitutional idea that "the collegial decisions of the Central Committee, adopted in the Orgburo, Politburo or Central Committee Plenum, and *only* those decisions, have been implemented by the Secretary of the party's Central Committee." [33] As was the case before 1938, party histories explicitly note that the post of General Secretary is filled by a candidate collectively chosen by the Central Committee.

Limited Historical Debate

This renewed emphasis on pluralism within the top party elite has brought with it still another change in party historiography—namely, the reappearance of some leeway for differences of historical evaluation in contrast to the imposed uniformity of the Stalin era. One evidence of this was a protracted public controversy carried on between party historians in Moscow and Kiev from 1957 to 1962 over the revolutionary purity of the Ukrainian Communists a half-century earlier—a controversy not without relevance to contemporary sectional politics. One observer, an old Bolshevik who had served a term in Stalinist prison camps, wrote:

. . . for five years the Ukrainian comrades waged a

[29] *Istoriia KPSS* (1969), pp. 482, 586, 587, 609.

[30] *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza. Tom Piatyi. Kommunisticheskaia Partiia nakanune i v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny. Kniga pervaia (1938-1945 gg)* [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Vol. 5. The Communist Party on the Eve and During the Years of the Great Fatherland War. Book One (1938-45)], Moscow, 1970, pp. 164, 169, 220, 276, 334, 339, 589.

[31] *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza. Tom Pervyi. Sozdanie Bolshevistskoi Partii. 1883-1903 (History of the* Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Vol. 1. Creation of the Bolshevik Party. 1883-1903), Moscow, 1965, pp. 29 ff.

[32] *Istoriia KPSS* (1969), p. 345.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 336.

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desperate struggle with the [Stalin] cultists for a truthful, Leninist history of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and for five years not one article appeared in Voprosy Istorii KPSS [*Problems of CPSU History*] *which helped them in the struggle for honest essays about the history of the Ukrainian party (CPU). The journal did not contribute one bit to the good essays which the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party finally approved. On the other hand, there were many articles defending the eructations of the Stalinist falsifiers, who blackened the most shining pages of the CPU's history. And the best cadres of the CPU were scorned as deviators. The Central Committee of the CPU ignored all this and published good, truthful essays.*

One should not be astonished that this journal [Voprosy Istorii KPSS], *while defending the Stalinist eructations, published articles on problems of Ukrainian Communist Party history which cynically vulgarized Lenin in order to confirm Stalinist fairy tales. Here is an example of how Lenin was used for anti-Leninist purposes. Lenin had said, "We jokingly call the Kievans fighters for independence." In one of its articles, the journal deleted the word "jokingly" and added "that is, 'Leftists,'" which Lenin never said. So it comes out as if Lenin seriously called [the Kievan] fighters for independence the "Leftists" of the CPU. But Lenin said "jokingly" and uttered not a word about "Leftists." And such methods are used . . . after the 20th Congress! Is this how the party is being cleansed of the cult's aftermath? This is indeed cynical falsification of Lenin!* [34]

Similarly, conflicting assessments of the implementation of Stalin's collectivization drive have repeatedly filtered into print. In 1966, for example, *Kommunist* scolded "some historians" for having attributed the huge losses of livestock in 1930 to "the urge of certain persons to accelerate collectivization by any and all means." [35] *Kommunist's* implicit defense of Stalin was promptly challenged, however, by a researcher at Moscow University, who maintained that the *Short Course* had wrongly charged local officials with the sin of adventurism for the sake of salvaging Stalin's reputation.[36] This anti-Stalinist study was commended in 1967 by an academic historical review, only to be torn to pieces a year later in the official journal of party history.[37] Nevertheless, in 1971, the latter journal published an article by another author who accented the negative side of collectivization and insinuated that Stalin was not empowered by the Central Committee to rush things as he did.[38] And so the debate goes on.

Controversy among historians over evaluation of the Stalin legacy also takes the form of scholastic haggling over periodization. Under Khrushchev it was usual to treat Stalin's death as a historical watershed, dividing the party's postwar history through 1958 into the periods 1945–53 and 1953–58. The Brezhnev leadership, however, wished to retain at least a legitimating symbol of continuity with the Stalinist regime; hence the party history manuals of 1969 and 1971 switched to a periodization that divided the 1945–58 period at the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952. Professor L.A. Slepov, senior researcher at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, has since proposed a return to Khrushchev's periodization in view of "fundamental, qualitative advances in historical reality" and the "change of party policy."[39]

There have even been a few, more venturesome historians who have acclaimed the frankness of intraparty dialogue on policy issues in 1918–20 and gone so far as to wonder aloud if the anarcho-syndicalist platform of the "Workers' Opposition" was not, in fact, quite consonant with solemn commitments made by Lenin during the Bolshevik Revolution.[40]

Nevertheless, the norm for party historians remains the dutiful observance of a vast array of taboos designed to safeguard the legitimacy of one-party rule and protect the leviathan mechanism whereby the Kremlin leaders maintain social control at home and project Soviet influence abroad. Lenin is the divine patriarch of the system, and his fiercely partisan version of Russian revolutionary history is gospel. This involves acceptance of such dubious "facts" as the solid unity of workers and Marxist intellectuals in St. Petersburg during the 1890's; Lenin's almost singlehanded creation of the newspaper *Iskra* and authorship of the original party program; the role of the Mensheviks as "agents of the bourgeoisie in the labor movement"; the immutabil-

[34] *Vsesoiuznoe soveschanie . . .*, pp. 268-69.

[35] No. 3, 1966, p. 97.

[36] N. I. Nemakov, *Kommunisticheskaia Partiia—Organizator massovovo kolkhoznovo dvizheniia (1929-1932 gg.) Po materialam nekotorykh oblastei i kraev RSFSR* [The Communist Party—Organizer of the Mass Kolkhoz Movement (1929-32). From Materials of Certain Oblasts and Krais of the RSFSR], Moscow, 1966, pp. 12 and 20.

[37] *Cf. Istoriia SSSR* (Moscow), No. 4, 1967, pp. 158-59, and *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 6, 1968, pp. 111-18.

[38] *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 6, 1971, pp. 120-23.

[39] *Ibid., No. 10*, 1971, p. 72.

[40] *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 10, 1970, pp. 127-32; No. 11, 1970, pp. 166-73; and *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 1, 1971, p. 46.

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ity of Tsarist absolutism in 1906–14; and the absence of close contact between the Bolsheviks and the German high command in World War I. The battling over Lenin's succession cannot be viewed in terms of raw power politics but must be construed as simply a matter of differences of opinion concerning economic and class relations. The part played by spontaneity in revolutionary events is still denied, and a vanguard role is fancifully attributed to the Bolsheviks in the upheavals of 1905 and March 1917. One of Brezhnev's lieutenants, who has chronicled the regime's agrarian policies, is especially harsh on theorists who preach spontaneity in agricultural development, accusing them of "fully taking up the sword" of "Bukharin's anti-Marxist theory."[41]

Balance Sheet

In the short span of less than 15 years (1924–39), Stalin left a permanent mark on the recording of CPSU history. He not only confiscated most private archives but also barred anyone inside the USSR from writing monographs or memoirs solidly based on the unrestricted use of original sources. No less a figure than Khrushchev would later become the victim of this Stalinist rule which he himself had kept on the books.

Since Stalin's death, official control of party historiography has become less personalized and restrictive, but Khrushchev did not allow anything like real objectivity or freedom of interpretation to come into play—and even less has his successor, Brezhnev. Control over documents and publication has remained broad enough in scope to dismay both professional historians writing for party outlets and those who engage in *samizdat*. The legacy of Stalinist historiography has also lingered on through the continued presence in the party-history bureaucracy of many scribes from the Stalin era whose habits of bowdlerizing and falsifying still tend to vitiate the official literature. A whiff of lingering Stalinism may further be detected in the Brezhnev leadership's decision to allow an ultraconservative *apparatchik* like Trapeznikov to pen historical essays on the collectivization of agriculture and "revisionism."

Substantively, the "one-sided version of party history" against which Olminsky prophetically warned in 1930, and which became a hallmark of the Stalin era, has been modified to some degree. Some diversity and public exchange of opinion in professional historical circles have reemerged, along with historical narratives that go beyond the rehashing of factional struggles and the biographical records of present-day leaders. Welcome, too, is the apparent trend away from Khrushchev's contradictory ploy of seeking to disgrace Stalin by means of Stalinist methods. Nevertheless, small progress has been made toward an objective and realistic delineation of men and events, not to speak of capturing the color of history as seen through the eyes of those who lived it. It is simply implausible that Lenin was a statesman wholly free of ulterior or less than idealistic motives; that the Bolsheviks always stood in the forefront of Russia's revolutionary masses; or that the CPSU Central Committee, which meets irregularly for one or two days, has always been the real locus of governing power. At least so far as the processes of policy-making are concerned, one can say that the Stalinist *Short Course,* with its heavy overtones of Kremlin intrigue, presented a picture more suggestive of the actual state of affairs than all the drab manuals of party history that have followed.

In any event, it is wrong to believe that Khrushchev revolutionized the character and methods of Soviet party historiography, or that Brezhnev in turn has deviated drastically from Khrushchev's policies in these areas. Stalin created the institutional framework and set the fundamental orientation for party historiography, and these have remained constant under the regimes of both Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Though the spirit of bureaucratic dictation and cynical manipulation that characterized the Stalinist approach has perhaps been moderated somewhat, its basic persistence in the face of immense social change is what seems truly remarkable. Indeed, this persistence would seem to suggest an inherent quality of the Soviet political mind that transcends the personal eccentricities of individual party bosses. There may be at work here some inner logic of a single-party state whose leaders have never obtained a legitimate popular mandate to rule and have felt compelled to resort to historical make-believe in order to build up public confidence in their leadership. The fact that some diversity of historical thought is again being tolerated is, to be sure, a hopeful sign, but the question of how far this trend will go is but part of the larger question of the overall direction of change in Soviet society.

[41] S. P. Trapeznikov, *Istoricheskii opyt KPSS v osushchestvlenii Leninskovo kooperativnovo plana. Tom Vtoroi* (The Historical Experience of the CPSU in Effecting the Leninist Cooperative Plan, Vol. II), Moscow, 1967, p. 566.

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Bulgaria's Politics of Conformity

By F. Stephen Larrabee

Among the postwar Communist states of the Balkans, Bulgaria has been the least affected by the winds of change and national self-assertiveness that have moved first Yugoslavia, then Albania, and finally Romania to challenge, in one degree or another, Moscow's hegemony in that region. While Soviet influence has been eroded in other Balkan capitals, Sofia remains a docile ally, maintaining and even intensifying its political and economic ties to the USSR. As the recently-approved draft program of the Bulgaran Communist Party (BCP) stated,

The fraternal friendship and cooperation of the Bulgarian Communist Party with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the ever broader and deeper alignment of Bulgaria with the Soviet Union will remain the immovable cornerstone of the entire work and the domestic and foreign policy of our party.[1]

While this position has not precluded some initiative and experimentation in Sofia's foreign and domestic policies, the overall picture is one of constant, even increasing subservience. This is seen most clearly in the economic realm, where the trend has been toward ever closer integration of the Bulgarian economy with that of the Soviet Union. Such a policy was strongly affirmed by BCP First Secretary Todor Zhivkov at the July 1968 Plenum of the party's Central Committee, and it was carried further at a September 1969 Plenum where Zhivkov announced Bulgaria's intention to "move gradually toward joint planning in a number of [economic] branches" with the Soviet Union.[2] The policy of integration was also formalized in a series of sweeping economic agreements concluded between Bulgaria and the USSR in May 1969, August 1970, and November 1970.[3]

Why has Bulgaria, which entered the postwar world at roughly the same level of economic and social development as the other Balkan Communist states, moved in a direction contrary to that taken by its neighbors? Three factors appear paramount: Bulgaria's historical ties to Russia, the considerable Soviet aid poured into Bulgaria, and the weakness and insecurity of the Bulgarian leadership.

A very real factor in the cooperation between Bulgaria and Soviet Russia is the historical affinity between the two countries, which dates back to Russian liberation of Bulgaria from the Turks in 1878. There are also strong cultural, linguistic and religious ties between these two Slavic nations which date back to a much earlier period. Such common ties must not be discounted, although it seems clear that they are not sufficient to explain Bulgaria's persistent postwar orientation toward the Soviet Union.

A more significant factor has been the economic aid extended by the USSR—assistance which undeniably contributed to Bulgaria's ability to industrialize at a pace far more rapid than would otherwise have been possible.[4] The Kremlin's continuing "generosity" has several apparent motives. First, the large

[1] *Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), March 14, 1971 (emphasis added).

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[2] *Ibid.*, Sept. 27, 1969.

[3] *Ibid.*, May 23, 1969, Aug. 29, 1970, and Nov. 5, 1970.

[4] The extent to which the Soviet Union has been willing to underwrite Bulgarian industrialization is clearly illustrated in the fact that by 1967 more than 130 large industrial enterprises constructed with Soviet aid were producing 85 percent of all Bulgaria's ferrous metals output, 95 percent of its nonferrous output, 55 percent of its chemical manufactures, 70 percent of its electrical goods, and 100 percent of its shipbuilding output (see *Rabotnichesko delo*, May 10, 1967). In the same year it was estimated that there were 5,000 Soviet specialists in Bulgaria (see *Politicheska prosveta* [Sofia] No. 8, August 1967).

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credits have strengthened the dependability of Bulgaria as a Soviet pawn in the Balkans, an area of increasing importance to the USSR as its interests in the Middle East grow. Second, the assistance appears designed to make Bulgaria a showcase of socialist development. The Bulgarian pattern of economic development—stressing a rapid growth rate, a highly centralized economy, and major Soviet involvement—is one which Moscow seeks to establish as an alternative to the decentralizing reforms which have occurred in other East European countries such as Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Related to this, the Bulgarian example of coordination and integration with the Soviet economy represents the direction in which Moscow would like all members of Comecon (Council on Mutual Economic Assistance) to move. The Bulgarians themselves have explicitly described their policy in this sphere as an outgrowth and realization of the program of socialist integration charted by the resolutions of the 23rd and 24th sessions of Comecon.[5]

Patently, Bulgaria's economic advancement through cooperation with the USSR has been bought at the price of reduced political independence. The country's heavy dependence on trade with the USSR and Comecon (more than 60 and close to 80 percent, respectively, of the total Bulgarian foreign trade turnover) essentially precludes any dramatic foreign policy initiatives that would antagonize the Soviet Union. The extent of Bulgaria's dependence on the USSR for critical raw materials can be seen in the following representative figures: the USSR provides 100 percent of Bulgaria's hard coal, 100 percent of its paper, 92 percent of its crude oil, 90 percent of its iron ore, and 87 percent of its residual oil.[6]

The final and perhaps most influential factor underlying Bulgarian cooperation with the Soviet Union has been the insecurity and instability of the BCP leadership, which have forced Zhivkov to look continually to Moscow for political support. Although he has been the party chief for 18 years, his power was more nominal than real in the early years. It was only at the Eighth BCP Congress in November 1962 that Zhivkov succeeded in decisively overcoming the factional rivalry that had afflicted the party almost continuously since his accession to the post of First Secretary in 1954. The hasty visit paid to Sofia by CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev in May 1962 unquestionably helped pave the way for Zhivkov's triumph over Anton Yugov, Georgi Tsankov and Vulko Chervenkov at the Congress the following autumn. Zhivkov also lost little time in switching his allegiance to the new CPSU leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin, which replaced Khrushchev in 1964. This transfer of loyalty obviously suggests that for Zhivkov the support of the CPSU leadership is a necessity which transcends loyalty to any one Soviet party leader.

Yet while Zhivkov has managed to remain in power by courting the Soviet Union and outmaneuvering his political rivals, he has never really succeeded in establishing a relationship of legitimate "authority" either within the party or among the population.[7] An apparatchik who rose through the party ranks, he typifies the "pseudo-charismatic leader" [8] whose claim to leadership stature is artificial and often unconvincing. Moreover, the price Zhivkov paid to consolidate his power—and to maintain it—has been a loss of political flexibility and independence in many critical policy areas. Indeed, this may prove to be the outstanding legacy of the "Zhivkov era."

Zhivkov's inability to develop a legitimate authority relationship was perhaps most strikingly dramatized by the abortive April 1965 "conspiracy." Although very few details of the plot are known even today, it appears that the military were heavily involved.[9] The conspiracy came only five months after Khrushchev's downfall, and it appears that the ringleaders—who were discovered before they could carry through their plans—hoped to move against

[5] See Stephen Tikchev, "Socialist Integration in Action," *Mladezh* (Sofia), No. 1, 1971. The Comecon sessions were in April 1969 and May 1970.

[6] *Zemedelsko zname* (Sofia), May 12, 1970. By 1975, trade with the USSR is expected to increase to 68 percent of Bulgaria's foreign trade. See interview with former Minister of Foreign Trade, Lachezar Avramov, Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (hereafter BTA), Nov. 5, 1970.

[7] Alfred Meyer has discussed this problem in terms of the "primitive accumulation of authority"—the ability to transform institutional power into a form of authority which is perceived as legitimate by all actors. See his "Authority in Communist Political Systems" in Lewis Edinger, Ed., *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies*, New York, Wiley, 1967, p. 91.

[8] Raymond Bauer, "The Pseudo-Charismatic Leader in Soviet Society," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-August 1953, pp. 11-14.

[9] Six of the nine conspirators who were tried had connections with the military. The most important was Major General Anev, commander of the Sofia garrison. Two others, Micho Michev and Lyuben Dinov, were major generals on the active list. There appears to have been a personal bond between the ringleaders based on their common experience as partisan fighters in World War II. For a detailed account of this intriguing but little-known episode, see J. F. Brown, "The Bulgarian Plot," *The World Today* (London) June 1965, pp. 261-68.

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BEARHUGS . . .

Bulgarian party leader Todor Zhivkov receives a fraternal embrace from N. S. Khrushchev during a visit of the then Soviet First Secretary to Sofia in May 1962.

—Photo from *New Bulgaria* (Sofia), No. 6, 1962.

Zhivkov under cover of the uncertainty and insecurity caused by the ouster of the Soviet leader. Although the conspirators were charged with holding a pro-Chinese position, it is more likely that they were simply disenchanted with Zhivkov's leadership, especially with his subservience to Moscow, and advocated a policy closer to that of Romania than to that of Albania. Whatever pro-Chinese sentiment the conspirators may have professed was probably inspired more by hope of exploiting the Sino-Soviet rift in order to gain *Spielraum* for a more independent foreign policy rather than by any desire to actually join the Chinese ideological camp.

Since 1965, Zhivkov seems to have strengthened both his control of the party apparatus and his position in the Politburo (he purged a potential rival, Mitko Grigorov, from this body in 1966). However, this does not mean that he is invulnerable, for conflict appears to be innate in Communist systems.[10] Every leader must continually wage a complex battle behind the scenes to sustain and extend his power, and Zhivkov is no exception. The most recent attack on his leadership apparently surfaced at the October 1971 Central Committee Plenum, which adopted a decision that "in the future the CC should be kept regularly informed about the work of the Politburo and the Secretariat," and that the practice should be established of "informing the public about the more important decisions of the Politburo, the State Council, and the Council of Ministers." [11] This unusual formulation seems to be direct criticism of Zhivkov's management of the party, particularly the trend toward secrecy in Politburo decisions of recent years.

How serious a challenge Zhivkov faces is hard to say, but certain factors could become important in time. One is Zhivkov's long period in office. Now that Ulbricht has left the scene, Zhivkov has been in command longer than any of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries. It is possible that the October Plenum resolution reflected dissatisfaction on the part of younger members of the CC with Zhivkov's continuing subservience to the Soviet Union, as well as the discontent of the new generation of technocrats in the party with his failure to achieve meaningful economic reforms. At present, however, the evidence is still too scanty to suggest anything more than that the potential for the emergence of some intraparty opposition to Zhivkov's leadership does exist.

Reliant on Moscow to buttress his domestic power, Zhivkov has been among the most loyal and obedient of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies in matters of foreign policy. Nevertheless, his policy has not always been a mirror reflection of the Kremlin's. A mildly independent course was observable in Sofia's receptiveness to West Germany's *Ostpolitik* during 1964–66 and in Bulgaria's dealings with its Balkan neighbors.

The Appeal of Ostpolitik

Turning first to Bulgarian-West German relations, one should note that there are several factors which help to explain Sofia's openness to normalization of ties in the mid–1960's. First, unlike some of its northern neighbors, Bulgaria had no traditional anti-German feeling; in fact, she fought on the German side in both world wars. Moreover, during the interwar period, Germany had been Bulgaria's chief eco-

[10] For an outline and defense of the "conflict approach" to Communist politics, see the debate in *Problems of Communism* in late 1963 and 1964, especially Carl Linden's "Khrushchev and the Party Battle," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1963, pp. 27-35; his "Facts in Search of a Theory," *ibid.*, November-December 1963, pp. 56-58; and Robert Tucker, "The Conflict Model," *ibid.*, pp. 59-61. See also Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR*, New York, Torch paperback by Harper & Row, 1967.

[11] *Rabotnichesko delo*, Oct. 7, 1971.

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nomic partner, and in the 1960's the Bulgarian economy vitally needed the advanced technology available in the Federal Republic. Therefore, in the absence of any coordinated policy emanating from Moscow, Sofia responded favorably to Bonn's overtures and in March 1964 agreed to exchange trade missions with West Germany and signed a bilateral trade treaty with the FRG valid until 1966. Despite Soviet First Secretary Khrushchev's own toying with the idea of a normalization of relations with Bonn, there is no evidence to suggest Soviet direction behind Zhivkov's pursuit of what were primarily Bulgarian national objectives.

Sofia's independent course continued through 1966, in part as a result of the Kremlin leadership's preoccupation with adjustments of Soviet internal policies in the aftermath of Khrushchev's October 1964 downfall. For, although the Soviet party chiefs did definitely drop (at least for a time) any ideas of a rapprochement with West Germany, they also failed to lay down a clear, coordinated policy for the East European socialist states to follow in responding to Bonn's continuing blandishments. In the absence of such guidance, Zhivkov continued to welcome opportunities to improve relations with West Germany, as evidenced in Bulgaria's handling of Chancellor Erhard's March 1966 "Peace Note" urging improved relations with Eastern Europe. Bulgaria—like Romania—published no reply to the note, whereas the USSR and the other East European governments replied negatively. Although Sofia was not prepared to defy Moscow by publishing a favorable response, Bulgarian silence clearly suggested some sympathy for Erhard's proposal. A Bulgarian invitation to FRG State Secretary Rolf Lahr to visit the Plovdiv Fair in autumn 1966 reinforced the impression that Sofia was moving cautiously toward a normalization of relations.

This incipient flirtation, however, never fulfilled its early promise. Romania's establishment of formal diplomatic relations with West Germany on January 31, 1967, crystallized Soviet concern over the impact of Bonn's initiatives on Warsaw Pact unity, and at a meeting of Pact foreign ministers in Warsaw, Moscow apparently demanded rejection of the West German overtures and called for a united front against Bonn.[12] When the Warsaw Pact members reassembled at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in April 1967, it became clear that Bulgaria had stepped back into line. At the conference Zhivkov launched the first major attack on the *Ostpolitik* of the Grand Coalition, noting that "the new [West German] cabinet has proved that it is continuing the line of Adenauer and Erhard, the revanchist and militant line of West German imperialism." [13]

It is rather curious, in light of this background, that Bulgaria still maintains an essentially intransigent attitude toward the FRG at a time when Bonn-Moscow relations have improved markedly. True, since the initialing of the treaty of friendship between Bonn and Moscow in August 1970, Bulgaria has concentrated its attacks on the West German opposition rather than on the Brandt government, but there has been no significant improvement in relations between Bonn and Sofia. The volume of trade has steadily decreased since 1966,[14] and Italy has supplanted the FRG as Bulgaria's main Western trade partner. Relations even deteriorated further last year when Bulgarians refused to allow a tourist flight from West Berlin to land in Bulgaria, causing

[12] See Fritz Ermarth, *Internationalism, Security,* and *Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe, 1964-1968,* RM-5909-PR, the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, March 1969, pp. 42-59.

[13] BTA, April 26, 1967. A joint communique issued at the conclusion of a visit by Brezhnev to sign a 20-year treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with Bulgaria also condemned the "revanchist and militaristic aims" of the West German Government. See *Rabotnichesko delo,* May 14, 1967.

[14] German imports of Bulgarian goods in 1971 were 19 percent lower than in the previous year, while exports to Bulgaria were 6 percent lower. See *Handelsblatt* (Dusseldorf) Nov. 15, 1971.

. . . AND HANDCLASPS

Five years after the Khrushchev visit, Todor Zhivkov again plays host to the Soviet party's top leader, now General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev.

—Photo from Bulgaria Today (Sofia), No. 7, 1967.

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the FRG to retaliate by canceling all further tourist flights to Bulgaria from West Berlin.[15]

Why Bulgaria's relations with Bonn have remained frozen after the initialing of the Bonn-Moscow treaty opened the door for better relations between the East European countries and the FRG is hard to explain. One reason may be the insecurity of a Bulgarian leadership fearful of moving faster than Moscow in this touchy area. Another may be the fact that Bulgaria has few marketable commodities which could be exchanged for desired West German technology. Some modest improvement in relations should occur, however, now that the treaties with Moscow and Poland have been ratified in Bonn.

Building a Better Neighborhood

It is doubtless in the Balkans that Bulgarian foreign policy has exhibited the greatest initiative in recent years, although this "independence" of diplomatic activity has not necessarily run counter to Soviet purposes. Bulgaria began in the mid–1960's to reconcile decade-old differences with its immediate neighbors. These initial moves were temporarily impeded by the so-called "Colonels' coup" of April 1967 in Greece, which put a damper on Bulgarian-Greek reconciliation, and by Bulgaria's dutiful participation in the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, an action which antagonized Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. But in the last few years, Bulgaria has embarked on a virtual diplomatic offensive aimed at improving bilateral relations, and even at multilateral cooperation, with the neighboring Balkan states. This campaign has already produced a new 20–year treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid concluded in November 1970 with Romania; an agreement with Turkey in September 1970 providing for consular relations and expanded cultural exchanges; and an accord with Albania in November 1970 reestablishing diplomatic ties.[16]

Perhaps most noteworthy—in light of the staunch anti-Communist rhetoric of the Greek regime—has been the continual improvement of Bulgarian relations with Greece since the visit of the late Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev to Athens in May 1970. The motivations underlying this Bulgarian initiative were suggested by the terms of a comprehensive eight-point proposal of agreement put forward by Sofia to the Athens government in early 1971. One of the eight points reportedly included in the proposed agreement called for the granting of transit facilities for Bulgarian goods in the Greek port of Salonika.[17] Such an arrangement would give Bulgaria a long-sought outlet to the Aegean Sea and might possibly serve, indirectly, to bolster Soviet influence in a region of growing strategic importance to the USSR.

A particularly intriguing aspect of Bulgaria's recent diplomatic behavior was Sofia's conspicuous silence during the Soviet-bloc polemics against Romania in summer 1971.[18] Normally the most obedient and vociferous of spokesmen for the Kremlin, Bulgaria abstained from joining in the chorus against Bucharest, doubtless for fear of undoing the progress registered over the preceding 18 months toward better relations with Romania and jeopardizing the success of Sofia's general policy of reconciliation with its Balkan neighbors. It is possible, however, that the Soviets themselves felt on this occasion that it would be wise to leave the polemics against Bucharest to other Warsaw Pact countries in order not to endanger the fragile success of Sofia's Balkan rapprochement efforts.

The degree to which Bulgaria's policy is subordinated to Moscow's when the latter's vital interests are involved is perhaps best illustrated by the fluctuating course of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations. The chief obstacle to an understanding between these two countries has been controversy regarding Macedonia growing out of the fact that Macedonia, which became part of Yugoslavia at the end of World War I, had previously belonged to Bulgaria. While the Bulgarians have been willing to recognize Macedonia as an integral part of the Yugoslav federated state, they have been unwilling to recognize a separate Macedonian nationality and have continued to view the Macedonians as ethnic Bulgarians. The polemics have

[15] On May 28, 1971, Bulgaria rescinded landing permits and forced one modern jet aircraft to turn back, apparently because of pressure from the East Germans. The two West Berlin travel agencies involved in the arrangements for more than 5,000 tourists thereupon cancelled all their planned trips. On June 8, Bulgaria lifted the ban on holiday charter flights from West Berlin to its Black Sea coast, restoring full landing rights at Varna and other resorts to Modern Air, an American charter carrier handling the tours.

[16] The agreement provided for reciprocal diplomatic representation at the chargé d'affaires level. This was followed by the signing of a Bulgarian-Albanian trade accord. See Peter R. Prifti, "Albania's Expanding Horizons," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1972, p. 38.

[17] *The Times* (London), Feb. 15, 1971.

[18] For an analysis of the Soviet campaign against Romania and its implications, see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Neue Entwicklungstendenzen auf den Balkan" (New Development Trends in the Balkans), *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), March 10, 1972, pp. 179-88.

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often revolved around obscure points of history and linguistics, but the Yugoslavs have tended to view the Bulgarian positions in these debates as indicative of an "irridentism" that might someday be used to justify a territorial claim against Yugoslavia.

What is of interest in the present context, however, is not the substantive issues in dispute so much as the fact that the level of intensity of the polemics between Sofia and Belgrade has tended to fluctuate up or down depending on the current state of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. This was strikingly illustrated during the Soviet-instigated ideological campaign against Romania in the summer of 1971, when certain acts by Bulgaria[19] precipitated a major flare-up of the dispute seemingly designed to remind the Yugoslavs, who had recently been critical of Soviet policy in the Balkans, of their vulnerability to outside pressure. Relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia reached a new low when the Skoplje daily *Nova Makedonia* responded to Sofia's challenge with a vigorous attack on current Bulgarian policy regarding Macedonia, characterizing it as a manifestation of "overt territorial and other aspirations" based on the "most conservative and most brutal greater Bulgarian chauvinistic indoctrination." [20]

The improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations following a visit to Belgrade by Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev in September 1971 soon brought signs of a corresponding shift in Bulgaria's policy. The first was the dismissal, for "activities incompatible with the foreign policy line of the Central Committee," of Boris Krumov, editor of *Anteni,* a Bulgarian magazine which had published an anti-Yugoslav poem by a Yugoslav *émigré.* Shortly thereafter, a "long and friendly" talk took place between Bulgarian Premier Stanko Todorov and Yugoslav Ambassador to Bulgaria Anti Drnic,[21] and a tourist protocol —one of the signed texts drawn up in the Macedonian language—was concluded between the two countries.[22] This last represented a major concession on the part of the Bulgarians, who since 1966 had refused to sign documents drawn up in Macedonian on the grounds that this would imply recognition of a separate Macedonian nationality.

Given the fact that Brezhnev had made a stopover in Sofia on his way back to Moscow from Belgrade, the Bulgarian *volte-face* in the Macedonian controversy with Yugoslavia could hardly have been accidental. The likelihood that it was spurred by Moscow's desire to promote better relations with Yugoslavia was given even greater credibility when Soviet Marshal Grechko, during a trip to Yugoslavia at the end of March, stopped over in the Macedonian capital of Skoplje—a move regarded in diplomatic circles as serving notice that the Soviets were backing the Yugoslavs on the Macedonian issue.[23]

Such developments need not imply that the Macedonian issue between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia has been permanently laid to rest. With the approach of the post-Tito era, both Bulgaria and the Soviet Union are doubtless aware that there may again come a time when it might be to their advantage to exploit the age-old but still strong currents of Balkan nationalism in order to put pressure on Belgrade, and therefore both would probably prefer to retain the option of resurrecting the issue sometime in the future, rather than to see it liquidated entirely. But for the moment, the polemics appear to have been put aside because of Moscow's desire to improve Soviet-Yugoslav relations and to promote an atmosphere of détente in preparation for the convocation of a European security conference.

Bulgarian efforts to promote Balkan cooperation on a multilateral scale may also be interpreted as a reflection of Soviet policy goals, even though Sofia's initiatives in this area have had the semblance of being an independent policy. One of the early signs of this new Bulgarian interest in multilateral Balkan cooperation was an article published in *Otechestven front* in July 1970, which backed a Romanian proposal to turn the Balkans into "a zone of peace" and advocated "comprehensive Balkan meetings at various levels to discuss topical and more lasting questions of intra-Balkan relations" in an effort to bring about "a still greater improvement of the political climate in the Balkans." [24] Since then the Bulgarians have pressed the issue on several occasions.[25]

[19] Bulgarian distribution of a pamphlet entitled "The Macedonian Question" at a meeting of citizens in the town of Sandanski (at the border with Yugoslavia) and publication in the Bulgarian newspaper *Pirinskoe delo* of an inflammatory interview with Yugoslav exile Venko Markovski drew sharp Yugoslav reactions. See *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Oct. 7, 1971 and *Vecernje novosti* (Belgrade), Oct. 11, 1971.

[20] Oct. 31, 1971.

[21] Radio Belgrade, Nov. 5, 1971.

[22] Tanjug and Radio Belgrade, on Nov. 5, 1971, both reported the agreement to have been signed in Macedonian and Bulgarian, while *Politika* (Belgrade) and *Nova Makedonia* reported only the signing of the protocol without mentioning the languages used. The latter omissions may possibly have been pursuant to a Yugoslav agreement to refrain from playing up the Bulgarian concession.

[23] *The Guardian* (London), April 4, 1972. Also UPI, March 29, 1972.

[24] BTA, July 16, 1970.

[25] Zhivkov backed the "zone of peace" idea in his speech to the 10th Party Congress in April 1971 (BTA, April 20, 1971) and in a speech on June 25, 1971 (Radio Sofia, June 25, 1971).

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However, that Sofia could move ahead in this field only as far as Moscow was willing to permit was demonstrated by the sudden squelching—apparently by the Soviets—of a proposal which Zhivkov had intended to broach at the 10th BCP Congress in April 1971 calling for the early convocation of a Balkan security conference.[26]

Economic Recentralization

In the realm of foreign policy, then, Bulgaria appears since 1967 to have moved away from even the modest and halting efforts it had made earlier to assert a measure of independence from Moscow. This trend has been paralleled, on the domestic front, by a retreat from the economic decentralization reforms inaugurated in 1965 and a movement back in the direction of centralized management and controls.

To what extent this reorientation of economic policy was Moscow-inspired and to what extent a Bulgarian initiative is not entirely clear. There is no direct evidence that it was the former, but it is at least significant that the post–1968 pattern of Bulgarian economic reform, with its heavy emphases on recentralization and computerization, has closely paralleled trends that have been in evidence in Soviet economic policy over the same span of time.

What does seem quite clear is that the Bulgarian shift back toward economic centralization in mid–1968 was strongly influenced by the lessons of the "Prague Spring." In Czechoslovakia economic liberalization and decentralization in the mid–1960's precipitated—in the words of Ota Sik, the now exiled chief architect of the Czechoslovak economic reforms—general agreement that a "modern pluralistic democratic system was an essential prerequisite of economic development." [27] In light of this Czechoslovak experience, it is hardly surprising that the Bulgarian leaders—no less than the Soviet—were reinforced in their determination not to carry economic reform to the point where it might open a Pandora's box of political pluralism and generate pressures imperiling the leading role of the party.

The original Bulgarian blueprint of economic reform, or New Economic Model (NEM)—launched in December 1965 after some years of discussion and selective experimentation—provided, at least on paper, for a degree of decentralization that compared favorably with the provisions of similar economic reform programs in other East European countries at that time.[28] Since then, however, many of the NEM's most innovative features have fallen by the wayside because of slow, piecemeal implementation and numerous changes and adjustments. The decisive turning point in this process was the July 1968 Plenum of the BCP Central Committee, when the leadership clearly opted for a return to greater centralization. The revised reform program outlined by Zhivkov at the Plenum embodied a reduction in the autonomy of enterprises and an expansion of centrally-determined indexes, limits, and norms. It also evidenced an increasing reliance on science and technology, especially computerization, as a means of stimulating economic growth, and Zhivkov left little doubt that this new policy implied a turn away from the concept of "planning from below" originally featured in the December 1965 reforms[29]:

The construction of a socialist society, especially under conditions of the scientific-technical revolution, requires that the national economy be determined centrally through the state plan, *in accordance with the goals and tasks of party policy for a given period. In this way, an essential change will be*

[26] Speculation regarding the Soviet role was stimulated by the appearance in some versions of the text of Zhivkov's April 20 speech to the Congress of a paragraph calling for a "meeting of government representatives or leaders of Balkan states" and for a "common declaration by the Balkan countries." The paragraph was not included in the speech as delivered or in the Russian, French, English and Bulgarian texts, but it still appeared in the Spanish and German texts, apparently through an oversight. It seems probable that the proposal was dropped at the last minute because Moscow insisted that such an initiative should be postponed until after the convocation of an all-European security conference. See Carl Buchalla, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), April 23, 1971.

[27] See Ota Sik "The Economic Imperialism of Stalinism," *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1971, p. 10.

[28] As later approved by a BCP Central Committee plenum in April 1966, the basic features of the NEM were: considerable decentralization of economic decision-making, with greater responsibility assigned to associations, or trusts, and to individual enterprises; wider application of the profit motive as a spur to productivity and quality; a system of wages tied to production results; and more extensive use of economic levers, such as profit, prices, credit, interest, and taxes. For detailed analyses of the Bulgarian reform see J. P. Brown, "Reform in Bulgaria," *ibid.,* May-June 1966, pp. 17-21; and more recently, L.A.D. Dellin, "Bulgarian Economic Reform—Advance and Retreat," *ibid.*, September-October 1970, pp. 44-52.

[29] Zhivkov's report to the plenum, in *Rabotnichesko delo,* July 25-27, 1968. Actually, the principle of planning "from the bottom toward the top" seems to have been already set aside at the April 1966 plenum, which approved the December 1965 theses on the new system. At that time Zhivkov made no mention of the principle of planning from the bottom, but stressed instead state orders *(durzhavni poruchki)* on which the plans of the individual enterprises should be based. See Dellin, *loc. cit.,* pp. 45-46.

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made in the concept that has hitherto existed that the state plan must be built up mainly from the bottom toward the top. (Emphasis added.)

The initial steps taken pursuant to the 1968 Central Committee decision have previously been dealt with in these pages.[30] The most recent development in this area has been a further reorganization of the management of state industrial enterprises effected in early 1971.[31] The enterprises, which formerly were administratively subordinated to various trusts or associations (*obedinenia*) but which still enjoyed some legal and economic independence, have now been completely incorporated into 44 state associations. Virtually stripped of any economic decision-making powers, the enterprises have become, in effect, branches or subdivisions of the associations. The latter—which might be termed "super-associations"—now directly guide the economic activity of the subdivisions, from the procurement of needed supplies to the marketing of output. All capital funds are centralized in the associations, which are responsible for the expansion of production capacities and for technological improvements. To this latter end, each association is to have its own research and development center. The associations are also to be the repository for any foreign exchange earnings of the component subdivisions.

Although the 1965 Theses had envisaged a devolution of economic management powers from the central economic ministries to the various state trusts and associations, the extent to which the powers of individual enterprises are accumulated *upward* to the associations under the 1971 reorganization suggests that the end result is an increased rather than decreased centralization of management in the Bulgarian economy. Also, it is interesting to note that such associations have been widely endorsed in the party and economic press of the Soviet Union, and that hundreds of them have actually been formed there since 1965. The only significant difference between Bulgarian and Soviet practice in this regard is the fact that the Bulgarian setup covers the entire state sector of industry.

Similar observations can be made concerning the Bulgarian creation of agro-industrial complexes, an experiment launched by Zhivkov at the July 1968 Plenum.[32] By early 1970 the period of experimentation was completed, and the April 1970 Plenum resolved to introduce the complexes throughout the Bulgarian countryside.[33] State and collective farms were merged into 170 such complexes for the purpose of specializing and increasing production, reducing primary costs, and ultimately making Bulgarian goods more competitive on the international market. The program also envisaged the attachment of construction, manufacturing, and trade facilities to such complexes in an attempt to halt or discourage the migration of people from the villages to the cities. As in the case of industrial amalgamation, this vertical integration of the production of goods relying on the output of the state and collective farms makes good economic sense. And again, as in the case of the industrial associations, Bulgaria's agro-industrial complexes bear a striking similarity to organizational forms being introduced or discussed in the Soviet Union.

The Science-Technology Gambit

A major consideration underlying the above reorganizations is the BCP's desire to harness the ongoing world revolution in science and technology. The program unveiled by Zhivkov at the July 1968 Plenum sought to

. . . direct special attention to Bulgarian science and the working out and implementation of the proper strategy and tactics in the sphere of science policy.[34]

In effect, the BCP hopes to be able to employ the latest scientific techniques to increase the efficiency and output of the economy and simultaneously to strengthen the party's ability to regulate and control society.

According to an official release in December 1971, "automated systems" are to service a total of 70 percent of the Bulgarian economy by 1975.[35] During 1971 alone, the number of computers was slated to increase fivefold, and funds for scientific research were to increase 15 percent over comparable 1970 totals.[36] A recent study of the develop-

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 50-52.

[31] *Durzhaven vestnik* (Sofia), No. 98, Dec. 11, 1970, and No. 5, Jan. 19, 1971. See also Premier Stanko Todorov's report to the Bulgarian National Assembly on April 27, 1972 (*Rabotnichesko delo*, April 28, 1972).

[32] See his speech to the Plenum, *loc. cit. supra.*

[33] *Rabotnichesko delo*, April 29 and 30, 1970.

[34] See Zhivkov speech, *loc. cit. supra.*

[35] BTA, Dec. 9, 1971.

[36] *Ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1971.

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ment of Bulgarian science to the year 2000, made by the State Committee on Science, Technological Progress, and Higher Education, predicted that the number of scientific specialists will double between 1971 and 1975.[37]

Massive measures will indeed be required if Bulgaria is to have the skilled manpower necessary to operate a computerized society. At present, the absence of such manpower is a formidable roadblock to technological progress and even rational economic planning.[38] To cope with this challenge the party has embarked on a far-reaching reorganization of the educational system and of scientific research. The first stage of this reorganization, carried out during 1970, included the introduction of modern methods of teaching, increased differentiation in secondary education, and a restructuring of student curricula. The second stage, initiated in October 1971, is to see the creation of "centers of scientific research and development activities" (*tsentrove za nauchnoizsledovatelska, razvoina, i proektantska deinost*), which will be charged with speeding up the introduction of new technology into the economy. There is also to be a drastic reorganization of the structure of higher education with the ultimate goal of integrating both educational and scientific research activities in what will be called "unified centers for science and the training of cadres" (*edinni tsentrove za nauka i podgotovka na kadri*).[39]

Another major obstacle to Bulgaria's technological revolution is the enormous cost of building or purchasing electronic machines, technical facilities, and new plants, of planning and mastering information processing techniques, and of training the necessary manpower. Clearly, the regime will have to import much of the requisite technology, and Bulgaria suffers from a chronic shortage of hard currency. This is due in no small part to the country's dependence on outmoded Soviet technology in its earlier industrial development, a policy which has resulted in high-cost production of obsolete goods which can be sold only in Eastern Europe or in the less-developed countries. While the USSR has promised significant scientifical technological assistance,[40] the Soviet Union itself lags behind the West in many critical areas of technology.

Finally, technological innovation itself requires a free exchange of ideas not only within Bulgaria but also across its borders. However, the prospect of increasing contacts with the West in order to gain the necessary scientific and technical know-how is one that presents problems for a one-party regime that is vitally concerned with maintaining its firm political control. For all these reasons, one can safely predict that the road to technological progress will not be as smooth as Zhivkov and the BCP appear to hope.

It is entirely in keeping with the recent trends in Bulgaria's foreign policy as well as in its domestic

[37] *Ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1971. The September (1969) plenum resolved to increase the role of forecasting as a prerequisite for the formulation of economic, scientific-technical, and social policy. As a result, Bulgarian scientists and academicians today are increasingly preoccupied with one of the favorite pastimes of their Western counterparts, "futurology"—the working out of long-term forecasts and prognoses.

[38] For instance, an inquiry conducted in the District Administrative Body of the Economists' Union in Khaskovo (southern Bulgaria) found that 53.5 percent of those queried had difficulty in studying and applying the normative documents connected with the new system, and 75 percent of those polled could not use mathematical methods in planning and modeling economic processes. See *Ikonomicheski zhivot* (Sofia), July 29, 1970, p. 10.

[39] *Rabotnichesko delo*, Jan. 21, 1972; also *Zemedelsko zname*, Jan. 27 and 28, 1972.

[40] At the 13th session of the intergovernmental Bulgarian-Soviet Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation, held in Moscow last December, an agreement on specialization and cooperation in various spheres of industry was signed. For details see *Rabotnichesko delo*, Dec. 4, 1971.



A Bulgarian fitter works on construction of the Petrochemical Combined Works at Pleven, built with Soviet-manufactured equipment, according to Soviet designs, with the help of Soviet experts.

—Photo from *Bulgaria Today* (Sofia), No. 6, 1971.

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economic policies that the past several years have seen a stepping-up of the pressures exerted by the regime to enforce ideological and cultural orthodoxy. This tightening of ideological controls seems to have been motivated by the regime's anxiety to curb the liberal impulses briefly unleashed in the wake of the 1965 conspiracy against the Zhivkov leadership, rather than by "guidance" from Moscow, although the Kremlin doubtless draws satisfaction from Sofia's pursuit of an orthodox line in such matters.

Social Control Policies

The drive began in September 1966 with an overhaul of the Committee on Culture and Art aimed at strengthening official control over the various Bulgarian creative unions, and it has embraced three basic elements: (1) an effort to centralize all cultural institutions and to coordinate their activities under the watchful eye of the Committee; (2) an emphasis on the "constructive" role that culture must play in the development of Bulgarian society, coupled with a crackdown on "deviationist" artists and critics; and (3) an intensification of the cultural campaign to counter the alleged threat of Western bourgeois influences as well as to combat political apathy among large segments of the population, particularly youth.[41]

The attempt to impose rigid limits on criticism and on freedom of expression in general has not, however, been entirely successful. At the second national conference of the Bulgarian Writers' Union, held in November 1971, two of Bulgaria's best-known literary figures—Valeri Petrov, the country's leading poet, and Kristo Ganev, brother of the former Minister of Education and winner of the Dimitrov Prize for literature—were expelled from the Union because they refused to vote for a motion of censure against the awarding of the 1970 Nobel Prize for literature to the Russian dissident novelist, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.[42]

The fabric of social control has shown other bare spots. In the wake of the December 1970 riots which toppled Gomulka in Poland, there was evidence of worker discontent and strikes in several key areas of Bulgaria. In March 1971, a district party conference in Ruse, Bulgaria's fourth largest city, revealed that workers at the Nayden Kirov Plant (one of the city's largest) had protested strongly against unfavorable working conditions and the awarding of bonuses to senior officials rather than to workers.[43] In the same month, Stefan Krumov was removed as First Secretary of the District Party Committee in Pernik, a step which gave some credence to rumors of unrest among workers in this major mining area some 30 kilometers southwest of Sofia.[44] However, the most dramatic signal of BCP dissatisfaction with the situation on the labor front was a broad purge, also in March 1971, of the top leadership of the Bulgarian Central Council of Trade Unions.[45] It remains to be seen whether such a purely administrative response can effectively eliminate the causes of discontent among Bulgaria's workers.

The dilemma of productivity *vs.* tight control—whether in the arts or in industry—is symptomatic of the major problems which the Bulgarian Communist Party faces in the "new era" heralded by Zhivkov at the July 1968 Plenum. A quarter of a century of Communist rule, with its constant emphasis on the development of heavy industry has transformed Bulgaria from a primarily agrarian into a semi-industrial society. Now the goal is to exploit the latest achievements of science and technology to complete Bulgaria's transformation into a modern industrial society. However, the economic and social changes required to effect such a development are generating new demands upon a party which is wedded to an ideology basically inimical to social innovation and creative talent.

Old Leaders, New Problems

This tension, still scarcely recognized in Bulgaria, will very likely prove to be a continuing source of instability as the country moves further into the 1970's. In order to effect the desired transformations, the BCP must have an imaginative and innovative leadership, but today Bulgaria has the dubious distinction of having the oldest Politburo in Eastern Europe. One member, the Stalinist relic Todor Pavlov, is over 80, and three—Boyan Balgaranov, Ivan Mihailov, and Tsola Dragoycheva—are in their mid-70's. Todor Zhivkov himself is 61. Moreover, the

[41] For a discussion of developments on the Bulgarian cultural scene, see J. F. Brown, "Frost and Thaw in Bulgarian Culture," in *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), July-October 1969, pp. 95-121.

[42] *The Daily Telegraph,* (London), April 27, 1971.

[43] *Dunavska pravda* (Ruse), March 15, 1971.

[44] *Rabotnichesko delo,* March 6, 1971.

[45] *Trud* (Sofia), March 10, 1972.

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present ruling elite can look back on an average of almost 40 years of membership in the BCP: all the full members of the Politburo, except Ivan Popov, entered the party before September 9, 1944, the day of Bulgaria's "liberation" by Soviet troops, while three of the members—Pavlov, Mihailov, and Balgaranov—joined before 1920. It is also worth noting that, in contrast to the present Soviet leadership, a majority of whom have had technical education, only one member of the Bulgarian Politburo (Popov) has had such training, and only four (Zhivko Zhivkov, Mihailov, Popov, and Pavlov) even have university degrees.

This cursory survey of the country's top leadership demonstrates the need for rejuvenation of the top echelons of the party. Certainly, if the leadership truly intends to modernize Bulgaria according to its July 1968 Plenum blueprint, then it must pay increasing deference to the criterion of expertise. This means that there is a possibility that the *apparatchiki*—especially the older ones who lack technical skills or the advantage of a modern education—will become "functionally irrelevant." The drive toward the creation of a technological society could mean the emergence, in the next decades, of a new elite which would be in a position to bargain for political leverage on the basis of its much-needed skills rather than its mastery of ideology. Should the party attempt to assimilate or co-opt many of these specialists, it would risk becoming a loose coalition of experts rather than a "bureaucratic-dogmatic" party relying on ideology to provide its motivating force.[46]

When one endeavors to assess the outlook for the future in the light of the last decade, the prospects for significant change in Bulgaria over the near term do not look particularly promising. China's emergence from diplomatic isolation and its manifestation of increased interest in the Balkans will undoubtedly intensify Moscow's eagerness to retain Bulgaria as a firm and reliable ally in the region. Indeed, the recent emphasis on integration of the Soviet and Bulgarian economies may be seen—at least on Moscow's side—as designed to further this objective by increasing Bulgaria's dependence on the Soviet Union. Over the long run, however, the extension of Sino-Soviet rivalry to the Balkans could afford increased leverage and maneuvering room to a more nationalistically-oriented Bulgarian leadership willing and able to exploit them. The abortive April 1965 coup gave an indication that such elements do exist, however passive or impotent they may seem at present.

The real key to change, however, continues to lie in Moscow. Any change in Bulgaria's relationship with Moscow would seem to be conditional upon the recurrence of an internal situation in the USSR which would temporarily preoccupy the leadership, as occurred in the years 1965–66 following the changeover from Khrushchev to Brezhnev. Under such conditions, a more nationalistic Bulgarian leadership, while not abandoning close ties to the Soviet bloc, might be able to pursue a more autonomous policy. Given the history of communism in the Balkans and the role nationalism has traditionally played in the politics of the region, a development of this sort is not to be totally excluded. But such a turn of events, if it is to occur at all, will in all probability have to await the passing of the Zhivkov leadership.

[46] The fear of such a trend may well have been the motive for removal of Lachezar Avramov as Minister of Foreign Trade and the failure to retain him as a candidate member of the Politburo at the 10th BCP Congress in April 1971. Young, charismatic and ambitious, Avramov was thought to represent the younger technocratic members of the party.

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China and Latin America: New Ties and Tactics

By Cecil Johnson

One of the most intriguing aspects of the changing international outlook of the People's Republic of China is the resurgence of interest it has shown in Latin America since the beginning of 1970. The step-up of its activities on that continent seems to affirm the determination of a majority of the supreme policy-makers in the Chinese Communist Party to end the isolationist tendencies associated with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966–69. Peking's new foreign policy also reflects a marked shift away from the dogmatic purism of the GPCR years toward a more flexible stance that stresses the national interests of China over considerations of ideology. The present article will attempt to define the major elements of the new policy and to evaluate its impact on a number of target nations.

What is China's Interest?

Before we turn to specifics of the new Chinese approach, it might be useful to examine the general reasons for Peking's interest in Latin America. Doubtless one of the chief magnets is the Chinese conviction that the principal contradiction on the contemporary international scene pits the oppressed peoples of the Third World against the "imperialist" forces headed up by the United States. Thus, Peking feels that Asia, Africa, and Latin America will ultimately be the seats of the sharpest clashes between revolutionary movements and imperialism, and that the outcome of the struggle in these areas will largely determine the course of future history.

The Chinese also perceive much in the experience of the Latin American peoples that resembles their own. They have endeavored to convince the Latin Americans that China, too, was victimized by Western imperialism prior to 1949, and that since then the Chinese people and the Latin American peoples have confronted a mutual enemy in the United States. Clearly, Peking feels that the vast reservoir of anti-imperialistic sentiment in Latin America—reflecting the hostility of a broad spectrum of political leaders, intellectuals, students, and nationalist-minded military men toward the Colossus to the North—can be used to undermine the power and prestige of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. The historic roots of this sentiment go back, of course, to the "gunboat diplomacy" and "dollar diplomacy" policies pursued by the US in Latin America prior to the adoption of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy in 1933. The propaganda of Peking and its supporters has attempted to exploit Latin sensitivities by frequent references to past military interventions of the United States in a number of Caribbean countries—Cuba and Santo Domingo (now the Dominican Republic) in particular—when governments failed to preserve "law and order." Even sharper stress has been given to what the Chinese cite as recent examples of Yankee imperialism: the American involvement in the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala (1954), the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba (1961), and the use of American troops in the Dominican Republic (1965).

A third factor that has stimulated Chinese interest in Latin America is the respectability of Marxist ideas in intellectual circles in the region. Most Latin American universty students have been exposed to the basic concepts of Marxist thought. Perhaps the most influential of these concepts is the Leninist theory of imperialism because it provides a plausible explanation for the economic underdevelopment of

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the Latin American countries. Intellectuals of such persuasion hold that monopoly capitalists have siphoned off much of the wealth of Latin America in the form of "superprofits" earned through the exploitation of the peoples of the region. In their view, the US government is a mere tool of the big capitalists who have investments "south of the border." Quite frequently, they also charge that their own governments are controlled by these same foreign investors. Such is the view of many on the left of the political spectrum in Latin America.

A final and crucial factor that has spurred Chinese activity is the Sino-Soviet conflict. As the dispute between the two major Communist powers increased in intensity in the early 1960's, the Chinese launched a campaign to win converts in their global crusade against the "revisionists" led by the CPSU. In Latin America they invested much effort in founding pro-Chinese parties and movements as instruments to counter Soviet influence.

Phases of Chinese Policy

The past and current expression of these several Chinese interests is perhaps best perceived by reviewing Peking's Latin American policy over the last dozen years in terms of three distinct phases: 1959–66, 1966–69, and 1970 to the present.

It seems beyond question that Peking's initial interest in Latin America was sparked by the success of Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba. In the previous decade, the Chinese Communists had made intensive efforts to extend their influence on the Asian and African continents but had paid relatively little attention to Latin America. In the wake of the Fidelistas' seizure of power, however, Peking began to expend large sums of money to beam radio broadcasts to Latin American countries, to translate Chinese propaganda into Spanish and Portuguese and disseminate it through sympathetic local channels, and to underwrite the visits of numerous Latin American delegations to mainland China. To enhance China's standing with radicals and revolutionaries, the Chinese leaders sought to identify with Castro and the Cuban Revolution and indeed touted the Cuban experience as the model for other Latin Americans. In particular, they stressed the parallel between the Fidelistas' and their own insistence that the only path to power was that of armed struggle. At the same time, they sought to extend ties to the continent through trade with a number of countries.

This first phase of activity gave way to a sharp reduction in Chinese contacts with Latin America during the years 1966–69. The major cause of the shift was the gathering force of the Cultural Revolution, which compelled the Chinese to concentrate their attention on internal developments. But outside factors also affected the Chinese course. Perhaps most important, Peking's relations with Cuba steadily deteriorated because of Castro's refusal to align himself with the Chinese in their global campaign against the Soviet "revisionists." The Sino-Cuban alliance was further strained by the new challenge posed by Ché Guevara and Régis Debray to the Maoist bid for leadership of revolutionary movements throughout the world. Thus, the Chinese found themselves involved in a simultaneous campaign against the Russians and the Cubans. In this situation, they withdrew from contacts with Havana and pro-Castroite groups on the continent and concentrated their efforts on establishing pro-Chinese parties to serve as the future vanguard for "people's wars." Such groups were formed in Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Mexico. The parties were generally very small, however; and only in Peru and the Dominican Republic did Peking's supporters succeed in attracting a larger following than their pro-Soviet rivals.

The present phase of China's policy, which in retrospect can be dated from the turn of the decade, has witnessed a rather dramatic shift away from the promotion of pro-Chinese Communist parties to implement the strategy of "people's war," toward the normalization of relations with as many Latin American countries as possible. In the pursuit of this new course, the Chinese have intensified their efforts to expand both trade relations and cultural contacts with a number of countries. They have also succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with Chile, Peru, Mexico and Argentina and seem to have good prospects for diplomatic rapprochements with several other Latin American nations.

This shift is not really as surprising as it might seem at first glance. Despite the stress the Chinese have always put on the need for armed struggle, their contacts with Latin America—as elsewhere—have involved certain interests of *Realpolitik* not necessarily in harmony with their revolutionary interests. Since their advent to power, it has become obvious that one of their principal goals has been to assume a major role on the world scene. While they have protested at length that they have no desire to

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make the People's Republic of China a "superpower," their international posture has rather consistently reflected a deliberate effort to represent the PRC as the champion and defender of the small and medium-sized powers vis-a-vis the two international giants. In short, they have set out to restore China to what they view as its proper, exalted place in the world. Their current efforts to expand cultural and trade relations with Latin America have been calculated to help realize that objective, as well as to reduce the influence of the United States.

The desire of a number of Latin American leaders to diversify their commercial and political relations has made it easier for the Chinese to promote closer relations with the PRC as an alternative to excessive dependence on the US. At the same time, the Chinese course has affected the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence, leading to intensified rivalry at the level of state politics and diplomacy; indeed, in the immediate future, such competition may well overshadow the struggle for leadership of revolutionary efforts on the continent.

The policy of "normalization" does not mean that Peking expects or even wants to establish diplomatic relations with all Latin American countries. Peking's objective is to expand contacts realistically, husbanding the resources that it chooses to commit and picking countries and situations where a favorable climate exists. Obviously, there are limits on how far rapprochement can be pushed. In the commercial realm, for example, Peking is restricted by the fact that it cannot purchase all the agricultural goods, minerals and other raw materials which Latin Americans might want to market in China. In this situation, the Chinese have been shrewdly selective in negotiating agreements that yield maximum political gains. Their trade agreements with Peru and Chile (more on which shortly) are excellent cases in point.

Peking's ability to develop better relations is also limited by political factors, the most obvious of which is the anti-Communist orientation of the ruling governments in a number of countries. Probably the best example is the military regime in Brazil. No matter how interested the Chinese might be in a rapprochement with this largest country in South America, they will score few gains there unless or until the present regime modifies its attitude toward the PRC. Other governments, especially those with past experience in dealing with guerrilla movements and Communist-inspired revolutionary activities, may be cautious about moving too rapidly toward establishing ties with Peking. On the other hand, such

Lin Ping, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China, presents his credentials to Chilean President Salvador Allende in Santiago, June 22, 1971.

—UPI photo.

concerns may give way to more pressing considerations: Peru and Colombia, for example—for different reasons which will be examined—have indicated their willingness to expand contacts with the PRC, even though both countries have been plagued by guerrilla struggles for a number of years.

In the process of testing the limits of what they can and cannot accomplish in Latin America, the Chinese have demonstrated much greater flexibility than in the past in their tactical approaches to different countries and regimes. In Chile, they have curbed their suspicion of elected "revolutionaries" and capitalized on the emergence of Salvador Allende's Marxist government, which is committed to establishing socialism in Chile by constitutional means. In Mexico, they have perceived and played up to the desire of the business community to get access to the China market. In Peru and Ecuador, they have gained influence through their support for the Latin American coastal countries' defense of a 200-mile limit for territorial waters as well as through economic initiatives. In short, Peking's activities have come to reflect a greater appreciation of the complexity of Latin American realities. Instead of relying on simplistic Maoist class analyses as the sole basis for strategic planning and policy-making, the Chinese seem to have realized the need for evaluating the objective and subjective differences that distinguish the various Latin American nations.

The appreciable change in US policy toward China has also had an important effect on Peking's

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relations with Latin America, though in varying degrees in different countries. The Nixon administration's demonstration, through word and deed, that it desired a reduction of tensions with China removed one of the major obstacles to the improvement of Sino-Latin American relations. Prior to that time, some Latin American countries appeared to be hesitant to move toward reconciliation with Peking in part because they feared that failure to support Washington's position might have adverse economic or political repercussions. On the other hand, a number of countries showed that they felt little need to coordinate policies with the US and indeed moved much faster than Washington toward rapprochement with China.

In this connection, an interesting reflection of the respective postures of the Latin American nations was provided by the vote in the United Nations on Albania's resolution to seat the People's Republic of China and to expel the Chinese Nationalist government. Prior to the voting (which took place on October 25, 1971), Peking conducted a vigorous campaign to mobilize support for the resolution. In terms of motives, apart from the obvious satisfaction Peking could take in breaking down the long-locked gates of the UN and besting its mortal foes on Taiwan, the issue provided a tailor-made situation for a Chinese Communist appeal to the small powers to defy the US "superpower." The line-up behind or against this milestone measure provides some indication of Peking's potential leverage in different Latin American countries. In the final vote, seven Latin American members supported the proposal: Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Peru and Trinidad-and-Tobago. At the preceding session of the UN, when the same resolution was defeated, only Chile and Cuba had supported it; the rest of the countries named—with the exception of Mexico, which cast a negative ballot—had abstained from voting. Of the rest of the Latin American nations, 12 cast votes against the seating of Peking in 1971, while the remaining five (Colombia, Argentina, Barbados, Jamaica and Panama) abstained from voting.

The implications of this alignment of forces in the UN vote may become clearer in the course of a brief study of individual countries and of the specific problems and prospects that affect their relations (or lack of relations) with Peking. Because of space limitations, it has not been possible to include all the Latin American nations in the analysis. The principal criterion used in selecting countries for discussion was the degree of interest in expanding contacts manifested by Peking, in the first instance, and by the Latin nations in return. The countries that have been most resistive to the idea of "normalizing" relations with Peking have also been mentioned. While Cuba stands in a category by itself, it was included to show the extent to which Chinese policy has changed since 1969—even toward a country that must be counted an ally of Moscow.

The Sino-Cuban Reconciliation

During 1970, there were increasing signs that both the Cuban and the Chinese leaders would welcome an easing of the tensions that had plagued their relations in the preceding decade. Peking finally took the initiative toward a rapprochement by sending a delegation of the China-Cuba Friendship Association to attend the Cuban National Day celebrations in July 1970—the first PRC representatives except diplomatic personnel to visit Cuba in five years (the last delegation had attended the July 26th celebrations in 1965). The Chinese visitors remained in Cuba three weeks, an indication that Peking was making more than a token effort to pay its respects to the Cubans. Premier Chou En-lai also sent a warm message of greetings and congratulation to Fidel Castro in the course of the celebrations.

The Cubans were not long in reciprocating. Castro sent return greetings to Chou En-lai on the occasion of China's National Day, October 1. The next day the Cubans observed the Chinese anniversary with a reception and film showing sponsored jointly by the Cuban Institute for Friendship with Other Peoples and the Cuba-China Friendship Association. On October 6, the Cuban Foreign Ministry followed up with another reception commemorating the tenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the PRC. Shortly thereafter, the Institute and the Association sent a combined delegation to Peking headed by Association President Baldomero Alvarez Rios. Outdoing the earlier Chinese visitors to Cuba, the Cuban delegation remained in the host country a full month.

In December the Chinese dispatched a new ambassador, Chang Teh-chun, to Havana, as part of a general policy decision to return diplomatic personnel to their posts. Chang's predecessor, Wang Yu-ping, had left Cuba in January 1967, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. The new Chinese ambassador made a symbolic gesture to confirm the advent of an era of rapprochement when he took part, along

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with the heads of other diplomatic missions in Havana, in the annual December trek to the Cuban countryside to harvest the sugar-cane crop. In preceding years, the Chinese, as well as the Albanians, had registered their lack of solidarity with Cuba by sending their Third and Second Secretaries (respectively) rather than the ranking leaders of the missions to carry out this task.

Over the next several months, there were other signs of the thaw in Sino-Cuban relations, including increased coverage of Chinese developments in the Cuban press and on Havana television, the exchange of several sports delegations, and the inclusion of a tribute to Cuba in China's May Day slogans.

Given the great differences separating the Chinese and the Cubans on the issue of the proper strategy and tactics to be used in people's wars, it is very unlikely that they will achieve a level of ideological rapprochement comparable to the progress made in improving state relations. As pointed out earlier, the theories that grew *ex post facto* out of the Cuban revolutionary experience in time became anathema to the Chinese, and they have not hesitated to say so. To cite an example, the Ceylonese ambassador in Peking reported that in a recent meeting with Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier discoursed at length against the notions of Ché Guevara, calling them "adventurous and totally opposed to the revolutionary theories of Chairman Mao." According to the ambassador, Chou reviewed Guevara's revolutionary activities in detail to show why the Chinese Communists had never agreed with his tactics.[1] In this instance, Chou was probably motivated by a desire to convince the authorities in Ceylon that Peking was not involved in the activities of the self-styled "Ché Guevarists" in that island nation; nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt that the Cuban ideological heritage remains profoundly distasteful to the Chinese.

China and Chile

The Chinese reaction to developments in Chile has been somewhat mixed, combining immense enthusiasm over the establishment of a firm, anti-imperialist foothold on the Latin American continent with caution over the un-Maoist route by which Salvador Allende and his Marxist-dominated coalition came to power.

On the latter score, the Peking leaders' response to Allende's triumph in the 1970 presidential campaign was much more restrained and guarded than had been their reaction to Castro's revolutionary takeover in Cuba—certainly in part because they had strong ideological reservations about the "Popular Unity" coalition supporting and supported by Allende. The extent of Chinese doubts can be measured by the fact that the New China News Agency did not report Allende's first-round victory in the popular election until September 18, 1970, some two weeks after the voting had taken place. Even after Allende was firmly in the saddle as President (following the confirmation of his victory by a run-off vote in the Chilean Congress in October), the Peking leaders apparently continued to harbor reservations about the future of his regime. Thus—despite Chou En-lai's avowed dislike for Castroism—he recently was reported to have stated to the editor of the Mexican newspaper, *Excelsior,* that Castro's revolution had been more efficient than President Allende's Marxist coalition because Castro's victory had been achieved through armed struggle. Chou was also said to have expressed the view that Allende had "won the government but not the power" in Chile.[2]

At the same time, the Chinese have obviously been delighted at the emergence of a regime so deeply committed to the objective of stamping out US influence in Chile. Chinese coverage of Chilean events has ceaselessly pressed the theme of the "mounting struggle of the Chilean people against US imperialism's ruthless oppression, plunder and exploitation." [3] Reports in the mainland press have stressed Allende's pledges to reclaim Chile's natural wealth from "foreign capitalists" and "domestic monopoly" groups, and to end the country's dependence on the United States. Similarly, Premier Chou's formal message of congratulations upon Allende's accession to the presidency proclaimed the PRC's support for the Chilean struggle against "imperialist aggression, plunder and interference and for the defense of national independence and state sovereignty." [4]

Variations on the same anti-imperialist theme have dominated virtually all Chinese statements and could be quoted *ad infinitum.* Thus, a Chinese workers' delegation attending the inauguration of Allende was quoted as being most impressed of all by the

[1] Interview reported in the British CP organ, *Morning Star* (London), June 21, 1971.

[2] Reported in *El Mercurio* (Santiago), Sept. 7, 1971.

[3] New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA), Sept. 18, 1970.

[4] *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1970.

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Members of a labor delegation from the People's Republic of China attend the November 1970 inauguration of Salvador Allende as President of Chile.

—Photo from *Ercilla* (Santiago), Nov. 4, 1970.

new president's determination to "take back . . . natural resources, abolish monopoly enterprises and the latifundarian system, and pursue an international policy on the basis of the principles of safeguarding self-determination and of non-interference." [5] The same group was alleged to have had a conversation with Chilean workers who declared, in appropriate proletarian language: "US imperialism is the root of our people's poverty. Our country has rich resources and the people are industrious; but the US capitalists have fattened on the blood and sweat of our people." [6]

A joint communiqué announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Chile was signed on December 15, 1970, though curiously not made public until January 5, 1971. In hailing the event, an editorial in the authoritative *People's Daily* enlarged on the anti-imperialist theme in terms of Latin America as a whole, portraying the Chinese-Chilean agreement to establish ties as part of the ongoing struggle of all the Latin American countries to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty. As other actions in this struggle, the editorial cited the stand adopted by a number of countries of the continent defending the 200-mile limit for territorial waters and the decision of the Andean Pact Organization to restrict US and other foreign capital investments in its five member-countries. In these changing circumstances, the editorial went on, US imperialism could no longer "practice power politics in this area as it would like and manipulate at will the destiny of the people of various countries in Latin America." [7]

The text of the communiqué itself offered hints of some of the issues touched on in the negotiations. Regarding the status of Taiwan, Peking's representatives reaffirmed their view that the island stronghold of the Chinese Nationalists was an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China. The Chilean government took "note of this statement of the Chinese government" without endorsing it; however, Chile did stipulate that in its view, the People's Republic of China was the only legal government of China.[8] Chile's motives in agreeing to ties with China were hinted at by Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda in a statement issued simultaneously with the communiqué. Aside from the Chilean government's willingness in principle "to establish relations with all countries of the world in disregard of their ideological and political position . . .," he asserted that it would be difficult to achieve global peace and security without Peking's participation since China had the largest population in the world; furthermore—and more to the point—the PRC was a potential market of gigantic dimensions for Chilean goods.[9]

The Chinese have shown intense interest in and approval of the efforts of the Allende government to expropriate the copper mines owned by US-based companies in Chile without paying the latter compensation. To review these moves, on July 11, 1971, the Chilean Congress adopted a broadly-worded constitutional amendment authorizing the "recovery" of Chile's natural resources from foreign owners. Thereupon, the regime announced the nationalization of all copper mines, including "Chuquicamata," the world's largest open-pit mine, owned by the Anaconda Co., and "El Teniente," the world's biggest underground mine, owned by the Kennecott Co. On September 28, President Allende promulgated a decree providing for a deduction of "excess profits" in the amount of $774 million from any compensation to be paid the two companies.[10] Soon after, Hector Humeres, the Controller-General of Chile, an-

[5] *Ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1970.
[6] *Ibid.*

[7] "A New Chapter in the Relations between China and Chile," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 7, 1971.
[8] NCNA, Jan. 5, 1971.
[9] *Ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1971.
[10] *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1971.

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nounced that no payment at all would be paid to the companies since the book values of the mines were exceeded by the excess profits and other justifiable deductions (arising out of the bad condition of the mines); indeed, he asserted, the US firms should actually pay Chile $388 million.[11] This decision has been the subject of hot debate in Chile, and the issue of what constitutes fair compensation has now gone to a special tribunal for final decision. No such doubts have plagued Allende's Chinese supporters, however, who have hailed his confiscatory policy as "another important decision of Chile in defense of its national interests." [12] Peking has expressed similar enthusiasm for other steps taken by the Allende administration to restrict or terminate the control of private US interests over various types of industrial and commercial enterprises in Chile.

Turning to economic considerations, China's potential role as a trading partner and as a source of economic aid has of course been an important factor influencing the Chileans' attitude toward Peking. In fact, in Chile, as in some other countries, visits by trade delegations and discussions of possible commercial arrangements preceded the establishment of diplomatic relations, though the first formal Sino-Chilean trading agreement was not concluded until April 1971. In that month Chou Hua-min, PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, led a delegation to Santiago, where he negotiated with Pedro Vuskovic, Minister of the Economy and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. In an agreement signed on April 20, the PRC consented to purchase $65–70 million worth of Chilean copper and other mineral products annually during the years 1972–75 in exchange for Chilean imports of Chinese rice, tea, soybeans and light industrial goods.[13]

In the following July, the PRC extended its first economic assistance to a Latin American country (excluding Cuba) when it gave Chile a $2 million grant in hard currency to help repair damage in the wake of a severe earthquake. In August, Chung Fu-hsiang, head of the PRC's Directorate-General of Telecommunications and leader of a Chinese delegation offering cooperation in that field, signed a telecommunications service agreement in Santiago.[14] Toward the end of the year, the two countries signed additional trade agreements. Under one signed on November 23, the Chinese agreed to purchase 60,000 tons of Chilean saltpeter in the first six months of 1972; in a December pact the PRC reconfirmed and refined its pledge to buy Chilean copper.

Early in 1972—in a move that followed up and surpassed a dramatic credit agreement reached in November with Peru (on which more shortly)—the PRC took its most important initiative to date in the area of economic aid when it offered Chile a $65–70 million credit, of which $13 million was to be made available to cover imports during 1972, while the remainder was to be used over the following four years; the loan was granted *free of interest* over a 20-year period, with no obligation on Chile's part to start repayment until 1981.[15] Interestingly enough, Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda made a public announcement of the Chinese offer on January 28, 1972, just two days after the arrival of a Soviet economic delegation in Santiago—a "coincidence" that hints of the undercurrents created by the Sino-Soviet competition in Latin America (though for reasons of space this subject must remain beyond the scope of the present paper). In the first week of May Sr. Vuskovic, in the course of announcing that he would go to Peking to complete the negotiations for the loan, indicated that the ante might be raised even higher.[16]

A final note of passing interest might be added about President Allende's long-standing interest in Communist China. He was among the early Latin American visitors to mainland China after the Communist takeover, making a trip there in 1954. Nine years later, his wife and daughter spent five weeks in Peking, Shanghai and other Chinese cities as guests of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and at the end of their visit were granted a personal audience with Mao Tse-tung. The present Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, also spent five weeks in China in 1960.

The Wooing of Peru

One of the most dramatic examples of the new Chinese policy toward Latin America has been the about-face over the last year and a half in Peking's attitude toward the Peruvian military regime headed by President Juan Velasco Alvarado, who seized control of the government in Lima through a coup d'état

[11] *Ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1971.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (hereafter *SCMP*), US Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 17, April 1971, pp. 192-93.
[14] *SCMP*, No. 35, August 1971, p. 108.
[15] *Inter alia*, see *The Washington Post*, Jan. 29, 1972.
[16] ANSA (Italian news service) in Spanish, May 7, 1972.

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in 1968. During the new regime's first years in power, the Chinese press had treated it as a usurper whose "reactionary troops" had suppressed the Peruvian peasantry "resolutely engaged in a struggle against the landlords who had forcibly occupied the land." Peking's coolness persisted even though the new Peruvian leadership was quick to strike an anti-imperialist posture born of its intense nationalism and its aspirations for greater economic independence. For example, one of Sr. Velasco's first acts was to declare the confiscation of an oil refinery and industrial complex owned by US private interests, thereby repudiating a nationalization-with-compensation agreement negotiated by the predecessor government of Fernando Belaunde Terry; other moves to restrict foreign capital in Peru followed as part of what the regime called a nationalist and revolutionary, but not socialist, program of reform.

In time, Peking came to see the rich possibilities inherent in cooperation with the Velasco government. The desire of the new regime to diversify trade patterns triggered Peking's initial approach to the Andean republic. To review key developments, at the invitation of the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a high-level trade delegation from the PRC arrived in Lima on April 22, 1971, to discuss the resumption of trade relations between the two nations. (This was the same Chinese team that had signed an agreement with Chile just two days before.) The talks led to a preliminary trade agreement —signed by the Chinese representative Chou Hua-min and by Carlos Garcia Bedoya, Secretary General of the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—providing for "most favored nation" trade relations but allowing Peru to make exemptions with respect to certain benefits accruing to it through regional and sub-regional trading arrangements. On the question of territorial waters, China endorsed the 200-mile maritime limit by affirming in the agreement that "coastal countries have the right to dispose of the natural resources in the sea and adjacent to their coasts, and in the seabed and subsoil, for promoting the development and welfare of their peoples; consequently, they have the right to define the limits of their maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction. . . ." [17] The importance of this provision of the agreement to the Peruvians was underscored by Foreign Minister General Edgard Mercado Jarrin, who hailed it as a "historic landmark" constituting the first time the People's Republic of China had expressed formal support for the position of the coastal countries of Latin America.[18]

At the end of the talks, the authorities in Lima accepted a Chinese invitation to send a Peruvian delegation to Peking to negotiate further procedures to promote trade. Forthwith, a group headed by Carlos Alzamor Traverso, Undersecretary for Economic Affairs and Integration, and General Javier Tantalean Vanini, Minister of Fisheries, went to Peking, got a royal reception (extended by, among others, Premier Chou En-lai, who reiterated the PRC's support on the territorial-waters issue), and signed a more explicit trade agreement announced on June 16. According to the terms published, the Chinese agreed on the purchase from Peru, before the end of 1972, of 150,000 to 200,000 tons of fish powder; 20,000 tons of fish oil; 35,000 to 40,000 tons of copper; 10,000 tons of lead; and 10,000 tons of zinc. In contrast, the Peruvian commitment constituted a general agreement to "actively buy China's export commodities." Both sides also agreed to establish commercial offices in the other's country as soon as possible.[19]

In mid-July the Peruvian government announced the beginning of immediate shipments to China of the minerals contracted for in the June agreement, amounting to a total value of $45 million. A Lima broadcaster expressed the feelings of nationalist supporters of the regime when he declared:

Now our country is free to take its mineral products to any market in the world and thus obtain the funds it needs so much for its progress and the welfare of its people. . . . This makes the Peruvian of today proud and makes him feel more Peruvian.[20]

Statements of this sort indicate that the Chinese have tapped vital wells of potential support by playing up to the widespread frustration in Latin America that has resulted from excessive dependence in the past on the fluctuating US market for sales of key minerals and other resources.

Once trade negotiations began, expectations grew that China and Peru would establish diplomatic relations in the near future. The announcement of the two governments was finally made on November 2, 1971, and presented no surprises: Lima recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legal gov-

[17] NCNA, May 14, 1971.

[18] ANSA, April 29, 1971.

[19] NCNA, June 16, 1971.

[20] Lima Domestic Service, July 14, 1971.

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Chinese Premier Chou En-lai greets Peruvian Minister of Power and Mining Jorge Fernandez Maldonado during the latter's visit to Peking in November 1971 to negotiate a long-term loan from the PRC.

—Photo from Oiga (Lima), December 1971.

ernment of China, while Peking recognized Peru's sovereignty over the maritime zone off the Peruvian coast to the 200-mile limit. As in the case of the Sino-Chilean agreement, there was an avowal by the PRC that Taiwan was an inseparable part of China and a Peruvian response "taking note" of Peking's position.[21]

Predictably, the *People's Daily* greeted the establishment of diplomatic relations with a lengthy editorial reiterating familiar themes. Once more the refrain was sounded that "the Latin American countries and peoples are uniting to wage a heroic struggle . . . against big-nation hegemony" and that "the days when US imperialism can arbitrarily manipulate the fate of the Latin American peoples and do as it likes in Latin America are gone forever." Similarly, the editorial extolled the "anti-imperialist" efforts of the Velasco regime, noting that it had "nationalized quite a number of enterprises owned by foreign capital, especially US capital, and adopted a series of measures in the interest of the development of its national economy." [22]

The most recent development in the cementing of Sino-Peruvian relations was the signing of an agreement on economic and technical cooperation on November 28, 1971, negotiated by the authorities in Peking with a visiting delegation headed by General Jorge Fernandez Maldonado Solari, Peru's Minister of Power and Mining. Peking granted Lima a generous loan in the amount of $42 million, repayable without interest over a 20-year period, with no obligation on Peru's part to make repayments for the first ten years; furthermore, the loan was to be repaid in Peruvian products, not in foreign currency. In addition, the Chinese agreed to purchase $100 million worth of minerals from Peru over the next three years—including 90,000 tons of copper, 15,000 tons of zinc, and 15,000 tons of lead—and they also expressed interest in buying Peruvian sugar and cotton.[23] Only two or three times before in its history had Peking negotiated a loan on such liberal terms (though, as we have seen, the Chinese were to follow up with an even more remarkable offer to the Chileans). To all appearances, moreover, there were no political strings attached—at least in the formal agreement. In this connection, it is interesting that the Peruvian negotiator, Fernandez Maldonado, insisted in a later press conference that Peru had nothing to fear from the ideological influence of China.[24] Given the exceptional nature of Peking's efforts, however, it seems fair to take a wait-and-see attitude concerning the long-range effects of the rapprochement.

Other Chinese Contacts

The remaining countries that have been singled out for mention here have demonstrated a variety of reactions to the PRC that could be measured on the political thermometer from very warm to very cool. Their experiences will be reviewed briefly on a case-by-case basis.

Mexico. As noted earlier, Mexico's interest in closer relations with mainland China is clearly motivated by the prospects of expanded trade. A good deal has been written in the Mexican press on this subject, and some of the country's economists have even gone so far as to speculate that within a few years China could replace Japan as Mexico's second most active commercial partner after the United States. In a direct expression of the business community's interest, the Mexico City Chamber of Commerce sent a delegation headed by its president, Miguel Velasquez, to confer with the Chinese authorities in October 1971. Upon his return, Sr. Velas-

[21] NCNA, Nov. 2, 1971.
[22] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Nov. 4, 1971.
[23] *La Nueva Cronica* (Lima), Dec. 16, 1971.
[24] *Ibid.*

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quez reported that the conversations had elicited an assurance from Chinese Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien that Peking would welcome the establishment of trade relations with Mexico. Velasquez urged the Mexican government to set to work immediately to negotiate a trade agreement and to exchange official commercial representatives with the PRC. He added that the Chinese seemed to be interested in importing Mexican sugar, cotton, coffee, wheat, lead, copper, cacao, and certain chemical products, while in return exporting other chemical products and machinery.[25]

In subsequent weeks the Mexican government initiated steps toward a diplomatic rapprochement with Peking. As already pointed out, Mexico switched from a negative to a pro-Peking stance in the crucial United Nations vote to seat the PRC and expel the Republic of China. On the day the voting took place (October 25), the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a communiqué stating that Mexico recognized the representative of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate spokesman for China in the UN.[26] In an effort to forestall any further loss of ground, the Nationalist Chinese ambassador to Mexico announced in early November that his government would not, for its part, break off relations with countries that had voted for the PRC's admission to the UN. Nonetheless, the Mexican government proceeded unilaterally to announce that it was severing diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government, stating that this decision was consistent with the position its representatives had taken in the UN General Assembly.[27] The Nationalist Chinese ambassador was left little choice but to protest Mexico's attitude as "extremely unfriendly" and announce the closing of the Republic of China's diplomatic mission in Mexico City and consulates in Guadalajara and Mexicali (a group of Nationalist Chinese agricultural technicians on assignment in Mexico were also withdrawn).[28] Three months later, in February 1972, Mexico and the PRC announced the establishment of formal diplomatic relations and the appointment of respective ambassadors.

Argentina. The abstention of the Argentine delegation from the UN vote on seating the People's Republic of China came as a surprise to observers, since the Argentine government had already publicly expressed its interest in establishing closer relations with Peking—specifically, in a statement made by Foreign Minister Luis Maria de Pablo Pardo on September 21, 1971. It later became known that for some time representatives of the two countries had been holding unpublicized meetings in Bucharest to discuss the possibilities of expanding trade relations and achieving a diplomatic rapprochement. On November 2, 1971, Sr. de Pablo Pardo stated in public that negotiations were underway for a "normalization" of relations.[29]

Shortly afterward, a Buenos Aires daily reported that a group of Argentine businessmen had discussed trade relations with representatives of the PRC in the Argentine pavilion at the Santiago International Fair.[30] A report was also published that several representatives of the Buenos Aires meat-packing industry were leaving for Hong Kong in mid-November to explore the possibility of selling various products to mainland China.[31]

Toward the end of the year, some remarks made by Argentine President Alejandro Lanusse in a newspaper interview sounded a firmer note of cordiality toward Peking. In a seeming effort to make amends for Argentine's abstention in the UN vote on the China question, he declared that the People's Republic of China had taken the seat in the United Nations that rightfully belonged to it. On this occasion, he also confirmed the reports that had leaked out of the earlier bilateral contacts made in Bucharest.[32]

As in the case of Mexico, an agreement to establish diplomatic relations was eventually reached and made public in February 1972. So far, however, no formal trade agreement has been announced.

Guyana. In the present phase of rapprochement with China, one of the early expressions of interest in improving relations came from Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes Burnham. In a statement printed in the Georgetown *Mirror* on December 29, 1970, he maintained that closer ties with Peking were a logical step for Guyana, that he was impressed by the PRC's record of "untied" aid to underdeveloped countries, and that his government was ready to accept such aid.

Unquestionably, the Prime Minister's move was tied to proposed plans for nationalizing the Canadian-owned Demerara Bauxite Company (Demba),

[25] Mexico City Radio, Nov. 4, 1971.
[26] As reported by NCNA, Nov. 19, 1971.
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] Mexico City Radio, Nov. 18, 1971.
[29] AFP (French news service) in Spanish, Nov. 2, 1971.
[30] *La Nacion* (Buenos Aires), Nov. 14, 1971.
[31] *Ibid.*, Nov. 10, 1971.
[32] LATIN (Latin American news service), Dec. 19, 1971.

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which controlled over 70 percent of Guyana's major industry, the production and processing of bauxite. A nationalization agreement with Alcan, the owner firm, was finally arrived at in July 1971, and Demba was renamed the Guyana Bauxite Company (Guybau). Although the Canadian firm was expected to continue to buy Guyana's bauxite products, the Guyanese were also anxious to develop new markets.

In this situation, the Burnham government was bound to be pleased by a Chinese offer, in response to its overtures, to dispatch a high-level trade delegation to Guyana. The delegation arrived in August, under the leadership of Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade Chou Hua-min, who had headed similar missions to Chile and Peru in April. Principal items on the agenda were negotiations to arrange for Chinese technical assistance to Guyana and for Peking's purchase of bauxite from the Guybau plant. After preliminary talks, it was announced on September 17 that a Guyanese delegation would pay a return visit to China to work out the details for an expansion of bilateral trade, including the export of Guyanese sugar and timber as well as bauxite products.

The Guyanese delegation arrived in China on November 6, coincidentally less than two weeks after Guyana had cast its vote in favor of Peking in the United Nations battle. Premier Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien met the members of the delegation, headed by Minister of Trade David A. Singh, and thanked them for Guyana's support in the UN. In subsequent meetings, an agreement was negotiated under which China promised to purchase, *inter alia,* between 40,000 and 50,000 tons of alumina (a bauxite product) and between 30,000 and 50,000 tons of sugar annually; the initial target for trade between the two countries was announced as $15 million for 1972. The two parties also agreed to establish permanent trade missions in each other's capital. In announcing the trade agreement on December 4, Prime Minister Burnham stated that Guyana and the PRC would establish diplomatic relations in the near future.[33]

More recently, it has been reported that the Chinese have also offered Guyana a long-term, interest-free loan to finance a textile mill, a leather factory and a pig-iron plant.[34]

Ecuador. Ecuador is another country that supported the Albanian resolution to seat the PRC and to expel the Republic of China from the United Nations. In the weeks following the October vote in the General Assembly, there was some confusion over the intentions of the Ecuadorian government. Thus, Foreign Minister Rafael Garcia Velasco, while explaining (in early November) that his country's vote was a confirmation of its policy since 1968 and welcoming the possible benefits of commercial contacts with the PRC, stated that he did not consider diplomatic relations with the PRC "indispensable" and did not expect them to be established under the current administration (of President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra); he added further that the decision whether to continue formal relations between Ecuador and Nationalist China would be left to the latter, whose diplomatic mission in Quito would never be expelled.[35] Apparently the Foreign Minister's views were not wholly in accord with those of other officials of the Ibarra administration, for only a week after his statement was published, the Ecuadorian government announced that it had broken off diplomatic relations with the government of Chiang Kai-shek.[36] However, Quito made no move to establish formal relations with the PRC.

In February 1972 Sr. Ibarra was ousted from the presidency in a military coup d'état. So far the successor regime of General Rodriguez Lara has shown no disposition to pursue a further rapprochement with the PRC. Yet several factors—including Quito's interest in economic assistance, its stance on the territorial-waters issue, and its desire to diversify relations—would seem to favor such a development sooner or later.

Colombia. As noted earlier, Colombia was one of the five Latin American countries to abstain from the historic UN vote on the two-Chinas issue. Foreign Minister Alfredo Vasquez Carrizosa afterward issued a lengthy statement explaining that his government had favored the admission of the PRC to the UN but had opposed the expulsion of Nationalist China as a violation of the "principle of universality" in the United Nations.[37]

Apparently in response to the gains being scored by its Latin American neighbors in dealings with Peking, the Colombian government revealed in November 1971 that it was giving serious consideration to the possibility of establishing active trade relations with the PRC. Toward this end, it announced that it had established a technical committee in the offices

[33] Prensa Latina (Cuban news service), Dec. 5, 1971.
[34] Tad Szulc, reporting in *The New York Times*, March 5, 1972.
[35] *La Voz de los Andes* (Quito), Nov. 11, 1971.
[36] AFP, Nov. 18, 1971.
[37] ANSA, Nov. 4, 1971.

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of the Foreign Trade Institute to study trade prospects with all socialist countries and stated that the committee would soon begin an evaluation of the PRC as a market for Colombian products.[38] In addition, it was decided to send a Colombian trade delegation to the PRC and Eastern Europe in April 1972 (the results of the trip were not known to the author at the time of writing).

These expressions of interest seemed to indicate that Colombia was more ready than some of its neighbors to forgive—or at least to overlook—the support Peking has extended in the past to Maoist revolutionary groups, including guerrillas whose activities have been a source of great aggravation (more on which shortly).

El Salvador. While El Salvador is the first of the nations so far enumerated that voted against the PRC's entry into the UN, it had already made clear that it was considering the feasibility of developing a market in China for its major product, coffee. In fact, the Foreign Minister, Dr. Walter Beneke, left the very day after the vote (October 26) for a visit to the Canton trade fair, announcing that he hoped some of China's millions of citizens would find coffee to their liking and adding, on a broader note, that his country would welcome trade anywhere in the world so long as no conditions were attached.[39]

At the same time, the authorities moved to squelch widespread rumors in Central America that El Salvador was considering formal recognition of the PRC: on October 27 the Foreign Ministry issued a categorical statement that the government of El Salvador did not recognize the PRC and that it would continue to have cordial relations with the Republic of China.[40]

Bolivia. The Bolivian government was another to cast a negative vote against the PRC's admission to the United Nations. Although Foreign Minister Mario Gutierrez indicated in a subsequent press conference that Bolivia would attempt to improve relations with the PRC, he made it clear that there was no overwhelming enthusiasm in La Paz for such a move. With respect to economic issues, he stressed his government's dissatisfaction with "dumping" practices of the Chinese, which had affected antimony prices to the disadvantage of Bolivia. On the political and ideological side, he underscored Bolivia's differences with Peking by announcing his acceptance of an official invitation to visit Taiwan and his government's intention to sign a joint technical-scientific agreement with Nationalist China.[41]

Venezuela. The Venezuelan government also voted against the Albanian resolution in the UN, and the authorities in Caracas have since shown little interest in normalizing relations with the PRC. Foreign Minister Aristides Calvani stated emphatically in a press conference on December 18, 1971, while on a visit to Bogota, that his government was not considering relations with Peking.[42] There seems little doubt that in the case of Venezuela, the authorities' past experience in having to cope with disruptive guerrilla activity has accounted in part for their distinct coolness toward the idea of formal ties with the Chinese Communists.

Brazil. Finally, as noted earlier, the government of the largest nation in Latin America is probably the most adamant in its opposition to the development of ties with the People's Republic of China. Needless to add, Brazil was one of the 12 Latin American countries that voted against the PRC's admission to the UN, and its leaders have since made clear that they do not intend to change their policies toward either Peking or Taiwan. Despite pressures from certain Brazilian business interests who would like to establish commercial contacts with China, the government has clung firmly to its anti-Peking posture. Finance Minister Antonio Delfim Netto set forth the official position of the regime in stating that economic relations (a) were not practical because the Communist Chinese economy is controlled by the state, and (b) were not possible because the two countries do not have political relations (a defensible posture but a rather questionable line of argument considering, for example, the large volume of trade transacted between Japan and the PRC without benefit of political relations).[43]

The Course of Revolutionary Activity

Despite Peking's current emphasis on the need for the normalization of commercial and diplomatic relations, it has not completely ignored the activities of the pro-Chinese Communist parties and revolutionary movements in Latin America. From time to time, the Chinese have publicized the activities of

[38] *El Colombiano* (Medellín), Nov. 12, 1971.
[39] San Salvador Domestic Service, Oct. 27, 1971.
[40] *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1971.
[41] ANSA, Dec. 2, 1971.
[42] AFP, Dec. 18, 1971.
[43] LATIN, Dec. 22, 1971.

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these groups and—in connection with special events or anniversaries—have reproduced letters, declarations of solidarity, and programs of action issued by their Latin American supporters. For example, when the first Chinese satellite was launched, and again on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the CCP, numerous greetings from Latin American Maoists appeared in the Chinese press. Predictably, the messages included praise of Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, denunciation of "Soviet socialist imperialism" and "US imperialism" and endorsement of armed struggle as the only viable path to power.

It is quite noticeable, however, that the Chinese are devoting less space to these groups in their press and propaganda than was the case in the past. Criticisms of Castroite strategy and tactics have virtually disappeared, a reflection of the improvement in Sino-Cuban relations. Similarly, the press has warmed up to the Chilean and Peruvian governments since the normalization of relations with these countries. In the case of Brazil, on the other hand, the Chinese have had no reason to refrain from publicizing the attacks of local Maoists against the regime; thus, for example, the New China News Agency recently circulated a resolution originally printed in the Brazilian revolutionary organ, *A Classe Operaria,* calling on the members of the Communist Party of Brazil to prepare for the launching of a "people's war." [44]

Insofar as Maoist guerrilla activity is concerned, it is impossible to guess the extent of support—moral and/or material—currently being extended by Peking to revolutionary groups in different countries, but given the Chinese Communists' long-range visions of Third World conflict, it is logical to suppose that at the very least they follow such activities with intense interest. The most active efforts to implement the strategy of "people's war" have been undertaken in Bolivia and Colombia, so a word might be said about the guerrilla operations in these countries.

Although the Bolivian Maoists did not take part in the abortive guerrilla movement of 1967 led by Ché Guevara, there is every evidence that they subsequently attempted to establish a guerrilla base in the province of Santa Cruz from which they hoped to expand guerrilla operations into other parts of the country. In October 1970, Bolivian army rangers discovered and surrounded the campsite and arrested

[44] NCNA, Aug. 24, 1971.

The influence on Latin American revolutionaries of both Castroite and Communist Chinese literature is evident in this photograph taken in the wake of a raid on the headquarters of a Colombian guerrilla terrorist group in January 1966.

—USIA photo.

four guerrillas, one of whom was Oscar Zamora, the head of the pro-Chinese party in Bolivia and the leader of a band of fighters who, the year before, had seized a large landed estate, formed a "Union of Poor Peasants" (UCAPO), and urged the peasantry to join the Maoists in waging an agrarian revolution. In the 1970 raid, the rangers reportedly found a large quantity of arms, subversive propaganda, Maoist literature, food, and uniforms. Zamora and his associates nonetheless denied that the camp was a guerrilla training site (although they admitted their association with UCAPO). Shortly after their capture, they were exiled to Chile.

Several months later, Zamora returned to Santa Cruz, assumed leadership of UCAPO, and declared war on the local landlords. He is still operating in the area, though with little effect beyond harassment of the authorities. The tactics he has used in eastern Bolivia have clearly represented an attempt to realize the goals prescribed by Chairman Mao in his writings on "people's war."

In Colombia, the effort to stage a revolutionary "people's war" has been carried on by a guerrilla group that calls itself the People's Army of National Liberation (in imitation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army). The Maoists in Colombia have issued

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roseate claims of success on the part of the EPL. For example, *Revolucion,* the organ of the pro-Chinese party, published a report in January 1969 alleging that more than 50 successful operations had been carried out by the army in its first year. According to the report, the guerrillas had killed or wounded many enemy troops, captured arms, seized hundreds of thousands of pesos' worth of goods from "US imperialist enterprises" and "oligarchies," and "recovered several thousand hectares of land and thousands of cattle and horses from the hands of the big latifundists." [45] Similar reports have been issued from time to time during 1970 and 1971 and have been quoted with regularity in the Chinese press.

The Colombian authorities have called such accounts grossly exaggerated and have consistently downgraded the significance of Maoist as well as Castroite guerrilla activities. It is beyond dispute that in the last couple of years heavy casualties have been inflicted on the EPL by government forces given special training in counterguerrilla tactics. While this has not stopped the guerrillas from making sporadic attacks against the government troops, it is clear that the Maoists have failed to develop a fighting force capable of waging all-out "people's war" on the scale that has characterized guerrilla warfare in Asia.

Summary

To recapitulate the basic points of this paper, the Chinese Communists' interest in Latin America stems fundamentally from the fact that it is part of the underdeveloped Third World which, in the Maoist view, will eventually provide the crucial arenas for a revolutionary struggle that will reshape world history. In the present strategic phase, however, Peking has shifted away from its previous policy, which put primary emphasis on encouraging "people's wars" in Latin America, and has moved instead toward a policy that seeks the normalization of relations with as many countries as possible. The primary aim of this course is to forge a broad united front with the Latin American community against the two "superpowers," the United States and the Soviet Union—a strategy that Peking is pursuing with equal vigor in several other parts of the world.

The Chinese have pursued this objective through a number of tactics, including the promotion of cultural exchanges, the support in propaganda of policy positions important to the Latin Americans, the expansion of trade, and the establishment of diplomatic relations. In the cultural sphere, the Chinese and Latin Americans have resumed the exchange of various nongovernmental delegations—a practice that was mutually popular in the early 1960's though it dropped off during the Cultural Revolution. As in other approaches, Peking is making a definite effort to influence public opinion in Latin America through cultural diplomacy.

On the commercial level, the Chinese have made impressive political gains as a result of economic and trade agreements with Peru, Chile and Guyana, and have excellent prospects for achieving similar progress with respect to several other countries. The frustration of Latin Americans as a result of excessive dependence on a fluctuating United States market has facilitated the work of the Chinese negotiators. Peking has clearly perceived the tactical political advantage of agreeing to purchase a range of goods for which the Latin Americans are most anxious to find new markets. In the case of the extremely generous long-term loans to Peru and Chile, the authorities in Peking made an obvious effort to convince Latin Americans in general that the Chinese, unlike Western leaders, were willing to aid other countries without draining off the resources of the recipient nations.

Finally, the Chinese have sought formal recognition and exchanges of ambassadors with other countries to implement the formation of a global alignment against the "superpowers." Should they succeed in gaining diplomatic recognition from several additional Latin American nations, they will have made notable progress toward establishing the People's Republic of China as a world power. Such an achievement would enhance their prestige and thus strengthen their claim that the PRC, as the dominant force in the Third World, is the only power center capable of protecting smaller nations from exploitation by the two major powers.

Whether a significant number of Latin American states will in fact find it to their advantage to lean toward alignment with the PRC as a counterweight to the USSR and the United States is not at all certain. What is clear beyond challenge, however, is that the Chinese Communists have been far more successful in Latin America under the "new" policy of rapprochement than under the policy of encouraging "people's war."

[45] *Ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1969.

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Peking and the Provinces

EDITORS' NOTE: Western analysts have almost universally agreed that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution produced widespread political turmoil and disruption in the People's Republic of China, but assessments of the exact nature and permanence of the Cultural Revolution's impact on the Chinese political system have varied considerably. One major area of controversy has concerned the relationship between the central authorities in Peking and those in charge of lower-level administrative units, primarily the provinces. In the interest of furthering reasoned dialogue on this question, we present below two contrasting views on the subject. We also cordially invite our readers to send in brief comments, which we will endeavor to publish in the correspondence columns of subsequent issues.

Decentralization of Power

By Parris Chang

As a result of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) during the second half of the 1960's, political power in the People's Republic of China has become greatly decentralized. The political turmoil that the GPCR caused has seriously impaired much of China's central control system and has substantially weakened the ability of the central leadership to elicit compliance from provincial authorities. Consequently, the degree of provincial independence has grown considerably. This trend has been facilitated and enhanced by the fact that the GPCR enormously expanded the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the political system and gave PLA leaders control of provincial political institutions. Thus, the congruence of two political developments—namely, the increased autonomy of the provinces vis-à-vis Peking and the PLA leaders' simultaneous acquisition of both political and military power in the provinces—has introduced a new equation into China's central-provincial relations.

This article will attempt to substantiate these contentions and explore their implications. Specifically, it will seek to demonstrate how the decentralization of power came about, to evaluate the extent of provincial autonomy at present through an analysis of current interaction between the center and the provinces, and to assess the prospects for future central-provincial relations.

To gain an understanding of the altered nature of central-provincial relations in China today, we must review briefly the PLA's intervention in the GPCR and the PLA leaders' subsequent assumption of control in the provinces. It is important to note, however, that the PLA did not initially seek political power for itself; nor did it seize political power through a coup, as the military has done in many developing countries. Rather, up until August 1967 the PLA got more and more involved in the political arena largely against its will, and in many respects power fell to it by default.

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In the summer of 1966, when Mao Tse-tung and his opponents in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were engaged in a showdown, the PLA did play a significant supporting role in Mao's victory over such powerful party figures as Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing at the 11th Central Committee Plenum in August 1966; it was also instrumental in organizing and providing transport and logistical support for the hordes of Red Guards who descended on Peking in the summer and fall of 1966. But its extensive role in the subsequent "seizure of power" from below by the Maoist rebels was evidently not planned from the outset. In fact, many of the PLA's commanding officers seemed to be opposed to military involvement in what they considered an intraparty dispute, and they at first adopted a hands-off policy.

However, during the course of the assaults on the provincial party structures by the Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels" after the 11th Plenum, a large number of local PLA leaders appeared to side with the provincial authorities. Since the local PLA units had the responsibility of assisting in the maintenance of law and order and hence constituted a part of the establishment, their leaders probably viewed with suspicion and resentment those attacking the establishment and were therefore inclined to align themselves with the provincial party leaders. Personal and organizational ties between PLA and party leaders were also close. For example, in many provinces, children of the local PLA leaders and of local party leaders had worked together to organize the initial Red Guard groups—an action possibly initiated by the parents and in any case quite likely to have affected parental attitudes. Moreover, senior regional and provincial party secretaries often served concurrently as first political commissars of military regions or districts, and the PLA commanders were normally members of the party's regional bureaus or provincial committees.

Thus, even though the PLA was originally supposed to stay on the sidelines, the personal, political, and organizational ties of local PLA leaders as well as the occurrence of unanticipated events during the GPCR rendered PLA neutrality in the political conflict impossible. This was precisely Mao's argument for PLA intervention—and for intervention on his side. He has been quoted as saying:

The so-called "non-involvement" is false, for the army was already involved long ago. The question, therefore, is not one of involvement or non-involvement. It is one of whose side we should stand on and whether we should support the revolutionaries or the conservatives or even the rightists. The PLA should actively support the revolutionary leftists.[1]

In January 1967, Mao and his supporters in the leadership succeeded in reversing the policy of non-involvement of the PLA and pushed the PLA into backing the "revolutionary leftists." A central directive to that effect was issued on January 23, 1967.[2] By injecting the military into the GPCR, however, Mao provided the opening for subsequent military intervention in politics and for the PLA to emerge as the dominant political force in China.

These far-reaching consequences Mao probably did not foresee, and could not have foreseen, at the outset, for the PLA, having been indoctrinated for years with the thought of Mao, not only enjoyed his highest confidence but also seemed a reliable political instrument. Indeed, soon after the promulgation of the January 23 central directive, PLA leaders in Heilungkiang, Shansi, Shantung, and Kweichow provinces plus the municipality of Shanghai (see the accompanying map) dutifully aided local Maoists in seizing power from existing authorities and in establishing revolutionary committees (RC's), the new organs of power. But in most other provinces the response of the PLA leaders to the directive was at best equivocal. In some, PLA leaders even intervened, knowingly or unknowingly, against the Maoist groups whom they had been called upon to support.

The most important single factor that elevated the military to political prominence, however, was a series of rebel assaults on the provincial authorities in an effort to "seize power from below" (in emulation of the 1871 Paris Commune experience). These assaults paralyzed the party and government machinery in many provinces, and the resultant riots, disorderly demonstrations, and "struggle by force" between rival rebel groups produced public chaos. As the civilian party and government organizations could no longer exercise effective authority, the PLA had to move in to fill the power vacuum; thus, power in many provinces fell to the local PLA leaders.

From March 1967 onward, the political situation in numerous provinces approximated a military take-

[1] See "Decision of the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Affairs Commission and the Cultural Revolution Group on Resolute Support for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left (January 23, 1967)," in *Current Background* (Hong Kong), No. 852, May 6, 1958, pp. 49-50.

[2] *Ibid.*

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

This map is based upon information compiled by the author during the course of research for a forthcoming book on the intervention of the People's Liberation Army in Chinese politics.

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over. Not only did the PLA actually supplant civilian party/government officials and set up military governments in the form of "military control committees" to enforce direct military rule, but it also assumed various political and economic functions (such as the tasks of "three supports and two militaries"[3]), some of which had previously been performed by party and government authorities. In those provinces where the RC's had been set up to replace the defunct party and government organizations, the military, while it did not rule directly, wielded dominant influence, and its representatives actually constituted the backbone of the new leadership structure.

The Wuhan mutiny of July 1967 resulted in still further expansion of military sway in Chinese politics.[4] In fact, the incident was, in retrospect, a major turning point in the GPCR, for it ultimately compelled Mao to change his tack. The mutiny clearly indicated that at least some military leaders supported the anti-Maoist groups in opposition to the radical goals of the GPCR and were even willing to defy the central authorities overtly in doing so; it likewise testified to a direct and sharp clash between the PLA and the revolutionary rebels. Although Ch'en Ts'ai-tao, Commander of the Wuhan Military Region, and several of his collaborators were ousted after the mutiny was quelled, the broad conflict between the PLA and the rebels continued, and there was a distinct prospect that other incidents similar to that at Wuhan might occur. Confronted with this situation —and apparently pressured by regional-provincial military leaders who met in Peking in early August 1967—Mao decided to grant the military a new power. A central directive of September 5, 1967, authorized the PLA to use naked force to quell any disobedience.[5]

The effect of the September 5 directive was to make the PLA the determining political element in the provinces. The military authorities soon took advantage of their enhanced power and endeavored to crack down on unruly and protesting rebel groups. They sent the Red Guards and rebels back to schools and factories, enforced stern discipline against troublemakers, and forcefully dissolved many rebel organizations. Moreover, the PLA had a major hand in the formation of the RC's, the organs of "revolutionary power," in 23 provincial-level administrative units from August 1967 to September 1968. The very establishment of this new structure of authority politically symbolized the completion of the "seizure of power" from the former provincial authorities; hence it not only imposed greater limitations on the rebels' activities but also tended to negate their own *raison d'etre*.

The leading personnel of these 23 RC's unmistakably mirrored the prevailing political reality. Thus, of the 46 chairmen and first vice-chairmen, 36, or 81 percent, were high-ranking regional or provincial PLA officers.[6] As of September 1968, 95, or a little more than 43 percent, of the 220 chairmen and vice-chairmen of China's entire 29 provincial-level RC's were military men, with 20 of them holding the post of chairman. Quite plainly, then, most of the 23 RC's set up after the Wuhan incident constituted creations of the local military leaders.

It is true that military domination of the provincial structure of power is not without precedent in China under Communist rule. During 1949–52, PLA personnel ran China's provinces through "military control committees" and "military and administrative committees" and enjoyed considerable discretionary authority. But the circumstances of the post–1967 years do not appear comparable to those of the earlier period. By 1954, with the consolidation of Communist control of the mainland and the establishment of civilian institutions of rule, the military ad-

[3] The "three supports" tasks included providing backing to the leftists, facilitating industrial production, and ensuring the maintenance of agricultural production; the "two militaries" tasks were to establish order and to train the Red Guards.

[4] The origins of the mutiny go back to prior months and the actions of Wuhan PLA leaders in support of the local conservative faction against the local "revolutionary" faction. In July, two Peking emissaries—Vice-Premier Hsieh Fu-chih, a member of the Politburo, and Wang Li, a member of the Cultural Revolution Group and Acting Director of the CCP Propaganda Department—arrived in Wuhan to assess the situation. When they admonished the local PLA leaders for "suppressing" the "revolutionaries," the military officers became enraged, and matters quickly got out of hand. On July 20, members of the "Million Heroes"—a group which Hsieh and Wang had denounced but which Ch'en Ts'ai-tao and Hung Han-hua, Commander and Political Commissar, respectively, of the Wuhan Military Region, had backed—kidnapped and physically abused the two Peking envoys. For a detailed and excellent analysis of the incident and its consequences, see Thomas W. Robinson, "The Wuhan Incident—Local Strife and Provincial Rebellion During the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 47, July-September 1971, pp. 413-38.

[5] The September 5th directive is translated in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (Hong Kong), No. 4026, Sept. 22, 1967, pp. 1-2. (Hereafter this source will be cited as *SCMP*.) On the same day, Chiang Ch'ing made a speech tactily admitting that her Cultural Revolution Group lieutenants had erred in advancing the slogan of "dragging out the handful of capitalist power-holders in the army," and enjoining the rebels not to raid military headquarters or seize arms from the PLA. See *SCMP*, No. 4069, Nov. 29, 1967, pp. 1-9.

[6] Richard Baum, "China: Year of the Mangoes," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1969, p. 8.

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ministrators of the provinces had handed their political responsibilites over to civilian party/government officials and "returned to the barracks." Since 1967, however, the military administrators of China's provinces have shown no sign of a willingness to transfer their political authority to the civilians even though the turmoil and disruptions of the GPCR have ended and there is now a fair degree of order throughout the country. On the contrary, they have tightened their grip on the structure of provincial power.

This is graphically demonstrated by an analysis of the composition of the new provincial party committees formed between December 1970 and August 1971. Military representation is quite heavy. Of the 158 individuals holding the ranks of first secretary, second secretary, secretary, or deputy or assistant secretary in the summer of 1971, 95, or 60 percent, were military officers, 53, or 33.5 percent, were civilian party/government cadres; and 10, or 6.4 percent, were "mass" representatives. Of the 29 first secretaries, 21 were military men (of which 11 were concurrently military commanders; nine, professional political commissars; and one, a commander of public security forces), the remainder being civilian party officials.

Central-Provincial Interaction

The growth in the local influence of PLA leaders in the provinces and other similar administrative units has not only gone hand in hand with but helped bring about an increase in the influence of provincial-level officials at the center. This rise in influence was unmistakably reflected in the membership of the Central Committee elected at the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1961. Of the 279 members (170 full and 109 alternate), 132, or 46 percent, are representatives of provincial political or military groups (76 PLA men and 56 civilians); an additional 75 members, most of them model workers and peasants, also come from the provinces and presumably articulate provincial viewpoints. Thus, better than 70 percent of the current membership works in the provinces, as compared with only one-third of the members of the last Central Committee prior to the GPCR (originally elected in 1956 and then enlarged in 1958). Clearly, the balance of forces has tipped away from the center and toward the provinces.

Perhaps more important from the standpoint of the present discussion, Peking's mechanisms for controlling the provinces and similar units have been severely impaired by the GPCR. Previously, for instance, civilian party officials headed provincial institutions (except in outlying border regions like Sinkiang and Tibet), and there was a system of separation of powers and checks and balances between civilian-party and PLA officials. Now, however, local PLA commanders or professional political commissars head the party and government apparatuses in most provinces. In fact, PLA personnel actually comprise the core of the leadership in virtually every province. Furthermore, before the advent of the GPCR in 1966, senior secretaries of the provincial or regional party bureaus served concurrently as first political commissars in the provincial military districts or military regions to provide party control over the local PLA, but in most cases today this practice has been discontinued. Instead, local PLA commanders or professional political commissars now function concurrently as provincial party secretaries. This interlocking of party, government, and military leadership positions and the concentration of political, military, and financial powers in the same hands have greatly enhanced the opportunities for provincial autonomy and rendered the new provincial forces more intractable and more difficult for the central authorities to control.

To be sure, the situation just described is a far cry from the regionalism of the late Ch'ing period (roughly 1850–1911) or the warlordism of the Republican period (1911–49)—although these traditions may not be entirely dead. A system of central controls still exists, and the central leadership still possesses a number of resources which it can theoretically employ to keep the provinces in line. These include its monopoly of, and ability to manipulate, the symbols of legitimacy in the political system, its control over the allocation and use of the economic resources of the provinces, its right to appoint and dismiss provincial officials, and its capacity to apply brute force if other measures fail. Political changes in recent years, however, have reduced the effectiveness of these means.

For example, provincial elements are now strongly represented in the regime's top decision-making councils, so they are in a good position to register their views and aggregate their interests. Moreover, their increased access to the sources of legitimacy gives them considerable scope to manipulate and invoke the political symbols of the regime to legitimize *their* policy priorities.

The center's financial and fiscal controls over provincial authorities have probably been weakened

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by the GPCR and the economic decentralization that has taken place since the late 1960's. Although we lack detailed information about the regulation of economic activities under this decentralized system, it seems likely, judging from press reports on economic undertakings of the provinces and from the recent campaign to construct local industries, that measures similar to those employed during the economic decentralization of the late 1950's have been instituted. At that time, provincial organs assumed responsibility for a broad range of industries and commercial enterprises formerly under central control and obtained the right to 20 percent of the profits of these industries and enterprises. In addition, the central government assigned the provinces definite sources of revenue and authorized them to levy special taxes and to use their own initiatives to raise funds; moreover, it relinquished its control over separate items of local revenue and expenditure. Such changes substantially expanded the degree of financial autonomy of provincial authorities during 1958–60. If this same pattern prevails under the current economic decentralization, provincial leaders are much less dependent upon the center for resource allocations than they were during the early 1960's. Indeed, various justifications advanced for the current economic decentralization—such as the dispersal of China's industrial facilities and the rendering of each province self-sufficient in preparation for war—may have helped the provinces acquire an even greater degree of economic and fiscal autonomy than they enjoyed in the late 1950's.

While Peking's ability to appoint and dismiss officials and to apply raw force in order to secure the obedience of provincial institutions may have diminished somewhat during recent years, they remain the center's ultimate trump cards. Yet, these measures entail high political costs and are not suitable for frequent use. A command-obedience relationship is really a persuasion process, and dismissing recalcitrant provincial officials or dispatching troops to crush local opposition amounts to a painful admission that other ways of bringing about compliance have failed. The Wuhan mutiny affords a good illustration. Thus, the necessity of resorting to such means tends to betray the ineffectiveness of central control, and their use on many occasions could well exacerbate the problem.

On balance, then, the power of the provinces has greatly increased, and the capacity of the center to elicit compliance from the provinces has correspondingly declined. As a result, the central-provincial relationship has become more and more one of negotiation, bargaining, and manipulation rather than one of command-subordination, as was the case in the 1950's and early 1960's. Indeed, the central authorities have found it harder and harder to enforce policies which the provinces oppose, and provincial leaders have in several instances apparently imposed their views on Peking or successfully rejected its orders.

Provincial Recalcitrance

A good example is the slow pace of party "rectification" (*i.e.*, the reevaluation of old party members and the admission of new members) since 1969. Mao that year decreed that the party should conduct its reconstruction and rectification on the basis of "getting rid of the stale and taking in the new" and of an "open-door" principle.[7] These guidelines, if strictly implemented, would probably have altered the post-GPCR political situation drastically. The first would have produced a large-scale expulsion of old party members and a massive infusion of radical youth into the party; the second, embodying the idea of participatory democracy, would have accorded the new elements a major role in party affairs. Thus, the party would have become "packed" with radicals, and the incumbent powerholders would have found their authority diluted and their prerogatives threatened. These ramifications were not lost on the provincial leaders. Consequently, they have dragged their feet with respect to carrying out "rectification."

Another illustration is the overwhelming representation of the military in the reconstructed party organizations of most of the 29 provincial-level units. In its efforts to restore normality to China's political life after the disruptions and anomalies of the GPCR, the central leadership presumably would have liked to install civilians in the top posts of the provincial and local party committees and to return the PLA officers to fundamentally military duties; but the military leaders, instead of relinquishing their political power in the provinces, further entrenched themselves in the reorganized party committees and assumed the key leadership positions in most provinces. While Peking has the ultimate right to approve and reject appointments and may actually have intervened in

[7] "Long Live the Chinese Communist Party," editorial, *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily—Peking), July 1, 1969. (Hereafter, this source will be cited as *JMJP*.)

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the selection of a party secretary in a number of cases,[8] there is no reason to believe that the present composition of the provincial party leaderships is what it asked for or imposed from above. Rather, that makeup seems to have been largely the work of the prevailing political forces in the provinces, and the center appears in most instances merely to have acquiesced to the arrangements made by local powerholders.

A third example is the abandonment of the attempt to confiscate peasants' private plots and to introduce a new income-distribution system in the communes based on more egalitarian principles. During the GPCR, the Maoist leadership conducted a vigorous campaign against Liu Shao-ch'i's "revisionist" policies in agriculture, and it pressed several times for the implementation of radical measures similar to those enforced with disastrous consequences in the late 1950's during the Great Leap era. Apparently, local officials, fearing that such measures would provoke strong peasant resistance, disrupt agricultural production, and threaten local stability, have resolutely opposed the innovations for years, and there is now unmistakable evidence that their views have won out. Peking has recently reaffirmed its previous moderate policy, designed to increase peasants' material incentives.[9]

The growth in the economic and financial autonomy of provincial authorities vis-à-vis the center may constitute still another illustration. As has already been pointed out, provincial leaders during the last few years have come to exercise considerable *de facto* control over economic activities within their individual jurisdictions and have made great efforts to expand local industries and to build up their own respective "independent industrial systems." Did Peking initiate this policy of economic decentralization, or did it originate with the provincial authorities, who then cited Mao's alleged instructions (*i.e.*, to disperse China's productive capacity and to make the provinces self-sufficient in preparation for war) as justification? It is impossible to tell. But in any event, there have been indications that many provincial economic actions have been taken in defiance of unified central planning,[10] and there have been frequent charges that provincial authorities lack a "concept of the whole situation" and a notion of the "whole nation as a chessboard" and display "excessive dispersionism and departmentalism." [11]

That Peking's luminaries have a deep concern about excessive local power and political fragmentation is attested by their repeated criticisms of manifestations of so-called "polycentrism." In the summer of 1968, as the GPCR was drawing to a close, a front-page editorial in the *People's Daily* emphatically stated:

The proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao ..... is the one and only leading center for the whole party, army, nation and all the revolutionary masses. They can have only such a center and no other ..... The so-called theory of "many centers" is a reactionary theory of the bourgeois "mountain-stronghold" mentality and individualism. It disintegrates the unity of the revolutionary ranks based on Mao Tse-tung's thought and hinders implementation of the proletarian revolutionary line. If every department and unit wanted to "make itself a center" and there were many "centers" in the country, then there would be no center at all.

Seemingly referring to provincial leaders who tended to look after their own particularistic interests in disregard of central guidance and/or who refused to carry out inconvenient central directives because of "special conditions" in their own areas, the same editorial called for party officials to criticize and repudiate the erroneous idea of "making oneself a center," to strengthen the proletarian concept of "viewing the situation as a whole," to enhance the "revolutionary sense of organization and discipline," and to carry out "all instructions" from proletarian headquarters resolutely.[12] Several years later, the central authorities are still harping on these same themes. For instance, a *People's Daily* editorial of August 27, 1971, marking the completion of the

[8] The political rehabilitations of Chang P'ing hua and Chao Tzu-yang—former First Party Secretaries of Hunan and Kwangtung, respectively—and their elections as Party Secretaries of Shansi and Inner Mongolia, respectively—are two clear examples of central intervention.

[9] "Seriously Implement the Party's Rural Economic Policy," *Hung ch'i* (Red Flag—Peking), No. 13, Dec. 4, 1971. The article denounced those calling for radical reforms in agriculture and upheld private plots and the policies of "three-level ownership with the production team as the foundation" and of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work." See also the editorial in *JMJP*, Feb. 18, 1971.

[10] "Achieve Greater, Faster, Better and More Economic Results in Developing Local Industries," *Hung ch'i*, No. 6, May 25, 1970, pp. 82-88, and editorial in *Hupeh Daily*, broadcast over Radio Wuhan, March 17, 1972.

[11] For a typical example, see the editorial in *Hupeh Daily*, broadcast over Radio Wuhan, March 17, 1972.

[12] *JMJP*, Aug. 5, 1968, in *Peking Review*, No. 32, Aug. 9, 1968, p. 8. See also the *JMJP* editorial on New Year's Day, 1969.

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reestablishment of the 29 provincial-level party committees, called for all party members and all departments to place themselves "under the absolute leadership of the party and reject the reactionary theory of many centers, that is, the theory of no center."

Furthermore, since the purge of Lin Piao in the fall of 1971, the Chinese leadership has renewed and intensified a nationwide campaign to downgrade the role of the military and to reassert party control over not only it but all facets of Chinese society. Specifically, PLA men in various party and government organizations have been attacked for arrogance and "commandism" and for a tendency to ignore the principle of democratic centralism and to rule by fiat, and their political activities have been subjected to close civilian scrutiny.[13]

The Prospects

While it is still too early to assess the accomplishments of this campaign in a definitive way, the achievements to date have been decidedly meager. In few cases have military party secretaries in the provincial party organizations been replaced by civilians,[14] and there has been no sign that the center is succeeding in tightening its grip on provincial institutions.

Over the long run, it seems doubtful that Peking can significantly reverse the present state of decentralization for three major reasons: (1) Provincial leaders now have a greatly expanded role in China's overall political process: they take part in decision-making at the highest level and help shape the regime's policies. As long as their representation in decision-making councils remains strong and as long as those representatives favor the accordance of a considerable share of power to provincial organs, it will be exceedingly difficult for the central leadership to "legislate" changes in the central-provincial relationship. (2) Once Mao has passed from the political scene, as he may well do in the fairly near future, the leadership in Peking will possess much less prestige and authority than it has now; hence, it will be less able to command obedience from provincial leaders than it currently is. (3) After Mao's departure, the central leadership, already split into a number of groups or factions, will likely become even more divided than it is at the moment. Under such circumstances, different factions will probably seek to enlist the support of the provincial leaders, or at least some of them, and the provincial forces will thus find themselves in an enhanced political position.

Indeed, the removal in 1971 of Mao's formally designated successor—Lin Piao—seems to have created a situation in which the influence of provincial leaders is likely to increase rather than diminish in the years ahead. Should Mao die tomorrow, Chou En-lai would probably take over and fill the leadership gap. Despite his enormous prestige and great political and administrative talent, however, Premier Chou clearly lacks the kind of authority Mao has possessed, and he would have to operate within the framework of a collective leadership based on a coalition of diverse political groups. But collective leadership is inherently unstable. Even if it works in the short term, Chou, at the age of 74, will not be around too long, and an intensive struggle for the succession will no doubt eventually ensue.

In such a struggle, the provincial leaders with military and territorial bases of power are bound to play an active and crucial role. Most likely, they will function as "king-makers"—that is, they will throw their weight behind the man or men that they favor.[15] Yet there are other possibilities as well. They could simply exercise a veto, *i.e.*, deny the national leadership position to those they oppose. Or the most powerful among them—individuals like Chen Hsi-lien (First Party Secretary of Liaoning; Commander of Shenyang Military Region, which encompasses the whole of Manchuria; and a member of the Politburo) and Hsu Shih-yu (First Party Secretary of Kiangsu; Commander of Nanking Military Region, which encompasses the three rich East China provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Chekiang; and a

[13] See, for example, "Firmly Support Party Principles, Uphold the Party's Unified Leadership," *JMJP*, Oct. 18, 1971; "Brief Comment" and "Uphold the Proletarian Party Nature," *Hung ch'i*, No. 12, Nov. 1, 1971, pp. 7-10, 14-19; and the joint editorial of *JMJP*, *Hung ch'i*, and *Chieh-fang-chun Pao* (Liberation Army Daily—Peking), Dec. 1, 1971.

[14] So far, only one civilian official—namely Wu Teh, who succeeded the deceased Hsieh Fu-chih in Peking—has taken over the post of provincial first party secretary from a military officer. Liu Hsing-yuan, First Party Secretary of Kwangtung and a follower of Lin Piao, has been removed, but his position has been filled by a fellow PLA leader, Ting Sheng. Two other Lin Piao men—Liang Hsing-chu and Liu Feng, the Second Party Secretaries of Szechwan and Hupeh, respectively—have also disappeared from public view, but their replacements are not yet known.

[15] The author is aware that the provincial leaders are by no means a monolithic group with identical views and interests. Different provincial leaders could therefore support different "candidates" in opposition to one another, but they would nonetheless still operate as "king-makers."

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member of the Politburo)—could conceivably become contenders for the top post.

At present, then, China appears on the threshold of an important transitional period. As long as Mao remains in the political picture, he may, by the sheer weight of his personal authority, hold the pieces together, but there are already unmistakable signs that his prestige and influence are on the wane. When he finally passes from the scene, "polycentrist" tendencies will almost certainly get stronger, and a new political system, in many ways different from that which existed prior to the GPCR, will thus emerge.

In such a system, the significance of the provinces as bases of political power will become even greater, and provincial leaders will assert themselves more vigorously in national politics. Not only will provincial leaders as a group be closely involved in the resolution of political conflicts at the top, but they will also actively participate in the party's decision-making process and help set the policies of the regime. The central leadership, in turn, will have to negotiate, bargain, and compromise with the provincial authorities instead of forcing its priorities on them and exercising highly centralized control over their activities as in the past.

This is not to suggest, however, that there are immediate dangers of a revival of Ch'ing regionalism or Republican warlordism. Rather, the "polycentrist" tendencies reflect the inevitable political and economic pluralism that develops in any vast and heterogeneous nation undergoing major political, social, and economic changes—changes which cannot be effectively controlled and directed by a single source.

Continuing Central Predominance

By Victor C. Falkenheim

Recent journalistic accounts of the People's Republic of China since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–68) offer a striking contrast to most current scholarly commentaries. While journalists and visitors accent the pervasive sense of confidence and renewed purpose characterizing the regime today, the dominant tone of much scholarly analysis is somber, if not pessimistic. This pessimism is rooted in the conviction of many analysts that the prime casualty of the Cultural Revolution has been the political system, and that the damage inflicted on party organization, state administration, and general authority relationships will be difficult, perhaps even impossible, to repair.[1]

For example, one representative assessment of the Chinese political scene at the end of 1971 stressed the unprecedented fragmentation of power in the system, both at the center and "between Peking and the provinces." [2] Such a view is shared by many who agree that the Cultural Revolution has resulted in a redistribution of power in the political system, with provincial and regional leaders the prime beneficiaries. Thus, one scholar has concluded that "the central authorities now exercise considerably less authority and control over local areas than in the past." [3]

If, in fact, central control over the regions has been permanently impaired as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution, that is likely to be of crucial significance to our understanding of politics in China

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[1] See Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 38, April-June 1969, pp. 63-91; or Victor C. Funnel, "Bureaucracy and the Chinese Communist Party," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), Vol. 9, No. 5, May 7, 1971.

[2] Harry Harding, Jr., "China: The Fragmentation of Power," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1972, p. 7.

[3] A. Doak Barnett, *Our China Policy: The Need for Change*, New York, The Foreign Policy Association, 1971, pp. 25-26.

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over the next decade. However, we should be wary of accepting such judgments uncritically. The purpose of this paper is to challenge these assessments on both empirical and methodological grounds.

Relations Before 1966

It is hard to chart relative shifts in the configuration of power in China even at the most stable of times, and it is even more hazardous to do so in the present era of transition. At minimum, one needs quite explicit benchmarks for determining and evaluating changes in the distribution of authority. If, for instance, the central government appears to have been relatively weak in the period prior to 1966, then trends observed at present may represent little departure from the policy-making norms of the pre-Cultural-Revolution period. In short, meaningful conclusions about the degree of centrifugal tendencies at work require a clear grasp of prevailing patterns of provincial-central relations before 1966.

Unfortunately, there is considerable disagreement among analysts as to the precise relationship between central and provincial authorities prior to the Cultural Revolution. Some scholars have questioned the adequacy of central controls in the light of China's well-known statistical and informational deficiencies.[4] Others have gone further, arguing that provincial leaders have been able to manipulate the economic and administrative resources at their disposal to counteract or modify central programs and objectives.[5] On the other hand, Frederick C. Teiwes, in a study of provincial policy-making, found a "high degree of provincial responsiveness to the central government," an "almost total accord" between provincial and national statements on policy questions, and a strikingly "low level of divergence" among provinces in the implementation process.[6] Ezra Vogel's study of Kwangtung Province largely supported Teiwes' findings in clearly demonstrating the paramountcy of the central government vis-à-vis even so traditionally an independent province as Kwangtung.[7]

[4] See, for instance, Peter Schran, "Economic Management," in *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society,* ed. John M. H. Lindbeck, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1971, pp. 193-220.

[5] See, for example, Audrey Donnithorne, *China's Economic System,* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1967, pp. 496-511.

[6] "Provincial Politics in China," in *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, op. cit.,* pp. 144-46.

[7] *Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969.

Resolving these divergent judgments poses difficulties—partly because there is no agreement on how to evaluate the available evidence. This evidence consists chiefly of public criticisms that Chinese leaders directed at their own bureaucracy. A reading of the daily press reveals a substantial concern on the part of national leaders to minimize mistakes and control "deviations" (*pien-ch'a*) from policy norms. Taken at face value, this concern implies a chronic problem of inadequate control.

Closer attention to the specific forms of "deviation," however, shows that they fall into two quite different categories. The first category embraces "deviations" such as "departmentalism," "mountaintop-ism" localism, parochialism, formalism, "right conservatism," "failure to grasp the orientation," and "inadequate level of political understanding"; the second includes commandism, bureaucratism, "blind advance," and "failure to integrate [the plan, policy] with concrete reality." The deviations in the first category (hereafter referred to as "departmentalist" deviations) involve the rejection or evasion of responsibilities imposed from above, in many instances as a result of counterpressures emanating from below; but those in the second category (henceforth referred to as "commandist" deviations) involve excessive responsiveness to orders from above. Such terms are usually used to describe cases where policy is applied mechanically or coercively, and they refer to efforts by cadres to perform assigned tasks at any cost. The problem that they deal with is not inadequate control, but actually overcontrol.

"Commandist" deviations seem to constitute evidence of a strong control system in operation, while "departmentalist" deviations appear to signal an impaired control system. The important questions then become: With what frequency do either of these categories of deviations occur, and how significant are they? Those who tend to find attacks on "departmentalism" and "mountaintop-ism" congenial to their intuitive views of the Chinese political system generally appraise the evidence accordingly. On the other hand, those who favor a more monolithic conception of China's political order attach greater weight to attacks on "commandism" and reject the charges of "mountaintop-ism" as exaggerated and politically motivated.

While we simply do not have enough detailed work at hand as yet to settle the issue once and for all, a careful examination of provincial administration in Fukien Province between 1949 and 1966 tends to

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uphold the more monolithic position. During this period, provincial leaders in Fukien consistently exhibited compliant behavior. The evidence for this conclusion is both direct and indirect.

Fukien: A Case Study

A close reading of the Fukien press leaves an indelible impression of steadfast provincial fidelity to central directives. At least 40 percent of the available news space was devoted to reproduction of national editorials or national policy directives. Local news stories consisted of accounts of successful compliance with these same directives. Production plans were almost always reported as fulfilled or overfulfilled; and campaign targets, as reached or exceeded. Even stories which alluded to difficulties in implementation ultimately reported these obstacles as overcome. On the surface, then, it is hard to escape the conclusion that provincial leaders were overwhelmingly preoccupied with satisfying central demands.

To be sure, newspaper coverage is undoubtedly weighted in favor of accounts of instances of successful compliance with directives, but this fact does not render a study of the press worthless. No provincial newspaper, for example, can avoid publicizing the central tasks of the moment, and the Fukien press reported success in these tasks with striking regularity. If one accepts these reports at face value, the implication would seem to be that, at a minimum, provincial leaders tended to carry out top-priority programs faithfully. Refugee accounts support this view of provincial leaders as reliable and loyal instruments of the center. True, middle-echelon refugees are not privy to the deliberations of their party superiors, so their opinions cannot be regarded as the final word on the subject. But the convergence of their testimony on this point and the documentary evidence makes the proposition hard to set aside.

The general pattern of stability of top personnel in Fukien during this period further supports such a picture of broad compliance. Tables 1 and 2 show the rate of turnover in selected party and state posts in the province from 1950 to 1966. The average length of tenure in each case was computed by dividing the number of years under study (16) by the number of men identified in the position. In most instances, the figures represent presumed maximums, for available information on length of service of particular jobholders is often incomplete. There are relatively few gaps in data about individuals who worked as a party secretary, as governor, or as a vice-governor, so the figures on these posts are reasonably precise. The sketchiness of information about persons who functioned as heads of party and administrative departments renders the figures on these latter positions subject to a greater margin of error.

The tables indicate a relatively slow rate of turnover in both government and party posts. If anything, the figures tend to understate the degree of personnel stability. That for the vice-governors affords a good illustration. Although the total combined length of service of the 18 vice-governors amounted to 135 years, two of the persons who held the position during 1950–66 had already left the province for jobs in the central government by the early 1950's; moreover, several of the vice-governorships were not established until the middle and late 1950's. If one takes these factors into account, the stability of tenure is quite impressive. For example, the five working vice-governors appointed in 1956 were all still in their posts in 1966. Furthermore, almost all the men

Table 1: Turnover in Major Party Posts in Fukien Province, 1950-66

Post	No. men identified in post	Av. years of service in post
1st Secretary[a]	2	8.0
2nd Secretary[b]	1	5.0
Full Secretaries	8	6.0
Deputy Secretaries[c]	5	1.2[d]
Alternate Secretaries[e]	6	5.3
Secretary General[f]	3	5.3
Heads of:		
Industry and Communications Dept.	4	4.0
Propaganda Dept.	3	5.3
Organization Dept.	3	5.3
Rural Work Dept.	2	8.0
United Front Dept.	4	4.0

[a] Up to 1955, the title of the top party position in the province was simply "Secretary."
[b] This post was created in 1961.
[c] These positions were abolished in 1956. The number of Deputy Secretaries in office at any given time ranged from one to three.
[d] The rate of turnover here is based on the 1950-56 period.
[e] These posts were created in 1956. The number of Alternate Secretaries in office at any given time ranged from three to six.
[f] Chief party administrative staff officer.

SOURCES: *Fu-chien Jih-pao* (Fukien Daily), 1950-60; New China News Agency, 1960-66; *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), 1960-66; and Radio Foochow, 1960-66.

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Table 2: Turnover in Major Governmental Posts in Fukien Province, 1950-66

Post	No. men identified in post	Av. years of service in post
Governor	4	4.0
Vice-Governors[a]	18	7.5
Secretary General[b]	5	3.2
Heads of		
Personnel Dept.	2	8.0
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission	3	5.3
Financial and Trade Staff Office	3	5.3
Commerce Dept.	4	4.0
Food Grains Dept.	2	8.0
Finance Dept.	6	2.7
Education Dept.	4	4.0
Health Dept.	3	5.3
Agriculture Dept.	7	2.3
Forestry Dept.	4	4.0
Communications Dept.	3	5.3
Industry Dept.	3	5.3
Civil Affairs Dept.	3	5.3
Public Security Dept.	3	5.3
Provincial Procuracy	5	3.2
Higher Court	3	5.3

[a] The number of vice-gubernatorial positions expanded from three in the early 1950's to more than 10 in the mid-1960's.
[b] Chief government administrative staff officer.

SOURCES: *Fu-chien Jih-pao*, 1950-60; New China News Agency, 1960-66; *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 1960-66; and Radio Foochow, 1960-66.

who functioned as vice-governor had long terms of previous service within the province prior to their appointments to that position. Only one came from outside the province, and he stayed in the job just 10 months.

The general impression of personnel stability is reinforced by an analysis of the careers of the occupants of department-level posts. Of the 19 men who held positions as party department heads, six took up their posts as initial assignments after the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, and the remaining 13 were already working in the province at the time of their appointments. Six of the latter group had served at lower echelons within the same organization previously, while seven came from other party posts at the provincial, special district, or municipal level. The same broad pattern obtains in the case of the administrative personnel. Of the 62 men identified as department heads or equivalent, 14 were the initial appointees to their posts, and 6 had unknown antecedents. Forty of the remaining 42 men were already in the province at the time of their appointment—22 in the same organizations of which they became chiefs. Only two men, then, came to their positions from outside the province.

These data tend to sustain the view that there was little attempt on the part of higher authorities to "pack" the Fukien leadership during the years in question. To the extent that higher authorities used their control of personnel assignments to try to assure the allegiance of provincial employees in Fukien, they did so by fairly subtle manipulations, not by crude or sweeping removals. An examination of the subsequent appointments of men leaving departmental-level posts in Fukien reveals that the vast majority stayed in the province and assumed more responsible positions within the same "system." In only three cases were the personnel removals clearly punitive, and in just one of these instances was the victim a party member, the others being united-front men ousted during the "anti-rightist" purge of 1957.

Of course, low turnover rates for key jobs taken alone are not evidence of compliant behavior. These could as easily signify impaired central personnel controls. Indeed, Audrey Donnithorne has suggested that the low frequency of purging may be misleading, for one does not know how many times the center refrained from dismissing individuals for fear of offending provincial interests or sensibilities.[8] While unimpeachable on logical grounds, this objection does not seem plausible in light of the overt behavior of central leaders. Peking purged sufficient numbers of provincial officials prior to 1966 to demonstrate its ability and willingness to remove provincial leaders from office when it deemed such a course necessary.

Central Intervention in Perspective

To sum up, the high incidence of publicly reported compliance, the stable provincial personnel patterns, the testimony of many refugees, and the general success of most programs testify to the adequacy of central control before the Cultural Revolution. Mao Tse-tung's plea in 1958 that action be taken to rectify the prevailing practice of "compulsory acceptance of directives" underscores the point.[9]

[8] Donnithorne, *op. cit.*, pp. 501-02.
[9] "Sixty Points on Working Methods (Draft)," *Mao Papers*, ed. Jerome Ch'en, London, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 70.

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Yet, to argue that local and provincial leaders were uniformly compliant would seem to ignore important countervailing evidence which supports an alternative model of Chinese politics. This evidence —drawn from countless provincial campaigns, most particularly from the collectivization campaign of 1955–56, the "hundred flowers'" campaign of early 1957, and the rectification campaign of late 1957 —adds complexity to the picture. Frequently, lagging provincial campaign efforts necessitated central intervention. Such intervention involved not only intensified central pressure, but criticism by the center of the deficiencies of provincial leaders. Often, cases of deliberate distortion of information or policy by local cadres came to light in the course of a campaign, providing clear evidence of weaknesses in the control systems.

Rather than indicating fragmentation or pluralism, however, these weaknesses were built into the system of control and compliance. Compliance should not be viewed as a mechanical relationship between subordinate and superior, but as a dynamic one. The central government communicated a multiplicity of tasks to provincial leaders. Given limitations on time and on administrative and economic resources, progress could not be even on all fronts. Thus, the problem of lag was inherent in the administrative system. The center therefore had to communicate priorities as well as targets to the beleaguered regional leaders. Whenever the center had to devote specific attention to the problem of lag, that situation usually resulted from unclear central signals, divided central leadership, or changed central priorities. The speed with which provincial leaders responded to such supplemental cues seems confirmation of the point.

Moreover, though distortion and evasion were a fact of administrative life in China, these occurred primarily at the basic levels—normally as a consequence of excessive pressure on local units. Such deviations complicated the lives of the provincial officials who had to deal with them just as much as they did the existences of central officials; and as long as provincial officials willingly and even ruthlessly tackled the problem of getting their own subordinates to follow directives, their behavior must be adjudged compliant. Only where collusion between provincial and local officials is demonstrable can one claim obstructionism or "mountaintop-ism."

While it is relatively easy to describe the compliance pattern of provincial leaders before the Cultural Revolution, it is less easy to explain that pattern. What, in fact, constituted the bases of provincial responsiveness? In a study of complex organizations, Amitai Etzioni has suggested that subordinates' adherence to the commands of their superiors is rooted in the normative, remunerative, and coercive powers of the superiors.[10] No doubt all three factors helped bring about provincial compliance with orders from the center in China in the pre-Cultural Revolution period, but it is not the author's aim to discuss their relative importance here. For purposes of this analysis, there seems to be a prior and more important factor that conditioned the application of normative, coercive, and remunerative sanctions and rewards—namely, the system of administrative controls which determined the level and quality of information available to national decision-makers. It is in the tight-knit control system that one finds the most compelling explanation of provincial compliance.

The Pattern of Controls

In turning to an examination of the structure of central controls, we must bear in mind the broad responsibilities and functions of provincial administrators. Provincial authorities were not only targets but also agents of central control. Indeed, they played primarily a prefectoral role within the broader administrative system. They served as agents of the central government in the territory under their jurisdiction and as such were responsible for overseeing the execution of central policies there. Furthermore, they for the most part exercised their leadership downward over subordinate units to secure maximum compliance with central demands, fulfilling this responsibility by performing the two related functions of supervision and coordination.

Such a situation gives rise to a basic dilemma which one must confront in attempting to delineate the control dimension of central-provincial relations. How is one to distinguish the efforts of the central government to control its provincial agents from its efforts to control the course of programs conducted under provincial auspices? The answer lies in the fact that once the center had reached a policy decision, a fundamental identity of interests theoretically existed between central and provincial leaders. Both were supposedly concerned with achieving the program objectives, and the presumed focus of each group's attention was plan fulfillment. Thus, any failure in central control manifested itself initially in the

[10] *Complex Organizations*, New York, The Free Press, 1961, pp. 3-4.

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failure of provincial leaders to secure compliance from their subordinates.

The pattern of central and provincial controls over more subordinate units involved a complex process of interaction that is far from well known. Without inordinate risk of oversimplification, one can analytically identify four distinct processes in that pattern of control. They are: (a) the process by which the central and provincial organs communicated or assigned objectives or targets to their subordinate units; (b) the process by which these higher organs jointly monitored the speed and effectiveness of the implementation of their directives; (c) the process of feedback—*i.e.*, the process by which the lower-level units sought to modify the assigned objectives or targets; and (d) the process of deviation control—*i.e.*, the process by which the higher organs coped with any problems that arose during the implementation phase. Most analysts who credit provincial leaders with having exercised substantial influence over policy outcomes predicate their contentions on the allegedly wide discretionary role of provincial leaders in the implementation phase. This line of argument, however, understates the quality, intensity, and continuity of the control that was exerted during the implementation process, as well as the specificity of the directives. Let us explore the nature of the directives first, in order to establish a proper framework for looking at the implementation process.

The communication of general objectives downward invariably took place in documentary form (*wen-chien*). Not all such documents were alike, however. Some were advisory in character and were meant to be interpreted and applied broadly and flexibly; others were binding and authoritative, leaving no discretionary powers to the implementing unit. What would seem to be of crucial significance, then, is the comparative frequency with which the leadership employed the two types. In seeking to ascertain this frequency, however, one can easily arrive at erroneous conclusions. The usefulness of directives and regulations published openly in the press is questionable. These documents are often so sweeping as to imply an absence of restriction on subordinate units; yet their lack of specificity is misleading. Internal documents which expanded upon those published openly (and most of which are not available for detailed scrutiny) were frequently far more concrete and gave the local levels far less room for maneuver than might normally be supposed.

More important, other forms of guidance were used to supplement documents. Specific policy objectives and guidelines were frequently conveyed directly and personally through conferences. (*hui-yi*). According to officials who attended such meetings, policy was discussed in exceedingly concrete terms, whatever the issue, leaving little opportunity for flexible adaptation. Hence, no matter how general the documents concerning a central decision might have been, any high-ranking provincial official returning from a conference in Peking to transmit the "spirit" of that decision to his subordinates had quite firm notions about what he was to do. Similarly, lower-level personnel often received lengthy and detailed reports on the process for implementation in telephone conferences with provincial officials, which severely limited the scope for exercise of individual judgment or imagination.

Issuing orders and convening conferences, of course, carried no guarantees of compliance; hence, the monitoring process was central to the control of provincial functions. The progress of routine administrative and production activities as well as of *ad hoc* campaigns was checked through a formal, structured system of work reports (*pao-kao chih-tu*). Under this system, the schedule of reports could be a fixed one (*ting-ch'i pao-kao*), or it could be more flexible. In either case, the reports that came forward to higher levels constituted merely the first step in the effort of provincial and national officials to monitor the fulfillment of tasks and identify potential problems. To afford themselves an independent check outside the formal reporting system, higher authorities frequently initiated "investigation reports" (*tiao-ch'a pao-kao*).

The Implementation Process

For purposes of clarifying this broad pattern of higher-echelon controls during the implementation phase, let us trace the implementation process through from beginning to end.[11] Typically, a provincial department received a central directive specifying a task, laying down the rationale and the overall goals, and leaving the concrete arrangements to the

[11] The material in this section is drawn from the author's "Provincial Administration in Fukien, 1949-1966," to be published in Robert Scalapino, Ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, forthcoming.

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provincial officials. These officials then generally established some form of *ad hoc* working committee to rough out the schedule of implementation and to estimate the personnel needed and the effect on the other responsibilities of the department. If the task was not of top priority, the working committee would probably establish several experimental points (*shih-tien*) to test their tentative program, and they would call on lower-level organizations to begin to set up similar experimental points of their own.

The purpose of such experimental points was to provide data on the impact and effectiveness of the policy in pre-selected regions with varying characteristics. If the program was economic in nature—for example, involving the application of a new agricultural implement or technique—experimental points might be selected in mountain regions (*shan-ch'u*), hilly regions (*pan-shan ch'u*), and plains areas (*p'ing-yuan ch'u*). If the program was political in nature—for example, an assault on "local superstitions"—the key points might be chosen on the basis of the strength of the local political organizations and their past performances in such campaigns: *i.e.*, advanced (*ch'ien-chin*) regions, median (*chung-chien*) regions, and backward (*lo-hou*) regions. Whenever the program yielded the desired results, the experiences (*hao te ching-yen*) gained from the pilot efforts were distilled into "models" for broader application; and whenever any difficulties were encountered, these were assessed for lessons (*shih-pai te chiao-hsun*) relevant to the shaping of the final scheme for implementation.

Once some preliminary experience had been acquired in handling the implementation, the scope of the undertaking was extended to "keypoint" (*chung-tien*) areas. Here experimentation and refinement continued, and local cadres from other regions began to train themselves to return to their own units to carry out the program. Finally, the program became universal, with the lessons and experience gained at the "experimental points" and the "key points" being applied to the rest of the territory ("*mien*").

This process presented considerable hypothetical opportunities for "implementers" to affect the actual substance of policy. For example, some of the charges made during the Cultural Revolution suggest that one technique available to provincial leaders was manipulation of the experiences of experimental and key-point areas to yield an outcome which would support their own policy preferences. Yet, I have found no evidence of such practices in my own research, and refugee informants seem skeptical about the frequency of such practices. They believe that "models" were subjected to such close scrutiny that it would have been almost impossible to conceal any blatant manipulation of resources or personnel.

Short of such manipulation, however, there can be no doubt that directives acquired specificity and substance, and also occasionally underwent modification, during the implementation process. But this fact does not necessarily constitute evidence of successful attempts by provincial leaders to put their own distinctive imprints on policy. While the deliberateness of prescribed "methods of work" meant that these sometimes got set aside during the implementation of policy, they still tended to prevent deviations on the part of provincial authorities. The center normally remained in constant touch with the provincial level throughout the implementation phase. It received reports from provincial authorities regularly, both at fixed intervals (*ting-ch'i pao-kao*) and on an unscheduled basis (*pu ting-ch'i*); and it from time to time dispatched its own investigating teams to the provinces to send back reports (*tiao-ch'a pao-kao*). Furthermore, it encouraged provincial officials to consult with it frequently (*ch'ing-shih*) by post or by phone for guidance and aid.

If the center wished to maintain especially tight control over a given program, it also had several means of doing so. For example, it could place responsibility for the program directly on the shoulders of the party first secretary of the province, or it could summon the responsible department head to a working conference at which detailed work arrangements for a program would be laid down. (It ought to be pointed out, of course, that in the latter instance a provincial department could conceivably exert some influence on the outcome of the conference if the department ran "experimental points" prior to the gathering.) In such cases, the study of official public directives affords no help to the researcher, for the specific central instructions would have been issued orally or in a classified document.

In addition, the fact that many campaigns extended over more than a year facilitated the center's ability to maintain a tight rein over implementation efforts. Under such circumstances, the accumulation of experience resulted in an even tighter formulation of policy as summarized in the "experiences" of various "model" units or regions. In short, the longer the campaign ran, the less latitude provincial leaders enjoyed.

Provincial officials, to be sure, did have options

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that they could exercise to influence the character of the campaign if they failed to bring about modifications of the center's policy to suit them. Since they performed a crucial supervisory role in the implementation of central directives, they could evade the directives by abdicating their supervisory function and turning a blind eye to local-level "deviations." Yet one can uncover little evidence that this form of evasion was common.

An examination of the implementation process thus affords little support to those arguing that provincial authorities had an important part in the process of policy formulation. The structure of administrative reporting and the multiplicity of independent external checks on performance made it relatively easy for Peking to identify failure to comply with central directives; moreover, the interdependence of economic units, forged by the network of contracts, production quotas, and delivery quotas, reinforced this control system.

Financial Controls

Above and beyond the constraints on provincial independence of action that directives and economic plans embodied were others deriving from the system of fiscal and monetary controls. Financial centralization from 1949 on provided Peking with a major instrument for keeping provincial governments firmly under its thumb. In a study of the Chinese revenue system, George Ecklund has described the budget and the cash and credit plans of the Bank of China as a crucial "financial-control mechanism" for ensuring the execution of state plans.[12] Audrey Donnithorne has seconded this view, calling the "comprehensive financial plan" an important device for checking the main ratios involved in the economic plan.[13] Since every phase of governmental activity had a financial dimension, control over the disbursement of credits or raw materials plainly set an additional limit on provincial leaders.

Though a number of changes took place in the financial control system after 1949, the central government never relaxed its authority over a number of critical financial categories, among them the level of credit, the level of investment in capital goods, the transfer of funds for capital purposes, and receipts and payments under the national budget, including moneys remitted by the local government to the center and grants or subsidies made by the central government to localities.[14] These direct controls were supplemented by a variety of indirect controls flowing from the central management of raw-material allocations, price policy, and the size of labor inputs. The indirect controls operated in part through the banking system. For example, the provincial branch of the Bank of China had the responsibility, as agent of the central authorities, of enforcing labor controls by setting a limit on the total wage bill of the province, and the Construction Bank, the source of budgetary grants for investment purposes, could not legally disburse funds for any expenditure unless the State Construction Commission had given prior approval for its inclusion in the construction plan.

Under such a system, the amount of money available to the provincial government was regulated not by the size of its revenues but by the amount of centrally-authorized expenditures. This set very tight limits on policy autonomy.

In short, a study of the center's control systems before the onset of the Cultural Revolution reveals the existence of a multiplicity of overlapping administrative, fiscal, and legal controls which hedged in officials at every level. If one adds to these the agencies and mechanisms of control represented by the party itself, its own watchdog units, the various supervisory organs of the state administration, and the public security and secret police agencies—not to speak of the periodic "clean-up" campaigns—the broad pattern of compliance on the part of provincial and lower-echelon officials does not seem in the least surprising.

Conclusion

What are the implications of these findings for a trend analysis of provincial power? It would seem that in order to argue that provincial independence has grown in the years since the eruption of the Cultural Revolution, one must demonstrate both that the Cultural Revolution significantly impaired the old systems of central control and that no new mechanisms of control have taken their place. Even more important, the identification of trends toward grow-

[12] George N. Ecklund, *Financing the Chinese Government Budget*, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1966, p. 17.

[13] Donnithorne, *op. cit.*, p. 471.

[14] *Ibid.*

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ing localism should be based not on logical propositions derived from one's view of the post-Cultural Revolution political order but on observed behavioral changes.

However, the author's investigations of Fukien Province before and after the Cultural Revolution have revealed a striking continuity in both the pattern of central controls and the overt behavior of provincial leaders since 1969. The province has consistently responded positively to initiatives from the center. Such major centrally-inspired undertakings as the "struggle-criticism-transformation" campaign, the campaign to prepare against war and natural disaster, and the programs to disperse population and to stimulate agricultural innovation *a la* Tachai have all been vigorously endorsed and promoted by the provincial leaders. An examination of the implementation process in the province since 1969 also reveals many of the pre-Cultural Revolution control mechanisms at work. Provincial efforts have been governed by plans and directives from above, and progress has been monitored by a reporting and investigation system similar to that employed in the early and mid-1960's.

To be sure, some of the political control measures that the center used in the 1950's and 1960's have been less in evidence since 1969, but alternate forms of surveillance by the "masses" have been introduced to ensure a firm central grip. Insofar as the press has contained signs of internal tensions within the province, these tensions appear to have reflected political and policy uncertainties at the center and instabilities in the composition of the provincial revolutionary committee. Many of the latter instabilities were temporary. By early 1970 a new leadership group had been transferred into the province to assume direction of provincial affairs, and this group has since been confirmed in office with the election of the provincial party committee in April 1971.[15]

In short, while the Cultural Revolution severely damaged the party organization, the systems of administrative, fiscal, and legal controls remained largely intact. Furthermore, the gradual assumption by officers of the People's Liberation Army of the functions that party controllers had previously performed, remedied the major temporary deficiency created by the wrecking of the party organization. (Even here, it would seem likely, in light of the present campaign to reconstruct the party, that the situation will eventually revert to the *status quo ante*.) These factors are reflected in the continuing pattern of provincial responsiveness to central direction discernible in Fukien since 1969.

Evidence drawn from Fukien and elsewhere in China to support contentions of growing local power needs to be placed in historical perspective, for this evidence, consisting largely of attacks in the press on remnant leftist factionalism, PLA arrogance, or allegedly significant subnational variations on national political themes, constitutes only partial evidence. The tensions that the attacks mirror, both within the provinces and between the national and provincial governments, are real. What is important to underscore, however, is that they are not new. Attacks on factionalism in Fukien occurred frequently during the pre-Cultural Revolution period.[16] Moreover, some regional diversity has always characterized the wording and emphases of provincial and local news. Indeed, differences in policy views among individuals and between levels of government have been perennial, and the output of the media has reflected these differences. Therefore, to maintain that such evidence indicates a new degree of pluralism in present-day China, one must show that the degree and intensity of traditional central-local tensions have changed qualitatively.

There can be no doubt that the present fragmentation and division within the *central* government will have important consequences for provincial leaders in China. It may be that prolonged division at the center will ultimately force them into new and expanded political roles. But the evidence drawn from a study of Fukien suggests that up to the present that process has not yet begun.

[15] New China News Agency, Foochow, April 6, 1971.

[16] See, for example, the speeches delivered at the Fukien CCP Provincial Congress in 1956 (New China News Agency, Foochow, July 19, 1956) and at the Second Session of the First Fukien CCP Congress in 1958 (*Fu-chien Jih-pao* [Fukien Daily], Feb. 15, 1958).

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Books

PRC Leaders in Profile

By Jerome Ch'en

DONALD KLEIN and ANNE B. CLARK: *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, 2 vols.

OVER THE LAST THIRTY years English-speaking students of Chinese affairs have been presented with three prize biographic endeavors by US scholars: A.W. Hummel's *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period,* H.L. Boorman's *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China,* and now Klein and Clark's *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism.*[1] All are indispensable works of reference; all are the results of admirable scholarship and industry; all are also in part the fruits of generous support.

In authorship, the Klein-Clark dictionary (which the reviewer will hereafter refer to by the phonetic nickname, the K-K Dic.) is more akin to Boorman than Hummel in the sense that the compilers have written most of the entries themselves; only 11 of its 433 sketches are contributions from others (namely, S.T. Leong and Merle Goldman). Naturally for a project of this size, the compilers needed assistance from a large number of colleagues in Asia, Europe, and North America, and this they have acknowledged.

Like their predecessors, Klein and Clark have undertaken a twofold task, endeavoring not merely to provide pertinent biographic data on important personalities but to show how these individuals have helped shape modern Chinese history—an approach that has obviously demanded more comprehensive treatment of entries than preparation of a catalog of the *Who's Who* or *Who Was Who* variety. That is why the K-K Dic. has only 433 biographies, whereas a dictionary of a more limited scope like Kuang Chen-hsia's *Chung-kuo chun-jen chih* (Mao's Generals) contains 726.[2] This does not mean, of course, that the K-K Dic. is restricted to information on the 433 principals; in fact, its name index includes 1,750 listings. In an introductory section, the authors define their criteria for selection of entries. Their emphasis is clearly more on politics than on culture: not only do they choose to exclude certain cultural figures of some importance (*e.g.,* the writers Jou Shih and Mo Wen-hua), but they omit reference to the writings and publications of Communist leaders. They state at the outset that their periodization is from 1921 to 1965 and that, out of caution, they have not tried to include the years of the Cultural Revolution, since the facts of that era are "often unknown" and defy systematic analysis. However, this rule is not followed strictly; for example, the biographies of former Politburo members Ch'en Po-ta and Lin Piao are extended to reflect their important roles in the GPCR.

The commendable caution exercised by the authors is visible in their judicious use of data throughout the volume. Cautiousness is of particular importance in the use of Chinese Communist sources; while blatant distortions or falsifications are easily caught, it is harder to detect subtle twists of the meaning of words or the slight corruption of texts, at which Chinese propagandists are highly adept. The task of the biographer is made more difficult by the Chinese Communists' disposition to keep the private lives of leaders hidden from public view. To date, there is still no *true* biography of Mao, Chou En-lai, or Lin Piao written in Chinese.

In this situation, biographers must continuously make value judgments with respect to the reliability both of authors and of particular items of information.

[1] Hummel's work was first published in 1943 by Routledge, London; a 1964 edition was published by Paragon, New York. Boorman's work was published by Columbia University Press, New York, in four volumes, from 1967 to 1971.

[2] Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1969.

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Since many Chinese sources—non-Communist as well as Communist—are either hagiographic or defamatory, Klein and Clark are justified in resorting to the extensive use of English sources. They are careful, however, to give references showing where they got vital pieces of information, appending footnotes that are thoughtfully designed and informative. This documentation is a welcome innovation that distinguishes the K-K Dic. from both Hummel and Boorman.

In developing biographical material, Klein and Clark show distrust for such factors as personal relationships, local affinities, comradeship-in-arms, school ties, etc., which have inspired lengthy rumination among some non-Communist Chinese biographers. The writer Huang Chen-hsia, for example, puts heavy stress on the affiliations cultivated by soldiers of the People's Liberation Army when they served in one of the Communists' four field armies. Klein and Clark play down this emphasis, although they give detailed lists of the commanding officers and political commissars of some armies. The question at issue is whether serving in the same field army or on the same committee, or even participating in the same important event, has tended to encourage later factionalism. The varied careers and fates of participants in the December 9th Movement (listed in Appendix 33 of the K-K Dic.)—a group which tried and failed to curb the excesses of the Cultural Revolution in 1966—do not seem to support the contention of some analysts that they were all followers of Liu Shao-ch'i and, as such, "revisionist" victims of the GPCR. On the other hand, some information does seem to indicate factional loyalties; it is a curious fact, for instance, that no less than 24 members of the Politburo before 1945 shared French and Russian school ties, while not a single member came from among Communists with British or American schooling.

TO ILLUSTRATE the differences in biographical evaluations, it might be useful to compare three versions of the life history of a leader of enormous topical importance—Chou En-lai—using accounts in the K-K Dic. and in Boorman's dictionary, as well as an essay by Kai-yu Hsu recently published in *Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China.*[3] The K-K Dic. begins, as do all its biographies, with a brief sketch of Chou's place in the Communist movement, so that the reader immediately knows his status. The K-K Dic. states that Chou was born in Huai-an whereas both Boorman and Hsu give Shaohsing as his birthplace. Among the people who influenced Chou in his impressionable years, the K-K Dic. stresses Ma Chun, an early member of the CCP, while Boorman barely mentions him. The K-K Dic. version gives more details than Boorman on the period of Chou's activities after March 1926 (when Chiang Kai-shek attempted to reassert Nationalist leadership of the revolution); on the other hand, Boorman gives a more dramatic account of Chou's capture and release by the Nationalist military leader Pai Ch'unhsi in 1927, during an unsuccessful uprising in Shanghai. In the case of the latter incident, Hsu assigns Chou an exclusive role in the planning and direction of events, while Boorman infers there was broader responsibility among the Communist leaders. Again the K-K Dic. and Hsu give different impressions of Chou's relationship in the late 1920's with Li Li-san, who was then the most powerful leader in the Chinese Communist Party (the K-K Dic. hints at a deterioration in their comradely feelings; Hsu does not).

Chou's "Shaoshan report" to the party in September 1930—an effort to minimize the consequences of the collapse of Li Li-san's adventurist line—is treated in astonishingly varied ways. The K-K Dic.

[3] Chun-tu Hsueh, Ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971.

Reviewers in This Issue

JEROME CH'EN—Professor of History and Director of the East Asian Studies Program at York University (Downsview, Canada); author of numerous works on China, including *Mao Papers,* 1970, and the forthcoming *Yuan Shih-k'ai.*

ROBIN BUSS—A student of Arab affairs currently preparing his doctoral dissertation at the University of Paris; author of *Wary Partners: The Soviet Union and Arab Socialism* (Adelphi Paper No. 73), Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970.

WALTER D. CONNOR—Assistant Professor of Sociology and staff member of the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor); author of *Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism,* 1972.

MICHAEL BOURDEAUX—Research Fellow of the London School of Economics and Political Science and Director of the Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism (Chislehurst); author of numerous works, including *Patriarch and Prophets: Persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church Today,* 1970; member of the Anglican clergy.

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refers to it in equivocal terms; Boorman ignores it altogether; Hsu, having hinged his view of Chou's grey eminence to this report in an earlier work, still attaches importance to it. The Ningtu conference of August 1932, at which Chou replaced Mao as the Political Commissar of the Red Army (and at which Mao himself has said he nearly lost his party membership), is also treated unevenly by the authors. While this was at the least one of the turning points in Chou's life, only the K-K Dic. mentions it; Boorman and Hsu disregard it. Concerning Chou's visit to Moscow in September 1939 for a sojourn of nearly six months, the K-K Dic. links it with the P'ing-chiang incident of June 1939 (in which Nationalists killed a number of Communist functionaries at the headquarters of the New Fourth Army); Boorman sees no such link; and Hsu simply overlooks the whole affair. As Boorman was in China in the 1940's, his account of Chou's activities in those years is excellent. But after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, Boorman excels only in his account of Chou's role in the Korean war, while the K-K Dic. is consistently more thorough in its coverage.

Probably due to a serious lack of material, none of the three versions is clear on Chou's attitude toward, or role in, several of the PRC's major internal events of the last two decades, such as the Great Leap and the Lushan Conference of 1959 (at which Mao was the target of a famous attack by Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai, subsequently replaced by Lin Piao). Nor does any of the authors explain convincingly the volatile personality of Chou. Hsu ventures the view that he is the "perpetual compromiser," the "tireless persuader," the "unifier of contradictions." But these labels are rather at odds with a picture of Chou purportedly painted by Mao Tse-tung's brother, Mao Tse-min (as quoted by China experts Allen Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai):

My brother always said that Chou En-lai was one of few Communists who liked to create dissension among his fellow party members. He was chiefly responsible for the strife within the party during the early period of the Communist movement in Kiangsi.[4]

It is too bad that none of the biographers under comparison makes reference to this characterization, as one would like to know their view on the reliability of the quotation.

As noted, all of the biographers were laboring under the difficulty of a scarcity of information. In fact, Chou stands out among the top leaders of the CCP for the paucity of biographical essays, let alone full length biographies, on him in Chinese. In the 16 volumes of the *Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao* (the Red Flag Waves)—an important anthology of revolutionary reminiscences—there is only one short report on Chou (by Wei Kuo-lu, in Vol. 11).[5] So far as the reviewer knows, only one pamphlet has been published on him in the PRC. This should not be construed as a neglect of Chou; without doubt, it is his preference to remain relatively in the background. He has never made the least effort to build a personality cult or to advertise his brilliance. With neither public eulogy nor doctrinal innovation to his credit, Chou provokes no jealousy, involves himself in no ideological controversy, and frees himself from the vicissitudes of party leadership.

The case of Chou illustrates that biographers of the Chinese Communists will perforce differ with respect to the facts, emphases and interpretations they offer. It is not necessary to make a final comparative judgment of the volumes in question. All that needs to be said is that a new and *good* dictionary has made its appearance in the K-K Dic., and researchers will find it eminently useful if not totally infallible. It should be added that the compilers have devoted much care and consideration to the designing of the K-K Dic.'s 96 appendices. Here, at one glance, the reader has under his full command the vital statistics for a large number of CCP leaders; their participation in the major events of the past and recent past; their places in the gigantic organizational networks of the party, government and defense forces; their roles in various fields of specialization; and their travels abroad.

[4] *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot*, East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1958, p. 289.

[5] These volumes were published in Peking over a period of several years during the 1950's. For a useful summary and analysis, see Robert Rinden and Roxane Witke, *The Red Flag Waves*, China Research Monograph No. 3, Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, August 1968.

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Whither Arab Socialism?

By Robin Buss

MAHMOUD HUSSEIN: *La lutte des classes en Egypte* (The Class Struggle in Egypt). Paris, François Maspero, 1971.
SAMIR AMIN: *The Maghreb in the Modern World. Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco.* Translated by Michael Perl. Harmondsworth, England, Penguin Books, 1970.

MAHMOUD HUSSEIN'S *Lutte des classes en Egypte* and Samir Amin's *Maghreb in the Modern World* are studies by French-speaking Egyptian writers on economic and political problems in Arab North Africa.[1] They approach their subjects from rather different points of view: Hussein is a Communist of pro-Chinese orientation, and his book is essentially a program for political action; Amin is concerned more with economic than ideological problems, and the political sections of his book are significantly weaker than those dealing with economic history and the prospects for development. In certain respects, however, the two writers arrive at comparable conclusions. Because their views embody criticisms, whether explicit or implicit, of orthodox Soviet thinking on Arab North Africa, the reviewer proposes to examine their conclusions in the light of Soviet writing and policies concerning the region.

Moscow's policy toward the countries of the Arab world is still being justified by Soviet Arabists on the ground that certain Arab socialist ideologies will ultimately become—with Soviet help—the foundation of scientific socialism in these countries. Rostislav Ulianovsky wrote recently that

Marxists bring out and foster the shoots of genuine socialism in petty-bourgeois concepts that will probably persist in Afro-Asian countries for years. . . . We believe that this is the right line to follow. It proceeds from the idea that national democratic parties, above all their left-wing groups, can, after starting from non-Marxist national socialism, advance towards scientific socialism and, in the course of struggle and of overcoming contradictions, finally adopt it.[2]

Ulianovsky goes on to classify various trends in Third World socialism, ranging from "national reformism" through "modern petty-bourgeois utopian socialism" to the ideology of "national or revolutionary democratic states." Such distinctions are commonplace in Soviet writing on the subject. In reality, however, they are not based on economic or social relationships within the countries concerned, on the class background of their leaderships, or on the attitude of the ruling regimes toward local Communist movements or parties; rather, the real criterion for differentiating individual regimes is the extent to which each is seen as supporting or hindering Soviet foreign policies. In the past, the differentiation used to be made quite explicit in the slogans publicized on the occasions of the Soviet May Day and October anniversary celebrations. For example, the people of the United Arab Republic were credited with struggling "for the socialist development of their country," and the people of Algeria merely with struggling for "social progress," while the countries with less acceptable regimes —*i.e.*, Morocco and Tunisia— were not even accorded individual slogans.[3] (Today this is no longer the practice.)

Both Hussein and Amin would contest the basis as well as the validity of such Soviet distinctions. In their view, the claims of the regimes in Egypt, Algeria and

[1] Amin's book is a revision and updating of his two-volume *Economie du Maghreb* (Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1966), with the addition of materials on political history and ideologies.

[2] "Marxists and non-Marxist Socialism," *World Marxist Review* (*Problems of Peace and Socialism*, Prague), September 1971, p. 40.

[3] The quotations are from the official slogans adopted for May Day, 1967, as reported by Moscow Radio, April 17, 1967. Since then, the number of slogans has been reduced, and separate slogans are no longer published for individual Arab countries.

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Tunisia to be creating socialist societies is belied by the reality of socio-economic relationships within these societies. Amin describes both Tunisia and Algeria as "state capitalist" countries which, while pursuing different foreign policies, are becoming more alike in their administrative and political systems. He views the nominally "socialist" policies flaunted by the two regimes as representing merely a transitional stage on the way to an authoritarian and bureaucratic "national socialism" or to capitalism. Indeed, Amin sees little reason, in the last analysis, to distinguish between any of the three former French Maghreb states (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco). "Despite the quarrels of politicians and the rhetorical contests of journalists," he writes, "the differences in actual behavior between the partisans of the 'Western course' and those who prefer the 'socialist road' are minimal" (p. 245).

Hussein's critique of the Egyptian regime is likewise based on an analysis of socio-economic characteristics and leads him to a similar conclusion with respect to that country. His contemptuous dismissal of the claim that Cairo is following a "non-capitalist" path that can lead eventually to scientific socialism stands in almost humorous contrast to the seriousness with which Soviet theorists have elaborated on the favorable prospects for Egypt's socialist development. Hussein denounces the Soviet view as an "insane schema evolved by the Soviet revisionists after their 22nd Congress," and he flatly rejects it because he denies the possibility of building socialism without the leadership of the working class and a working-class party and because he is scornful of the Soviet Union's claimed ability, as leader of the "world proletariat," to further socialist transformations even in countries where the native working class is numerically weak and lacks the necessary leadership (p. 141).

Given Hussein's predilection toward Maoism, it is hardly surprising that his criticisms of the present Egyptian regime and its inability to solve the country's social and economic problems are not based solely on efficiency criteria but rest, in considerable measure, on judgments of a moral-ideological character. He seems, however, to beg the question of concrete, viable solutions in merely echoing the Maoist line that a revolutionary, proletarian leadership should not be composed of the "best" specialists in administrative, economic, ideological or military affairs, but rather of elements "most likely to raise and protect the revolutionary initiative of the broad masses at each stage in their struggle" (p. 374). Amin, on the other hand, has less to say about harnessing the "creative initiative" of the people and offers more in the way of practical suggestions for economic reform.

BOTH AUTHORS, however, are agreed in identifying the present central problem in the North African Arab states as the rise of bureaucratic elites lacking in dynamism yet increasingly anxious to maintain their privileged status, and both are concerned at the inability of these elites to achieve economic development and real national independence for their countries. They see the near-term future of North Africa as probably one of continued domination by foreign powers—according to Hussein, within the context of a world capitalist system of which he considers the Soviet Union to be already a part.

The emergence of a new elite class in the countries of North Africa is related to the establishment of a "modern" industrial sector in their economies alongside a traditional agricultural sector. One would be wrong to discount altogether—by reason of his political bias—Hussein's description of the nature of this class and the course of its development. He is fair in his recognition that the 1952 revolution in Egypt increased social mobility, at least within the Egyptian middle and lower-middle classes, and like Amin he rightly acknowledges the extent to which a so-called new "technocratic" class was grafted onto a traditional administrative bureaucracy. Both writers, however, underestimate the attempts of the governments of the self-proclaimed "socialist" North African countries to overcome social problems, as well as their awareness of the need for mass participation in political life. We may also question Amin's view that the Maghreb regimes are destined to grow more alike in a process that will lead to the creation of a uniform pattern of society.

At the same time, one need not accept the rosy Soviet forecast of the eventual triumph of scientific socialism in Third World countries governed by what Moscow terms "progressive" regimes. As pointed out earlier, Soviet writers on North Africa base their evaluation of these regimes more on the role the latter play in the struggle between "the two world systems" than on the reality of socio-economic relationships within the societies concerned. They do of course speak of class conflicts

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and relate their optimistic assessment of the socialist potential of these societies to the gradual maturing of class consciousness within them. But they do so in terms which suggest that they foresee the passage of a long period before any confrontation occurs—or perhaps even an indefinite avoidance of violent confrontation. Given a correct policy on the part of the regime, according to one Soviet writer on Third World socialist governments, "even abrupt shifts in a socialist revolution do not necessarily lead to an aggravation of class struggle." [4]

Meanwhile, Soviet ideologues attempt to sketch as favorable a class profile as possible of the regimes the USSR currently supports. L. Stepanov, for example, has favorably compared Egypt's agrarian reforms with those in Iran solely on the basis of the class background of the Egyptian leadership, which—he alleges—is drawn from "intermediate strata" similar to the peasantry in that their social status resembles partly that of the working class and partly that of the proprietor class. He naively concludes that, because of this, it could have been expected that Egypt's agrarian reforms would uphold the peasants' interests and "succeeding events have generally shown that such an expectation would have been right" (presumably this was not the case in Iran).[5]

Though Hussein's analysis obviously differs from Stepanov's, he also tries to relate the class origin of the regime's leaders to what he sees as the dominant class in Egyptian society—namely, the "state bourgeoisie"—and he uses the same method to discredit the Egyptian Communist Party. He says, justifiably, that the Egyptian CP never got beyond being "a petty-bourgeois intellectual movement" (p. 92), and he sardonically observes that its voluntary dissolution merely freed ex-Communists "to swell the ranks of the regime's intelligentsia, that is to say, the section of the state apparatus specialized in demagogy" (p. 241)!

But errors of policy are not the prerogative of any one class. At a time when the Egyptian CP consisted of several small Marxist intellectual groups, the Algerian Communist Party had established a relatively strong central organization relying for most of its support on the European industrial working class in Algeria. Yet this party followed the French CP in its ambiguous attitude toward the liberation movement—a line which Soviet writers now attribute not to the party's class background but simply to a mistake in policy. Not all variations in attitude can be explained by Marxist conceptions of class behavior, and Hussein, like the Soviet theorists he attacks, suffers at times from the inflexibility of his theoretical models.

Some of Hussein's predictions about future trends in Egyptian public opinion seem to have been confirmed by the student riots in Cairo earlier this year, and Egypt is not the only Arab country in which the Soviet Union appears to be losing the support of the Left. To many Arabs, particularly the young, it seems that growing Soviet involvement with the established Arab regimes, far from contributing to the social—and socialist—development of their countries, may ultimately block normal processes of development and even encourage the consolidation of bureaucratic machines. Some people are beginning to fear that the "non-capitalist path" may lead them back somewhere not unlike the place whence they came.

[4] A. Iskenderov, "Choice of a Road," in *The Third World*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1970 (in English), p. 188.

[5] L. Stepanov, "Why Social Reforms are Inevitable," in *ibid.*, pp. 139-40.

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Socialist Sociology

By Walter D. Connor

PAUL HOLLANDER, Ed.: *American and Soviet Society: A Reader in Comparative Sociology and Perception.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.
ALEX SIMIRENKO, Ed.: *Social Thought in the Soviet Union.* Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1969.
JERZY J. WIATR, Ed.: *The State of Sociology in Eastern Europe Today.* Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill., Southern Illinois University Press, 1971.

DURING THE PAST decade and a half, "sociology" has been transformed from dirty word to household word in the Soviet Union, and it has undergone similar, if more varied, transformations in most of the nations of Eastern Europe. The phenomenon has interested Western observers for at least two reasons.

First, the emergence of sociology as a discipline, of social research as an enterprise, and of sociologists as in some sense "professionals" has raised the question of the possible transformation of systems of a "totalitarian" type—if not in the direction of Western-style liberalism, at least toward more rational and "humane" forms of social management. Sociology is seen as an important touchstone of such change: as Alex Inkeles has observed,

> *the extent to which sociologists may pursue their interests, fully publish their results, and freely state their conclusions is one important index of the degree to which a nation qualifies as a free and open society.*[1]

Second, the growth of social research in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has raised the hope of foreign scholars and observers, barred from conducting their own on-the-spot investigations, that access to the output of such research would enable them to learn much about social conditions in those countries, hitherto so wary of publishing—and even, perhaps, of gathering—such information on a large scale.

To what degree have this interest and hope proven well-founded? To what extent has the growth of sociology in the USSR and Eastern Europe turned out to be symptomatic of change in those societies and/or provided greater information about their domestic social processes and problems? Though their foci, purposes and origins differ, each of the books under review goes some way toward giving us answers to these questions, at the same time raising some new ones. Detailed analysis of contents totaling 1278 pages is, however, impossible within the confines of a review essay, and the reader will therefore have to be content with an exploration of some of the general themes that emerge from the books.

Professor Hollander has assembled a broad selection of parallel American and Soviet articles, ranging in coverage from values and ideologies to family life, from old age to crime and delinquency, from mass culture to ethnic discrimination. His objective is thus to present a comparative overview of parallel structures and processes in the USA and the USSR, as well as of cross-national perceptions. Ideally, his format is one of a two-by-two tabular presentation for each process, providing the reader with (1) an American treatment of "X" in the USA, (2) a Soviet treatment of "X" in the USSR, (3) an American view of "X" in the USSR, and (4) a Soviet view of "X" in the USA. Some of the compartments remain empty, but that is scarcely the fault of the editor. The Soviet selections are both representative (something that was no doubt easier to ensure with the Soviet selections than with the American, which are a sample from a far larger and more diverse body of literature) and illustrative of the "state of the art" in the USSR in the later 1960's. The editor's own discussion of the sociological enterprise in the two societies, of their common and

[1] Alex Inkeles, *What is Sociology? An Introduction to the Discipline and Profession,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964, p. 117.

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different problems, is an informative one. One of his summary comments that still seems valid in 1972 is that Soviet sociology "has become very fashionable in the last few years and is surrounded by hopeful curiosity and expectations which are exceeding its professional and financial resources."

Less easy to summarize is the Simirenko volume. "Social thought" here takes on a certain expanded definition which seems to render the book, as a whole, somewhat shapeless. While political science, law, historiography, economics, anthropology and sociology clearly fall within the scope one would naturally give to social thought (and are generally well and informatively handled in essays by Bociurkiw, Barry, Mendel, Sherman, Dunn, and the editor, respectively), it is less clear that experimental psychology, psychiatry and structural linguistics do. The essays, which are original papers written for this volume, are loosely organized around the theme of changes since Stalin's death, but some maintain their focus better than others.[2] The result is some unevenness in quality, as well as inconsistency in the degree of attention given by the individual contributors to questions involving the linkage of ideology and political change to social science.

The third book comes with a different pedigree. Under Jerzy Wiatr's general editorship, nine East European sociologists have contributed essays detailing the growth, vicissitudes, current status, and future prospects of sociology in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. It is on the whole a well-integrated volume—with the various contributors addressing themselves to the same questions and topics—and a useful source of information about research emphases and institutional developments, as well as about the sociologists' conceptions of themselves, of the nature of sociology, and of its relation to Marxism as an ideological-historical system.[3]

THE PICTURE OF sociology in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that emerges from these books is a mixed one not only with reference to the significance for the political system of sociology *per se,* but also with regard to the potential utility of the "product" of sociology in these countries as a source of information for outside observers. One cannot do justice here to all facets of the picture, so it may be well to focus on some particular themes.

First, the "penetration" of sociology by ideology—a phenomenon marked by all observers of the discipline in Communist societies—did not originate with the advent of Communist regimes (though presumably the forms it assumed were new). As Wiatr notes, "sociology emerged in all Eastern European countries as social protest rather than [as a] purely academic discipline." It was, indeed, a form of intellectual activity carried on primarily outside the academy, by "scholars-*engagés*" of progressive-liberal-leftist inclinations, including but by no means limited to Marxists. Today, it has claimed the respectability and acceptance that come with university chairs, research institutes, and state support, and on the other hand it has become penetrated, to varying degrees in the different countries, by a single ideology — Marxism-Leninism — whose "progressive" qualities are open to legitimate and serious doubt. Yet, as Zev Katz has observed in these pages (with reference to the USSR, but with probable *a fortiori* application to the other European Communist countries), "sociological research and theorizing have challenged the validity of various aspects of official Marxist-Leninist theory and eroded a number of the official dogmas and images." [4] At the very least, Soviet and East European sociology and sociologists have come a long way since the period when the imposition of historical materialism as *the* science of society tolled the death knell of empirical research. As Andras

[2] Some contributors seem to make rather unwarranted assumptions about the degree to which official policy objectives have been translated into reality. It seems unlikely, for example, that many specialists in Soviet affairs (or Soviet citizens?) would agree with the claim Ziferstein makes in his contribution on psychiatry (in Simirenko, p. 338): "The omnipresence of the collective spirit is manifested in many ways. The lead headlines in the newspapers are always devoted to the latest achievements of the collective farmers in such places as the Krasnodarsk region who fulfilled 118 percent of their quota of grain sold to the government, or the miners of the Kuzbass who have already produced 120,000 tons of coal over their yearly quota. *To the foreigner all this seems boring, but to the Soviet citizen it is of absorbing interest.*" (Emphasis added.)

[3] However, in an attempt to "balance" reports from the various countries, problems of *imbalance* appear to arise. It seems very questionable that the current level of development of sociology in Bulgaria warrants a chapter of 38 pages, plus 10 pages of footnotes, when sociology in Poland receives only 41 pages, plus 5 pages of notes. Moreover, the footnote references for Bulgaria, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia provide a great deal of information on published sources, whereas the chapter on the Soviet Union has only three notes (of which two are to Lenin). This tends to "sell short" by a great deal the amount of interesting Soviet sociological research over the last decade.

[4] Zev Katz, "Sociology in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, D.C.), May-June 1971, p. 39.

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Hegedus, in his contribution to the Wiatr volume (p. 81), describes that period in Hungary,

. . . any branch of scholarship dealing with the social problems of the age had only a single function—to serve as propaganda for the given political practice, the "patented" forms. And whoever broke this rule was open to accusation of being a reactionary, of playing into the hands of the bourgeoisie. Under this historical situation, scientific "objectivity"—even if it was loaded with a commitment to social progress—was regarded as a hostile attitude, something against which socialism had to be protected with the full force of law.

If, generally, socialism is no longer seen as needing protection from sociology (though this is at least questionable in some places, such as Czechoslovakia since 1968), what *sort* of sociology—or, more generally, social science—has emerged in the USSR and the East European countries in the last decade? Is it symptomatic of critical changes, or is it only a development that can be easily accomodated within maturing socialist systems facing increasingly complex problems of the "system-management" variety?

The answer the books give seems to lie between the two. While the import of the development—and indeed encouragement—of social research should not be discounted, sociology in these countries remains, in practice, very largely a "managerial" science, as the reviews of research emphases and activities show. Studies of time budgets, utilization of leisure time, and worker satisfaction, of rural-urban migration and the planning necessary to accommodate new urbanites, still make up the bulk of the research, and there is no inherent conflict between such research and a basically "illiberal" (though not "Stalinist") political system. The data resulting from such studies, where available in published form, are often interesting and informative for Western observers, but they are also highly useful to the Communist leaderships as indicators of social forces, popular moods, and trends which must be "managed" and, to a degree, accommodated if those leaderships and the systems they run are to maintain themselves *in roughly their present forms*. In other words, no equation links even a flourishing sociological research establishment with liberalization.

This seems particularly clear in the case of another sort of sociological research in the USSR: *i.e.*, that which concerns the "career plans" of secondary-school graduates and their fulfillment. The systematic disadvantages experienced by collective farm and urban working-class youth in competing with scions of the intelligentsia for the scarce places in a higher education system that represents the "mobility ladder" have been clearly detailed in the researches of Rutkevich, Shubkin, *et al.* While the economy and the shape of the labor force dictate that not everyone can be upwardly mobile, the official response to the findings has been "underwhelming," with no evidence of any decisive moves to "do something" about these disparities in life-chances. If such moves *were* being made, one could consider them indicative of relatively important changes attributable, in some measure at least, to the encouragement of sociological research.

In a review essay of this type, one unfortunately tends to talk of "Eastern Europe" as a unit of analysis, deemphasizing the great historical and cultural differences between its component societies. Further, it is difficult to keep in view the gulf between the USSR itself and its close neighbors, whose post-World War II social histories have been so influenced by the imposition of Soviet "models." The institutional framework that was "imported" into these latter countries in the late 1940's was one of the Soviet invention and alien to the receiving countries. Surely, the "meaning" of the many elements of the Soviet model that are still in evidence—in greatly varying degrees—in East European societies differs from their "meaning" in the Soviet Union; and just as surely this fact must be taken into account in examining the differences in the sociologies of the East European countries. These differences are detailed in Wiatr's volume, while the Hollander and Simirenko books provide rich impressions of the style, problems and priorities of social science in the USSR.

WHAT OF THE future? The fact that the growth of sociological research in the USSR and Eastern Europe has not thus far been symptomatic of notable political change would seem to suggest that its *further* growth and consolidation in the years to come need not be paralleled by such change. Realistically, it seems more likely that with the "consolidation" and growing professionalization of sociology will come (indeed there is evidence that this is already the case) an increased emphasis on methodological and quantitative expertise, on sophisticated survey design and data manipulation, that will take sociology further away from any "criti-

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cal" approach. Wiatr argues that Marxism's influence on sociology in Eastern Europe is expressed, *inter alia,* in "the emphasis laid on the study of large-scale social structures and institutions, [*i.e.,* in] the dominance of the macro-sociological approach"; yet much of the research of recent years has been more of the "micro" variety, directed toward gathering data relevant to specific problems of social management—which is hardly suggestive of a critical sociology. Hegedus may be closer to the mark in the way he sums up the situation (Wiatr, p. 84):

In the European socialist countries, including Hungary, the kind of social science which treats the present faces the dilemma of whether to become an apologetic science influencing behavior, or to provide the analysis and at the same time the criticism of the conditions that have developed. Some demand that it be the former, some the latter; the scholar who undertakes the former task may often gain considerable material advantages, whereas the reader who prefers to interpret the responsibilities of sociology may often invite censure, not excluding material disadvantages.

The output of Soviet and East European sociologists is certainly of value to different groups within their own societies—as well as to outside observers of those societies. But in general, even if sociologists so desired, they are scarcely equipped to play major roles in changing "the system." Empirically established social "facts" do not point unambiguously to a single, definite course of action. Besides, whatever the nature of the problems the sociologists delineate and whatever the direction of their findings, *acting* on these findings is a matter for those whose realm is politics rather than science. Policies and courses of action are chosen by political leaderships that are increasingly becoming assemblages of competing interest groups with differing sorts of "stakes" in maintaining the status quo. It is, if anything, rather interesting that sociology has progressed as far as it has, in sophistication and technique, in a situation where sociologists generally are *not* completely free, in Inkeles' words, to "pursue their interests, fully publish their results, and freely state their conclusions."

This is not to say that the emergence of sociology in the USSR and Eastern Europe signifies nothing. Even given its present limits, it indicates a drift of potentially great importance away from "high coercion" modes of coordinating society in which the political leaderships operate under conditions of "low information." But the ultimate direction of such a drift is still indeterminate, and there is good reason to agree with Katz that we should not assume that the direction is one "of Western-style democracy, or that it will necessarily involve a revolutionary explosion." [5] If the new respectability and continued growth of sociology and social research in the more advanced Communist countries warrant a great deal of interest and attention, they cannot justify any but the most modest speculations on the larger changes they may herald.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 40.

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Religion in the USSR

By Michael Bourdeaux

RICHARD H. MARSHALL, JR., Ed.; THOMAS E. BIRD and ANDREW Q. BLANE, Assoc. Eds.: *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union, 1917–67.* Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1971.

THIS COLLECTION OF essays was conceived and proposed as a project at a gathering at Columbia University in 1966, one of the first in a notable series of conferences on religion in the Soviet Union which has continued under various auspices on both sides of the Atlantic over the last decade. Appropriately, the book is dedicated to Dr. Paul Anderson, the doyen of scholars on the Russian Orthodox Church and a tireless advocate of the study of religion in Soviet society. Dr. Anderson has himself provided a thought-provoking chapter of "Reflections on Religion in Russia," which is a highlight of the volume.

In a perspicacious foreword, Richard Marshall delineates clearly the magnitude of the task still facing scholars in evaluating the phenomenon of the continued vitality of religion in the Soviet Union more than fifty years after the first dogmatic assertion of official state atheism. In doing so, he touches on some of the deficiencies of the book as well as on its achievements—deficiencies which stem primarily from the fact that there are still not nearly enough good analysts prepared to spend their time studying the extreme complexity and variety of the religious scene in the USSR today. As an important example, Mr. Marshall notes that it is quite staggering to see how many assessments of the Khrushchev period by political scientists fail even to mention the topic of religion, let alone to place Khrushchev's repressive antireligious policies in the context of his comparative liberalization in other areas.

The spine of the volume is Section II, comprised of five essays on various aspects of "Religion and Soviet Society" by six scholars of outstanding ability (one chapter is a joint work). If the rest of the book had been up to this magnificent standard, it would have been one of the finest on Soviet affairs ever published. Most of the names here are recommendation enough in themselves. Bohdan Bociurkiw contributes an excellent general essay on "Religion and Atheism in Soviet Society," which operates almost as a second introduction to the volume. George Kline, in "Religious Themes in Soviet Literature," has assembled examples from a wide field of choice, and his analysis will persuade many students to look with fresh vision at the works of several modern authors, especially Siniavsky (pp. 170–74) and Brodsky (pp. 177–84). It is a pity that Dr. Kline did not undertake a similar treatment of Solzhenitsyn: *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* deserves more than half a sentence, not to mention Solzhenitsyn's prose poems (though perhaps at the time Dr. Kline wrote, he had not seen the latter, which were first published in the West in 1965).

The three essays that form Chapters 5–7 provide overwhelming documentation on the Soviet regime's relentless hounding of religious believers ever since the Communists came to power. Among certain Western church leaders today one finds a misguided and naive optimism that in some way Soviet policy toward religious believers is becoming more "tolerant." Certainly there have been periods of greater and lesser violence, and the last seven years have seen fewer imprisonments, but the chapters in question leave no doubt that such variations are merely the swings of a pendulum, leaving unaffected the ultimate Soviet object of extirpating religion from society. The study by Donald Lowrie and William Fletcher of the Khrushchev period should be required reading for every single churchman who has dealings with the Russians. It is the best analysis of the late leader's antireligious purge (not too strong a word) to appear anywhere, and the present-day situation cannot be understood without reference to what happened under Khrushchev in 1959–64.

That these occurrences were no temporary aberration of an individual is proved by Joan Delaney's chapter on the "Origins of Soviet

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Antireligious Organizations" and Joshua Rothenberg's "Legal Status of Religion in the Soviet Union." It is good to note here the emergence of a new authority of outstanding ability—Miss Delaney—on a subject which has so far escaped systematic analysis in any history of Soviet religion. Joshua Rothenberg's long essay on the law, which is complementary to Miss Delaney's, is a basic study and long overdue (an earlier version appeared in *Problems of Communism* in September-October 1967). It should be read in conjunction with the first article in Section III, in which Alexander Bogolepov demonstrates how the legal framework operates when applied to the Russian Orthodox Church.

UNFORTUNATELY, AFTER this promising start of the book's longest section, which deals with individual religious groups, there is a sad decline in the quality of the studies. Perhaps the editors were too ambitious for the present state of scholarship. In any event, the reader—with high expectations aroused by the second section—is prepared for a great deal of enlightenment about Khrushchevian policy as it was applied to individual churches and their reaction to it. He is in for a disappointment.

The problems in this last section involve sins of omission rather than commission—primarily the failure of the authors to bring their studies up to date. The last major study in depth of the USSR's various religious groups was *Religion in the Soviet Union* by Walter Kolarz, which was published over a decade ago (1961) and which reviewed with vast competence the situation then prevailing among all the mainstream denominations and many of the minor ones. That there were nonetheless loopholes in the work was quite forgivable in view of the fact that Kolarz was at the time virtually alone in the field of religious studies.

By the same token, it was perhaps inevitable that some important religious groups would be left out of the present volume. Still, one regrets the absence of coverage of the Adventists, the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Old Believers, and the few inadequate pages on the Buddhists (nestling uncomfortably among the Siberian shamans in a study by J. J. Gapanovich). Here was a great opportunity for improving on some of Kolarz's weak spots—but while each of the twelve scholars here represented did something to fill in the blanks, it is not enough.

A bigger disappointment in the volume is the almost total failure of the contributors to update Kolarz's research. One can understand—even while regretting—the editors' decision to establish the end of 1967 as a cut-off date, since a number of the contributions were written in 1966-67, and later updating would have imposed a heavy editorial burden. But surely developments to that time should have been covered. Instead, there seems to have been a curious reluctance among the writers to apply the Lowrie-Fletcher canons of Chapter 7—defining Khrushchev's purge—to the denominations under review. Two writers, somewhat illogically, confine themselves to a much more restricted period than that spanned by the book as a whole. Bernhard Wilhelm, writing on the Muslims, covers only the years 1948-1954, and Andrew Blane restricts his discussion of the Protestant Sectarians to the single revolutionary year 1917. Both articles are useful and well-documented contributions to scholarship—but their limited coverage leaves the reader without any guide whatsoever to the present situation of these two religious groups of outstanding importance.

Several other essays purport to bring the situation up to date through 1967 but in fact singularly fail to do so. Fathers Melia and Krikorian, writing on the Georgian Orthodox and the Armenian churches respectively, are particularly disappointing in this respect. The evidence so far available on whether Armenian Christians suffered during the Khrushchev period commensurately with other groups is contradictory and fragmentary. Elucidation on this point would have vitally affected one's assessment of the interaction between Soviet policy toward religion and that toward nationalities. Perhaps Father Krikorian, Catholicos Vazgen's official representative at the World Council of Churches in Geneva, could not be expected to write with frankness on this subject—but perhaps he was not the right man to invite to contribute the chapter, either. The essays on the Mennonites (Frank Epp), the Jews (Joshua Rothenberg), and the Siberian tribes (J. J. Gapanovich) also leave something to be desired in up-to-date coverage. One is occasionally tempted to wonder whether, had Kolarz lived, he might not have done a better job of the whole section single-handed.

As a review of the current situation, the superb chapter by Stanley Vardys on "Catholicism in Lithuania" stands in isolation. One detects some distinct discrepancies between the optimistic tone of Father Mailleux at the end

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of his general essay on Catholicism, where he mentions the improvement in Kremlin-Vatican relations, and the much more guarded conclusions of Vardys, whose comprehensive knowledge of the present situation of Lithuanian Catholics makes him hesitant to accept recent Kremlin initiatives at their face value. Still, it is good for both church and university that men who are primarily representatives of each should appear side by side in a volume such as this; each has insights which are vital to the other, and hopefully the result will be a better crossfertilization than has occurred up to now.

THE STRANGEST LACUNA of all in this book is its failure to provide any information on the one major issue which at present should be riveting the attention of both churchman and scholar: the reaction of the Soviet faithful to the most recent major purge against them. Here, perhaps, the book suffers from its origins. At the time the Greystone conference was held in 1966, there was very little documentation available on religious dissent. The evidence has since become massive: considerable quantities of religious *samizdat* have reached the West in the last three years, including items that originated in each year back to 1961, so the phenomenon is not excluded by the editors' cut-off date. Yet except for three brief pages at the end of Alexander Bogolepov's chapter, there is scarcely a hint of what has occurred—namely, the emergence of vocal and highly responsible protest groups in the Orthodox and Baptist churches (similar dramatic reactions have of course taken place in the Jewish community, as well as in the Roman Catholic Church, but their later development would explain their omission from the volume). These protest elements have made their case for religious freedom and their proof of the injustice of current Soviet practice known to those who have ears to hear throughout the non-Communist world. Yet, the names of such seminal figures of the last decade as Anatoli Levitin and Georgi Vins are nowhere to be found in the collection under review. Clearly, an additional essay evaluating the phenomenon of religious dissent would have improved the balance and sharpened the impact of the volume.

These limitations are serious, but they do not deter the reviewer from reiterating that several "aspects" of religion in the Soviet Union (to borrow from the title) are superbly treated in the book, and even its less impressive contributions have an objectivity and accuracy that is to be admired—due in part, no doubt, to the rigorous standards demanded by a fine team of editors. To the latter also goes the credit for a very useful appendix of basic legal texts, a good selected bibliography, and a comprehensive index.

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